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

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
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Before Europe loses its nerve, Helmut Kohl and Jacques Chirac should disregard the Maastricht deficit targets and declare monetary union between their countries.

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Many in the West believe the world is moving toward a single, global culture that is basically Western. This belief is arrogant, false, and dangerous. The spread of Western consumer goods is not the spread of Western culture. Drinking Coca-Cola makes a Russian no more Western than eating sushi makes an American Japanese. The essence of the West is the Magna Carta, not the Magna Mac. As

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countries modernize, they may westernize in superficial ways, but not in the most important measures of culture—language, religion, values. In fact, as countries modernize they seek refuge from the modern world in their traditional, parochial cultures and religions. Around the globe, education and democracy are leading to "indigenization." And as the power of the West ebbs, "the rest" will become more and more assertive. For the West to survive as a vibrant and powerful civilization, it must abandon the pretense of universality and close ranks. Its future depends on its unity. The peoples of the West must hang together, or they will hang separately.

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Democracy makes good neighbors, and in an increasingly interconnected world the United States has both the means and the motive to promote the democratic process abroad. On the home front, Americans crave a foreign policy grounded, like their nation, in idealpolitik as well as realpolitik. The administration has made support of nascent democracies a priority of its diplomacy from Latin America to East Asia, and the returns from South Africa, Haiti, Russia, even Bosnia seem positive. But democratization is a long, hard journey in which elections are only the first step. The United States should encourage new democratic governments through their most fragile phase.

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Twice before, America had the opportunity to make the prevention of conflict its first line of defense. It must not lose this moment after the Cold War to foment a revolution in security strategy. Preventing proliferation is key, and U.S. programs help turn Soviet missile sites into sunflower fields. The American armed services, the world's most emulated, show other militaries how to function in a civil society and conduct exchanges that head off misunderstandings. In Europe, George Marshall's fondest hopes are being realized through the Partnership for Peace, which reverberates well beyond the security realm. Meanwhile, the United States leverages forces for maximum deterrence and invests in smart technology. But its best investment is in openness and trust, the essential tools of the art of peace.

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Though a leap to global free trade is a nice idea, the political support is just not there. Nor is any such earthshaking step necessary. The World Trade Organization has an extensive built-in agenda that should not be derailed. Fears of regionalism are greatly exaggerated, since regional trade has not increased much since the early 1970s and current plans for free trade in the Americas and the Pacific are unlikely to succeed. Few countries share the free-trade faith of the United States and Great Britain, and even in those places, economic anxiety threatens to push trade in the other direction.

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Comments

American bankers agree on the correct course for Latin America, but locals should beware.

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The Liquidity Trap

Latin America's Free-Market Past

Michael Pettis

The story is well known in economics lore: A famous academic, one of the world's leading proponents of deregulation and free markets, is invited to Chile, which is in economic trouble. He and his followers propose a series of measures to open the economy, including easing banking restrictions, freeing credit, and eliminating tariffs. Their prescriptions are followed, and, as foreign capital pours in, the Chilean economy booms and becomes a model for the region. Or another version: In Mexico the president turns against the policies that have left the country heavily indebted and starved for domestic investment. He places a group of young foreign-trained economists and engineers in the trade and finance ministries, and they move rapidly to free up key areas of the economy and renegotiate Mexico's external debt. One of the most striking results of their reforms is a dizzying rise in inflows of foreign capital. In both cases foreign politicians, journalists, and bankers praise the reforms for spurring a transformation: from traditional, corporatist economic dogmas and their long history of poverty and economic stagnation to Anglo-Saxon-style competition and free markets.

These may sound like stories of modern Latin America, but both are old. The Chilean example does not refer to the "Chicago boys" of the 1970s and 1980s, nor does the Mexican example describe the Harvard-, Stanford-, and Columbia-trained technocrats whom President Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado pushed forward in the mid-1980s. The foreign expert who so beguiled the Chileans was the French academic Jean Gustave Courcelle-Seneuil, one of Europe's high priests of free-market capitalism, who was invited to Chile from 1855 to 1863 to advise the government. Among other reforms, his followers slashed tariffs in 1864 and even privatized the nitrate mines acquired from Peru in 1882 during the War of the Pacific. The brilliant Mexican technocrats were the *científicos,* a party of idealistic young men who controlled key posts during the administration of President Porfirio Díaz

Michael Pettis is a principal of the Hamilton Arbitrage Fund in New York City and an adjunct associate professor of finance at Columbia University's Graduate School of Business.

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in the 1890s. Under the expert guidance of José Y. Limantour, the sophisticated and forceful finance minister, their policies resulted in huge capital inflows, mostly into mining and railroad ventures, and a dramatic increase in Mexico's exports.

In neither case did the success last. The global crisis that swept through the United States and Latin America in late 1873 devastated Chile. As world commodity prices fell, the Chilean economy collapsed, a disaster exacerbated, according to many historians, by Courcelle-Seneuil's free-market policies. Fairly or unfairly, they argue that changes in the Chilean banking laws led to the failure of the country's currency and the abandonment of convertibility in 1878, that the 1864 tariff reduction brought about the destruction of domestic industry, and that privatization concentrated ownership among a small group of Chileans and foreigners.

In Mexico in the 1890s, the wealth of leading businessmen skyrocketed, workers' wages stagnated, and poverty among farmers and farm workers rose. Local banks had written too many loans to those who were politically connected or who speculated on real estate or securities, and when the international market had a periodic downturn, the banking system collapsed. The crisis following the 1907 global contraction was so severe that even members of the elite turned against Díaz. When the president used the crisis as a partial excuse for reneging on a promise to return to democracy, it threw the country into a period of political instability that ended with the start of more than ten years of revolution and, in 1913, a suspension of payments on the external debt.

The parallels with the recent past are striking. Over the last decade Latin American countries have enacted reforms aimed at deregulation and a lowering of trade barriers that is generally referred to as the Washington Consensus. Bankers claim that, in contrast to this "new" model of economic development, which the bulk of economists and financial journalists have supported, the previous interventionist approaches—supposedly the norm in Latin America—were proved to be failures by the debt crisis of 1982 and the subsequent long-term economic contraction. For example, Mexican Finance Minister Guillermo Ortiz recently argued that "turning the clock back is not an option. Going back to a closed economy or statist policies or trying to spend our way out of the recession have been tried before, in this country and elsewhere, and they haven't worked." Even after the December 1994 peso crisis in Mexico, criticism was directed not at the Washington Consensus but at violations of it.

But it is not just the statist models that have not worked. Latin American countries have long histories of periodic enthusiasms for reforming the economy according to sound academic theory and for importing foreign experts. The most famous of these was the American economist Edwin Kemmerer, the "money doctor," who from the 1890s to the 1920s prescribed market reforms for about a dozen Latin American countries. His recommendations were demolished by the Great Depression and remained out of fashion until they were resurrected in the 1980s.

CAPITAL TIDES

The pattern in Latin America's economic history does not seem to change much. Whenever Latin countries have embarked

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on programs of deregulation and free markets, and commodity prices were high and global liquidity was abundant, the response of the local economy was usually positive and sometimes miraculous. There's the rub: if commodity prices were high and global liquidity was abundant. When these conditions were reversed, the same countries that eagerly embraced sound economic theory found themselves devastated by economic contractions and defaulted on the foreign loans that had financed the expansion. All Latin American booms have had in common the conditions of excess global liquidity resulting in capital inflows, and high or stable commodity prices. Whether the regime was pro-market or interventionist seems to have mattered less.

While economists identify reforms as the chief determinant of economic success, history suggests a wider set of forces. In the 1860s a Latin American lending boom occurred when English and French capital poured into a wide variety of risky foreign investments, including shady railroad stock and the bonds of an effectively bankrupt khedive of Egypt. Another occurred in the 1880s, when the passion for investment included Ponzi schemes and Florida swamps. In the 1920s, the liquidity generated by German reparations payments and the Federal Reserve's 1927 easing of U.S. monetary conditions to help the British return to the gold standard helped spur both a Wall Street stock market rally and the huge capital inflows of the Latin American "dance of the millions." Forty years later the lending wave to less-developed countries took place because commercial banks were eager to recycle the vast petrodollar flow. It collapsed at the end of the decade, just as previous booms had collapsed during global monetary contractions, this time with the sharp contraction engineered during the Carter administration.

Why do these booms occur? Probably because in times of great liquidity, investors' tolerance for risk grows enormously and high-risk projects with high expected returns are flooded with capital. When these projects are in poorer countries, the capital influx can easily set off a self-fulfilling local boom. Latin America is growing, but over the past five years it has had a large capital inflow—it took in $201 billion of private capital in 1995 alone and $182 billion the year before.

This history suggests that when large amounts of capital flow into Latin America, the result is an investment boom that causes a spurt of economic growth—growth, however, that has never been sustainable. It may suggest further that bankers are naive to assume that a combination of a new market orientation among the political elite, reducing market barriers and failures, and increased credibility will pull these countries out of the cycle of poverty and underdevelopment. Only wider political participation can broaden the benefits of growth and, when the next liquidity crisis comes, prevent popular backlash and default on the debt. Nor should some divergence from the Washington Consensus be regarded as backsliding.

NO SAVING GRACE

The bankers who tout the current round of reforms as a real break with the past usually argue that they will result in higher domestic savings rates in Latin America. Once the savings at home are sufficient to replace foreign investment,

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the argument goes, the region's economies will be uncoupled from international capital and able to achieve the growth rates of the Asian tigers. But there is a problem here too. The growth in the savings rate is not uniform among these nations, nor is it sustainable. Furthermore, increased savings may be an effect, not a cause, of improved economic performance, and they could dry up in a significant economic downturn.

Most important, since free capital flows are part of the Washington Consensus package, it is not clear that higher domestic savings rates will always result in greater domestic investment. High savings, generally produced by savvy upper and upper-middle classes, can fuel capital flight. Preliminary work by Michael Adler, a finance professor at Columbia University, suggests that domestic investment in Argentina has a closer correlation to foreign capital inflows than to the national savings rate. Argentine savings tend to accumulate in offshore accounts and behave like foreign hot money. If Adler is right, then domestic savings, rather than cushioning domestic investment from the volatility of international capital flows, may actually exacerbate volatility. Attempts to force savings into strictly regulated pension funds will not necessarily solve the problem, since in times of trouble local governments often treat pools of domestic savings as piggy banks available for purposes other than prudent investments.

Confidence in the Washington Consensus might be merited if the growth spurts in Latin America had occurred only when local governments were experimenting with free-market philosophies, and not during what Sebastian Edwards, one of the theorists of the new consensus, describes as periods of "heavy state interventionism, inward orientation, and disregard for macroeconomic balance." These cases are usually defined to include the import substitution of the 1960s and 1970s, Brazil in the 1930s and 1960s, the early American Popular Revolutionary Alliance in Peru in the late 1950s, and Argentina under Juan Peron (1946-55 and 1973-74). Even these regimes have experienced intervals of rapid growth before breaking down. Brazil, two years after the 1964 military coup that brought with it a

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nationalist and corporatist ideology, began a period of extraordinary growth celebrated as the "Brazilian miracle." Mexico during much of the reign of José López Portillo in the 1970s posted impressive economic numbers when it tried the now-discredited import substitution model. But, like the free-market regimes, these alternatives invariably produced disappointing results.

THE WESTERN MODEL

The point is not that that economic policy does not matter or that there is no hope for economic success in Latin America. Rather it is that the current reforms are not at all new and that historically they have not led to sustainable economic growth. Long-term growth may have more to do with political maturation and democracy. Ironically, the democratizing goals of President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Léon may do more for Mexico's economic prospects than will the determination of his predecessor, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, to open the economy. This is a much-argued point, since in the short term the correlation between democracy and rapid growth may not be very strong. But the fact remains that the only countries that have achieved sustained economic growth are those in which political power and participation are widely distributed.

In Latin America, opening the economy and keeping money sound has too often increased the value of assets at the expense of real wages, coupled with promises of future relief once the economy takes off. But without robust mechanisms for sharing power and economic benefits, all previous bouts of liberal economic reform have run up against popular opposition that led to the reversal of reforms. During the bursts of rapid growth attributable to large capital inflows, as the dominant groups grab a disproportionate share of the benefits, the rest of the country cannot absorb the inevitable external shocks—a capital shortage or collapse of commodities prices. The middle and lower-middle classes that suddenly emerge during boom periods lose everything in the bust. Given these groups' subsequent antipathy to the economic regime and the unwillingness of the local elites to share power, it is not surprising that the prevailing economic system is almost never able to outlive a major external shock.

If free markets have not worked in the past, how should Latin American policymakers proceed? The nineteenth-century United States is often held up as an economic model for Latin America, but its backers depict a mythical country of laissez-faire capitalism, orthodox monetary policies, and free trade, whose citizens naturally gravitated toward sectors where productivity growth was fastest. This picture leaves out the government's important role in promoting manufacturing, digging canals, subsidizing nearly all the railroads, and, above all, protecting domestic manufacturers from competition with the much more productive English. Of all major countries in the second half of the nineteenth century, the United States was the least open to international trade. In fact, one of the most important causes of the Civil War was the trade policy conflict between the free-trading South, which was content to export commodities and import manufactured goods, and the protectionist North, which was determined to promote domestic manufacturing.

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Perhaps Latin American policymakers should study the efforts of the brilliant eighteenth-century Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton to convert the United States, a nation of squabbling farmers and corrupt politicians, into a major economic force. Under the Hamiltonian system, sustainable growth was the result of a pragmatic and unorthodox combination of a reasonably focused infant-industry policy, protection of high-productivity growth areas of the economy, fairly intense domestic competition, and free capital flows. Like Latin America more recently, the United States in the nineteenth century suffered severe economic fluctuations tied to changes in global liquidity, but these took place in a nation where political power was widely shared and where populist movements were regularly able to capture power democratically and seize a portion of the economic benefits.

Since the benefits of the recent growth in Latin America have not been widely distributed, international bankers should not insist on a rigorous, even zealous, free-market orthodoxy that imposes a burden on the poor. Bankers continue to argue that such reforms will bring long-term growth and are too willing to tolerate income inequality in the near term. Without real popular political participation, economic growth has rarely helped the poor. Global liquidity will inevitably contract again—perhaps in this decade—and if the past is any indicator, Latin American economies will suffer disproportionately. Without popular support, currently fashionable reforms will not survive.

Latin America's historical record is bleak, and it is difficult to be optimistic about the region's prospects, but given the strong will there and in the United States to see economic success south of the border, it would be tragic if the current period proved just one more failed attempt at catch-up. World markets are going through another cycle of abundant liquidity, and funds will continue to flow into the emerging markets for many more years, leading to bursts of growth in many parts of Latin America. It would be foolish, however, to confuse this growth with the success of the Washington Consensus. Bankers generally agree on the correct course for Latin America, but local authorities should not put too much faith in their advice.

A Global Ethic
The Leadership Challenge



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The Case for Regulating Financial Markets

Will Hutton

Across all classes and in all countries in the West, people feel a growing sense of being at risk. The shape of this "risk shock" varies, obviously, given the wide variety of welfare and employment structures among these countries, but the phenomenon emerges everywhere in one form or another. There is a process of marginalization and social exclusion in train that is reproducing some of the worst features of the nineteenth century in terms of both inequality and poverty. The United States has had rising income inequality since the early 1970s, and in Western Europe structural unemployment has forced a reconsideration of some aspects of the welfare state. All Western nations have suffered from a slowdown in growth. There have therefore been calls for an activist response—both for more international policy coordination and for increased spending on education and worker training at home.

This approach is rooted in a proper concern for the dangerous social potential of current trends and represents an effort to face up to the problems. Yet while it is ambitious, in some respects it would not be ambitious enough. For what is driving the current process is now intrinsic to capitalism, and its solution requires something more dramatic. That is not to argue for old-fashioned, unworkable attempts at central planning and government ownership, but it is to insist that the economics of Keynes be revisited and updated in contemporary conditions. Western countries must attack the forces driving the current world economic order rather than simply manage their consequences.

The answer is not protectionism; in some respects aggressive free trade is good. Busy sea-lanes and teeming ports are the handmaidens of prosperity for all, not its enemies, although in some sectors, international competition causes profound dislocation, and part of the downward pressure on wages of unskilled workers is explicable in these terms. But there are areas of the international economy that do require active supervision and control. Regulations must be put in place to slow international financial transactions and reduce their destabilizing effects. International trade and investment grow best during a careful process of long-term

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planning and prediction. Uncertainty such as the current turbulence in the enormous currency markets and the high interest rates they cause are anathema to costly investment. Moreover, those same markets swiftly punish efforts to reduce the resulting unemployment and its attendant protectionist pressures through expansionary fiscal policy.[1]

Recasting the world financial system is therefore absolutely central to any program for relaunching Western economies on a rapid growth trajectory. The freedoms celebrated by the extraordinarily well-paid denizens of the international dealing rooms now threaten the capacity of the world to sustain a free trade regime and promote economic growth. Here, not in free trade, lies the cause of current high levels of European unemployment.

THE REAL CAUSE OF THE DEPRESSION

We have embraced one lesson from the 1930s—the malign impact of protectionism—but discarded the other, the case for regulated currency markets. The case against protectionism is well known. The instant one country, especially a major trading country, interrupts the flow of trade, it breaks a link in the delicate chain holding the trade order together. With trade interrupted, some countries can no longer obtain the foreign currency required to finance their own trade and service their debt. That threatens the viability of banks, which pull back on credit to their own economies and write off poorly performing loans. That in turn triggers a fresh round of production cuts, employment losses, and protectionist measures. Depression becomes global. This, loosely, is what happened in the early 1930s. American tariffs, undertaken in response to social dislocation, provoked the Latin American states to default on their debt, intensifying the crisis in the U.S. financial system and causing the huge credit contraction that brought on the American depression, which then had repercussions in Europe.

In the 1990s these developments are barely remembered, but at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 they were all too vivid. Delegates shared the view that, whatever else, protection had to be avoided. Financial markets must never be so insistent that a country uphold its currency that unemployment—which had led to protectionism in the United States—would have to be endured. An international financial system that would act as a shock absorber for economic surprises—rather than, as in the 1930s, a trampoline—was crucial. The system of international exchange rates needed to be under the control of governments and actively managed such that instead of diminishing trade flows it would become the instrument of adjustment. Although exchange rates would be pegged, rather than left up to free-wheeling arbitrageurs, as under the gold standard, adjustment would be smoothed by the International Monetary Fund. Finance was never again to be king; free trade and employment were to come first. This system remained in place until the early 1970s, when it unraveled amid American trade deficits and inflation, following U.S. expansionary fiscal policy of the late 1960s.

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[1] Paul Volcker, former chairman of the Federal Reserve, has made a similar proposal, "Toward Monetary Stability," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 24, 1996, p. A12.

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DETHRONING CAPITAL

Today that lesson has been forgotten, and the world has once again invented an international financial system that is a source of economic instability. Free movement of capital and floating exchange rates prevent countries from pursuing expansionary economic policies. Although the financial markets may deplore France's approach to curbing unemployment, for example, the country's decision on how to organize itself socially and economically should be its own. But as matters stand, the French feel they have no choice. The financial markets will sell the franc and impose high interest rates if France tries to expand unilaterally. But if it tries to sidestep the markets by adopting a single European currency, that too implies running the economy at high levels of unemployment to meet the economic criteria set by Germany, a country with a wholly different institutional configuration. The situation is unstable, and it is unlikely that President Jacques Chirac will finish his term before there is a more violent political reaction to the strains in France.

The freedom of capital and floating exchange rates are justified by an appeal to the same theory that apparently underpins free trade. If there is a free market in world production, why should there not be a free market in world financial capital? And why is it wrong for prices to determine the allocation of financial assets if prices may determine the allocation of productive assets? The answer lies in the old Keynesian argument about the mismatch and tension between the time horizons of producers and financiers. Producers are driven by expectations of future sales, which they take into account when considering the costs of capital. Financiers, trading in the most liquid of assets, have much shorter time horizons. They set out to establish a network of short-term contracts that can be immediately unraveled in the financial markets as their assessment of risk changes.

When times are good, optimism disguises the short-term nature of their commitment and the flimsiness of the valuations that producers of real goods and services use to judge capital costs and make investment and production decisions. When times are bad, the asymmetries become clear. Financiers sell, asset prices fall, and capital flows fall off—and suddenly producers must make painful and unexpected adjustments. As they learn that they run this risk, they become averse to investment, and would rather run their firms at lower capacity with smaller core labor forces than build up capacity and payrolls that might prove unwarranted.

Mexico is a classic example. It financed its growth with short-term dollar investments from American mutual funds, which closed the gap between imports and exports. All went well when the financial markets were bullish, but when sentiment turned sour at the end of 1994, the value of Mexican assets collapsed, and the investment around which Mexico had constructed its growth evaporated. To restore confidence, Mexico had to slash public expenditures, with a real impact on living standards, and obtain a gigantic support package from the International Monetary Fund and the U.S. government.

Some argue that Mexico needed to make this adjustment. Arguably it did, but now it must do so over a matter of

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months rather than years. Mutual funds could turn off the tap in December 1994 and reopen it in the autumn of 1995 with comparatively little pain. After all, they were simply riding short-term changes in the value of financial assets. But the Mexican economy and society cannot make adjustments of this magnitude so quickly, at least not without setting off powerful forces insisting that there must be better ways of organizing the economy. In less than a year Mexican GDP has contracted by more than five percent, and unemployment has nearly doubled. If it is important to earn foreign currency to service Mexican debts, ask siren voices in the country, why not simply limit Mexican imports? As in the early 1930s, the excessive power of unregulated finance compels countries to examine whether limiting trade is a better option.

WORLDWIDE ADJUSTMENT

Countries with stronger economies are finding themselves asking similar questions. France, fearing the veto of the financial markets, which wrecked its expansionary plans in the early 1980s, has worked for ten years to become sterner than the Germans about price stability. It wants to protect itself behind a single currency, merging the franc with the mark. But the transition costs are vast, even if they are exacerbated by—as the financial markets describe it—"excessive social charges" for French industry. As unemployment mounts, France may choose to protect its society not by looking to a European single currency, but by erecting tariffs and setting quotas.

The problem is not limited to France and Mexico. The conventional explanation for high European unemployment is that it results from heavy social charges and excessive labor market regulation. But these costs are a result, not a cause, of slow growth, which in turn is due to low investment. What is striking is the lack of correlation between social spending and unemployment. Danish social charges, for example, are among the highest in Europe, and trade unions are strong, but unemployment is around the European average. What is truer is that as growth has slowed, welfare spending has grown, creating higher budget deficits and narrowing the scope for an expansionary fiscal boost. Social security spending is a link in the chain of causation, but it is preceded by the growth slowdown.

Slow growth in turn is closely linked to the decline in investment spending across the continent. Paradoxically, the more the financial markets have internationalized and thus enlarged the pool of savings, the more real interest rates have risen. Capital mobility has empowered bondholders relative to national governments, enabling them to exact high real interest rates as the price for maintaining bond purchases, particularly in Europe, where markets benchmark all European interest rates against those in Germany, taking its inflation outlook into account. Bondholders prefer short-term assets, thus shortening time horizons even more. The combination of high short-term real interest rates and more short-termism has deterred investment; that has lowered growth rates, which sets in train the whole vicious circle and associated trade tensions.

While the financial markets deal in a homogeneous asset—money—that can be traded instantly in a series of immediately renegotiable contracts, trade patterns

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originate in the very heterogeneity of countries and their different cost structures. These cannot and should not be made to conform to one standard, and adjustments can never be made as quickly as in the financial markets.

SLOWING THE FLOW

The solution to the conundrum of rekindling world growth while preserving free trade is regulating the financial markets so that their speed is slowed and their power reduced. Countries must recover the power to regulate capital flows and to manage exchange rates; finance must be compelled to behave in a more considered, long-term fashion.

The heart of a new financial order is maintaining stability in the value of the dollar, yen, and mark. The governments that issue these currencies must accept that monetary and fiscal policy need to be closely coordinated, and that differential incentives to save and consume, which so upset the relationship between the high-consuming United States and high-saving Japan, must be gradually harmonized. This means, for example, higher gasoline taxes in the United States and more deregulation in Japan. The policy of American benign neglect of the dollar must end; indeed, one objective of European monetary union and the launch of the euro is to challenge the hegemony of the dollar so that American authorities will be forced to take their international responsibilities more seriously.

This triangular currency relationship needs to become the core of a new Bretton Woods system of bracketed but flexible exchange rates, protected against excessive speculative currency flows by some form of turnover tax on financial transactions. The limits on all forms of derivative trading need to be tightened, so that banks will have to charge higher fees for what are essentially speculative financial assets. Capital controls should be introduced where necessary. Such a financial order would ultimately mean lower real interest rates, longer time horizons, less financial speculation, and more real investment and growth.

Is this possible? The tools have existed before, and they can be reinvented, given the political will, the economic conviction, and the international structures in which such action can be taken. If it is not done now, it will be done later, after countries have fallen back on protectionism and discovered that its costs are too heavy to bear. The villain is free finance, not free trade, and if the world went after the right quarry, it could save itself much grief.

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NATO and the Have-Nots

Reassurance After Enlargement

Ronald D. Asmus and F. Stephen Larrabee

The Atlantic alliance stands at the threshold of a historic decision to open itself to the new democracies of Eastern Europe. The NATO enlargement debate has focused on the question of which countries should be offered membership in the first round. Yet equally important is how the alliance deals with countries left out in that round—the so-called have-nots. Those countries have read the writing on the wall, and it makes them uneasy. They are pressing for assurances that the enlargement process will eventually include them. If they feel shut out, a destabilizing backlash could materialize, undercutting support for reform and strengthening nationalist forces within these countries. At the same time, Russia is seeking to keep the door closed. If the enlargement of NATO cannot be stopped, Moscow would like to ensure that the first new members are the last.

Before the alliance can move forward with enlargement, it must formulate a strategy toward the have-nots. This is a true test of NATO's ultimate intentions; if the talk of an open door is to be more than empty rhetoric, such a strategy would make the pledge credible. Since the debate began in 1993, very different views on the scope and pace of enlargement have coexisted within and among NATO members. Although there is a consensus on extending membership to a handful of select countries in the first round, the alliance's enlargement study, completed last year, established some broad guidelines but papered over disagreement on who should be in and how to handle those left out. Now that the process is moving from declarations of intent to action, members must forge a clear policy toward the have-nots if NATO is to achieve its post–Cold War goal of security integration and cooperation in Europe.

NATO'S THREE-WAY DIVIDE

The alliance is split three ways on how far enlargement should go and how to get there. The first group wants an open door policy based on self-differentiation: countries' aspirations and their ability to meet the standards the alliance sets for new members would determine enlargement's extent and pace. Enlargement,

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proponents of this stance declare, is the cornerstone of a new security architecture in Europe—one open in principle to all participants in NATO's Partnership for Peace, the U.S.-proposed program of military cooperation that more than two dozen countries, including former Soviet republics and long-neutral European states, have joined since early 1994. NATO, therefore, must not impose its preferences in enlargement, and should refrain from preselecting candidates or denying other countries the right to seek membership. To be sure, one of the hurdles candidates face is obtaining the support of all 16 NATO members in the vote on accession. Nevertheless, the political message is that the door is open—at least in theory—to all PFP partners and that it is up to would-be members to establish the speed and extent of their transition to full NATO membership.

This approach is the official policy of the Clinton administration. Washington does not want the benefits of security integration and cooperation limited to a handful of countries. Moreover, it sees self-differentiation as the best way for NATO to avoid an internecine fight over whose favorite candidate makes or misses the short list. The strategy also leaves the door open to both Ukraine and Russia, mitigating their sense of isolation from the West and, the administration hopes, softening Moscow's opposition to enlargement.

Opponents insist that the approach would prevent NATO from keeping the enlargement process consistent with its own priorities. How would the alliance ensure that the right countries got in and the wrong ones didn't? The strategy, critics say, would also raise expectations among aspiring countries that the alliance could not fulfill. Moreover, there is the so-called "numbers problem." Irrespective of the merits of the candidacies of individual countries, NATO could end up enlarging to the point where it became another overlarge, toothless Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

A second approach to enlargement can be termed parallel expansion. It holds that the list of NATO candidates should be the same as the list of current and potential members of the European Union. NATO enlargement, proponents declare, is part of the process of unifying the continent to produce a single Europe "whole and free." Proponents insist that the list of EU candidates covers what the majority of Europeans consider "Europe" and excludes countries, like Ukraine and Russia, that are not, at least not in the same way, and which they do not want as full members in such core institutions in any case. The approach would not require EU members to join NATO, but current and potential EU members would have a de facto right to seek NATO membership. Having acquiesced to the EU's enlargement, the thinking runs, Moscow will find it more difficult to fight NATO membership for such countries if enlargement is portrayed as the logical extension of European integration led by the EU.

Many in Europe support parallel expansion, including leaders of NATO members, Eastern European countries, and the Baltic states. The approach has been rejected, however, by the United States and some European countries, which do not want to openly exclude states like Ukraine and Russia or fear that the strat-

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egy might allow the EU to dictate NATO policy. Finally, parallel expansion, like an open door policy, comes up against the question of how big is too big for NATO. The EU, which is already experiencing decision-making difficulties with increased membership, is eventually expected to include 25 or so countries. Would an alliance that size lose its strategic direction and suffer from the same lack of cohesion the EU now faces?

A third view holds that NATO should limit enlargement to a few countries, based on strategic criteria, and then cap the process. NATO's assessment of its own strategic interests, rather than the broader vision of Europe's future or an EU list, would determine what countries are or are not candidates. Proponents believe in granting membership to only a handful of countries in east-central Europe deemed crucial for geopolitical reasons—for instance, Poland, the Czech Republic, and perhaps Hungary. Most NATO countries, they insist, do not have vital interests in the Balkans or the Baltic states and should not be expected to offer security guarantees there.

Proponents of capping argue that admitting a few select countries to NATO is worth the risk but that the costs and hazards of further enlargement rise while potential benefits to core Western interests dwindle. Whereas Moscow may acquiesce to a limited enlargement to east-central Europe, they argue, it will regard an open-ended approach as "rolling encirclement," leading to protracted confrontation between Russia and NATO. Capping is thus both the only way to keep from overburdening the alliance with new commitments and destroying its cohesion and the best strategy for minimizing conflict with Russia over enlargement. While no NATO member officially articulates this view, it has considerable support behind the scenes.

Opponents declare that enlargement to only a handful of states would be politically impossible to justify, could destabilize rejected countries, and in moral terms would amount to a "new Yalta." The approach could also divide the alliance as members jockeyed to advance their favorite candidates. Moreover, it would run counter to the rhetoric the alliance has employed up to now when making the case for enlargement.

THE BRIDGE BEFORE ENLARGEMENT

NATO is not going to resolve these differences in the near future. It will have to live with them and try to bridge the divide. The objective must be to achieve convergence on tactics for dealing with the have-nots in the short term while accepting divergence in longer-term strategic views.

One possibility is a tacit alliance between proponents of a cap on enlargement and proponents of an open door based on self-differentiation. While at first glance the two camps appear diametrically opposed, they share a desire not to alienate Russia. Moreover, some who profess support for an open door actually favor a very long pause after the first round of enlargement; for them, the rhetoric of self-differentiation is political cover. Russia may discreetly back this unholy alliance. Some in NATO would see it as an elegant way of sidestepping both a fight with Moscow and internal divisions. While officially open, the door would be closed for the foreseeable future.

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Such a disingenuous strategy, however, could result in the worst of both worlds. By raising Eastern Europeans' expectations while offering little if any real prospect of their fulfillment, it would spawn a running guessing game about the alliance's intentions—hardly a recipe for maintaining either NATO's credibility or regional stability. Unscrupulous powers have misled and lied to Eastern Europeans too often in the region's tumultuous history. As the alliance of Western democracies, NATO must do better.

More constructive is a potential compromise between the proponents of self-differentiation and those supporting parallelism between NATO and EU membership. Those two groups disagree on several key issues, particularly whether the door should be left ajar for Ukraine and Russia, but their lists of future candidates are similar. Moreover, NATO has already acknowledged a loose link between EU and NATO membership, in the 1995 enlargement study. The two schools should thus be able to agree on a common tactical approach.

Two elements could create a narrow band of common ground on which a consensus on enlargement could be built: an "open door" proclamation affirming that the first new NATO members will not be the last, without naming next-round candidates; and a recognition of the self-differentiation that has already taken place among NATO aspirants not included in the first round. The alliance could recognize countries that have formally declared their intention to join the alliance, have achieved real progress in meeting the criteria and goals laid out in the enlargement study, and have sufficiently demonstrated their commitment through participation in the Partnership for Peace. Those countries would be placed in a special category that could be termed "recognized aspirants"—a category of their own making, not NATO's. The category would remain open to other countries that might, down the road, opt to seek NATO membership by meeting the same standards.

NATO could sign "Atlantic Agreements" with the recognized aspirants to parallel the Euro-Agreements many of them already have with the EU. These agreements would not preselect candidates but would recognize the aspiration to join NATO, the progress made toward membership, and the alliance's willingness to further deepen its cooperation with these countries as it opens its door to other new members. Or the alliance could simply upgrade its dialogue and dealings with the recognized aspirants. Either course would allow for more meaningful consultations between NATO and these countries.

NATO should make its intentions plain, but it should also openly acknowledge that enlargement is a political process with no watertight guarantees. Enlargement will not proceed automatically. It will start with countries for which the consensus for membership is strongest, both within the candidate state and among NATO members. If a country does not have the 16 votes, it will not get in.

The alliance must present a vision for its future, establish steppingstones that are as well-defined and open to scrutiny as possible, and provide tangible cooperation and integration to keep aspiring countries on the right track. The recognized aspirant strategy does just that. It

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

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

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

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would clear the way for creative diplomacy to begin addressing the political concerns of the have-nots.

EASTERN EUROPEAN FEARS

The primary objective of a NATO strategy toward the have-nots is prevention of a destabilizing backlash in those countries seeking membership but not included in enlargement's first round. What are the potential have-nots worried about? Many of the countries unlikely to be in the first wave of new NATO members are also unlikely to make the first round of EU enlargement, now looking like a longer wait than previously expected—a double whammy of exclusion. In addition, they fear that the cooperation under the Partnership for Peace process will be weakened when the most active partners join NATO or are placed on a fast track for membership. All the alliance's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, this development could turn the have-nots into a new buffer zone between East and West. Fears of such an eventuality feed on Moscow's obvious desire to cap enlargement and the knowledge that some in the alliance may not be entirely opposed to the idea.

The risk for the long term is that if NATO does not extend its security umbrella to all of Eastern Europe and the Baltic states, the destructive nationalism and geopolitical maneuvering that made the region so unstable in the past could be rekindled. But in the short run the danger is less that the have-nots will be driven to an agonizing reappraisal of their basic strategic choice for the West than that the impetus for reform and integration will simply lose steam. That may well happen if elites and ordinary people in these countries conclude that

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the chances of joining the West are remote and the sacrifices required too great.

For all those reasons, aspiring countries want the firmest possible promises that the door will remain open and that they will eventually get through it. If they cannot have guarantees, they want explicit signals that will reassure them and their people that they are on the right track and success is only a matter of time and hard work. NATO, however, cannot nonchalantly make such guarantees, nor should it pretend it can. Certain countries' internal problems or location in dangerous neighborhoods make some NATO members nervous, hindering the states' candidacies. The way out is for NATO to provide long-term perspective and for those countries to address their weaknesses and, whenever possible, clean up their regional neighborhoods so as to help overcome Western reticence and contribute to building the Western coalition in support of their eventual membership.

CREATING STRATEGIC HOMES

Defining the future steps in the enlargement process is only part of the answer to the problem of the have-nots. The other key is NATO's reorganization of the Partnership for Peace to expand defense integration and cooperation not only to new members but to countries not included in the first round. Internal reforms at NATO begun after the end of the Cold War have already created the tools for doing so. Changes in defense planning and command structures, along with reforms that allow the alliance to better plan for missions beyond its borders, present new opportunities for countries in the Partnership for Peace to build contacts not only in Brussels but at the regional level. They also allow the countries to participate more fully in preparations for missions beyond NATO's borders even before becoming full members of the alliance.

The alliance must employ these tools to create "strategic homes" in its new post–Cold War structure for Partnership for Peace members. The trend in NATO reform has been to retool the alliance to handle regional crises on and outside its borders, as opposed to deterring a theater-wide Soviet threat. Planners should conceive of NATO enlargement, too, in a regional setting, with three subregions, each calling for a specifically tailored political and military strategy.

Enlargement to east-central Europe involves Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and, potentially, Slovakia or Slovenia. Of the areas NATO is considering, this is the most important strategic neighborhood; alliance members agree that vital interests are at stake there. With the exception of Slovakia, this subregion's countries have all clearly indicated their intent to join NATO, have backed up the commitment in real terms, and suffer from few of the internal weaknesses or regional problems that hamper others' prospects.

Enlargement to northeastern Europe would potentially include the Baltic states and perhaps Finland and Sweden if they eventually sought membership. While Finland and Sweden are solid democracies with modest but modern military capabilities, they are still rethinking their attitude toward the alliance and are likely to sit out the first round of enlargement. Membership for the Baltic states remains controversial.

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Enlargement to southeastern Europe would involve Romania and possibly, at some point, Bulgaria. Support for enlargement to that subregion is weakest, given the lack of strong lobbying by major NATO allies, the fact that political and economic reform in Romania and Bulgaria lags behind that in the two other subregions, and many NATO governments' aversion to becoming more deeply involved in the Balkans.

By matching the alliance members most interested in pursuing each of these enlargement components with the appropriate regional command structure and the corresponding Partnership for Peace countries, NATO can construct strategic homes where new members as well as have-nots build a relationship with the alliance. Ideally, potential members would link up with a NATO command that would be their presumed strategic home if and when they joined the alliance. That would allow Partnership for Peace participants to cement ties at the regional level that could further their political case for accession as well as to build military ties with allies that would presumably play a key role in carrying out new security commitments if and when such commitments are extended.

Such thinking is beginning to be applied in northeastern Europe. NATO members such as Denmark and Germany have, with U.S. support, started to build various forms of regional military cooperation bringing together Poland, which is likely to become a new NATO member; the Baltic states, which eagerly seek membership but whose prospects remain uncertain; and such former neutrals as Finland and Sweden, while leaving room for Russia to join in such cooperation if it chooses. This is a very specific example of NATO managing a strategy on the have-nots issue while keeping the enlargement door open. It creates a strategic home through a new regional command for northeastern Europe where countries would fit in if and when they acceded to the alliance. This command would be responsible for security in the region as a whole, not only at NATO's borders. Now the alliance needs to think about how to implement this model and apply it to the enlargement process on a broader scale. NATO must also increasingly involve have-nots in preparations for new missions, which are likely to be central to the alliance's future.

None of this would supplant NATO efforts run from Brussels or Mons. In addition, Partnership for Peace countries not currently seeking NATO membership, above all Ukraine and Russia, would have the opportunity to define their evolving relationship with NATO not only through traditional structures but also through NATO's decentralized, regionally focused command structure.

A FINE LINE

Recent statements by Russian officials suggest that Moscow may have accepted the idea that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic will enter NATO. However, as the alliance moves closer to naming names, Russia is likely to attempt to prevent a second round of enlargement. Thus both the have-nots and Moscow will try, in their different ways, to force NATO's hand and win the assurances they seek. The alliance must have its priorities straight, and stick to them.

In doing so, it will have to walk a fine line between keeping open the possibility

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of further enlargement and addressing legitimate Russian security concerns. The way to accommodate Russia is not for NATO to undercut its principles and offer to compromise on who is in and who is not. Instead, NATO must go the extra mile and offer Russia its own, more attractive relationship with the alliance.

The compromise strategy suggested in this article provides a way to manage the dilemma without ceding to Russia a real or shadow veto over enlargement. It meets the minimum demand of the have-nots—an open door plus some form of differentiation from Russia and other countries that do not aspire to NATO membership—while not discriminating down the line against current non-aspirants. Overall, it lends credibility to the West's open door policy.

As action on enlargement draws near, NATO must lay out a vision for its new security structure in Europe, establish clear steps toward that goal, and reassure countries that may feel threatened or abandoned by the process, while retaining needed flexibility for the alliance. The solution recommended here does all that.

Developing a strategy toward the have-nots is far from a side issue in the NATO enlargement debate; it is front and center. Over the next few years there will be no more visible barometer of the alliance's true priorities and leadership—or lack thereof.

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Keeping Monetary Union On Track

Time for Another 'Kohl Shock'

Richard Medley

Despite the aura of relaxed confidence pervading European capitals and financial markets as next year's deadline for meeting the convergence criteria for European monetary union approaches, the lines for a politically divisive battle are becoming clear. On one side stand German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, French President Jacques Chirac, the European Commission, and the vast majority of senior European politicians, who care far more about making European monetary union (EMU) happen on time than about how they get there. They worry that if monetary union is delayed once, it could be delayed more easily a second time, and a third, and so on until the great postwar drive for European union—and the Franco-German alliance at its center—fizzles out. On the other side stands the German "stability coalition," composed of the Bundesbank, the Federal Constitutional Court, such popular German tabloids as *Bild Zeitung,* and opposition-controlled power centers in the Bundesrat, or upper house of parliament, and *Länder* governments. If Kohl and company worry that any delay would threaten European union, the stability coalition worries that rushing into EMU might cost Germany its sway over European economic policy, with control passing to a broad coalition of economically weaker southern European countries, led by a resurgent France.

German voters' opposition to giving up the deutsche mark buttresses the stability coalition, with most polls showing three-to-one majorities opposed to putting euros in their pockets.[1] Only a constitutional provision against referendums (to prevent a recurrence of the Weimar experience) and the tremendous confidence voters have in Kohl have allowed the chancellor to get this far with monetary union despite those odds. But Kohl faces a personal referendum on this issue in December 1998, when he must

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stand for reelection. That means he will be going to the polls only weeks before formally—and irrevocably—handing over the deutsche mark to a gaggle of Europeans on January 1, 1999. If he condones flagrant cheating by French budgeteers, or too obviously looks the other way if France misses the deficit targets of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union by a wide margin, he risks turning the election into a referendum on giving away the deutsche mark. With that as the central question of the campaign, even the spavined Social Democrats could not be counted out entirely.

The most important threat to Kohl and thus to the EMU process comes not from bending the deficit or accounting rules for France but from the attempts it would trigger from Spain, Portugal, and eventually even Italy—sometimes referred to as the "Club Med" countries—to use the same bent rules as a way of clambering into EMU in the first round. That is why German officials protested in September when France included in next year's revenues the windfall gain from taking over France Telecom's pension system. Depending on how far the accounting conventions are bent for France, Spain and Portugal could breeze into EMU with room to spare. In the worst case, from the stability coalition's point of view, bending the rules for France would put the European Union (EU) on a slippery slope, with each country demanding just a slightly looser interpretation of Maastricht. As the requirements of being a good German and a good European came into direct conflict, Kohl would quickly find himself in a political and financial tangle he has tried hard to avoid during his 14 years in office.

Not for a moment would the stability coalition tolerate a drift toward both wider membership and looser criteria. Reimut Jochimsen, a senior member of the Bundesbank's Central Bank Council, which sets monetary policy, has publicly fired a warning shot, saying that if southern-tier countries with "the will, but not the means" to meet EMU criteria are let into the system, interest rates in Europe would rise, thereby hinting at a financial crisis. Students of the 1992 European currency crises will remember that Jochimsen issued a similar early warning to Britain and Italy before they were swept out of the European Monetary System.

Opposition to early membership by southern-tier countries is in part a matter of anti-southern bias, but for German voters and their representatives in the stability coalition it is also a matter of fiscal prudence. As mid-May hearings in the Bundestag brought out, if Club Med countries entered EMU in the first round, massive new expenditures from the EU "cohesion fund" would be required to ensure that the less-developed economies could afford the austerity politics of Germany and France. The fact is that the northern countries could ill afford the combination of their own austerity

[1]On the high side is a May 1996 Forsa poll showing that 84 percent of voters wanted EMU to be delayed or scrapped; in between are the Louis Harris poll for *The Independent* and the Election Research poll, both of June 19, 1996, which showed 67 percent opposed to EMU and 29 percent in favor. The narrowest margin, found in an Emnid poll for *Der Spiegel* the week of June 24, 1996, was 52 percent opposed and 40 percent in favor.

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programs and new spending for the cohesion fund. The inflationary bias of these new expenditures and the political problems of cutting domestic spending while paying out huge new sums to other countries make wider membership in EMU a possibility that Germany's stability coalition will seek to block at all costs.

Blocking or delaying monetary union is well within the reach of disgruntled stability coalition members if they choose to use their influence over financial markets. Since traders have bought into the notion that EMU will happen, they are more vulnerable to any sign of danger. Loaded with European bonds, stocks, and currencies, fund managers around the world need only a hint of trouble before they stampede for the exits. A word of protest from the Bundesbank, the European Monetary Institute, or the German Federal Constitutional Court would be enough. Reality always makes a belated—and sometimes violent—appearance in European politics, and it will be no different this time.

Fortunately, there is a way for Kohl and Chirac to avoid this nasty dilemma while the market gods are still smiling on them. They should forge ahead by declaring a mini-EMU between France and Germany and not risk devastating their economies in a fruitless attempt to hit an arbitrary deficit target agreed to five years ago. But getting there would require them, first, to admit the twin truths that deficits will be above Maastricht targets and that monetary union is primarily a political tool to cement the postwar peace and, second, to make those truths all but irrelevant by taking a patented Helmut Kohl bold leap forward.

DEFICITS DO MATTER

There will be no crisis and nothing to solve unless France or Germany misses the Maastricht-dictated budget deficit target of 3 percent of GDP by an undisguisable margin in 1997. "Undisguisable" is the key concept here. In other words, the deficit must be large enough that it cannot be manipulated into a politically acceptable gray zone with politically acceptable tricks. The definition of political acceptability is that it allows France in but excludes Spain, Portugal, Italy, and Britain in the first round of EMU. Whether willingly or not, the European Commission and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development have gone along with the strenuous efforts of French officials to disguise their budget performance. Deficit predictions provided by French Treasury officials show France meeting the Maastricht target in 1997 (see Table 1).

On the surface the numbers seem to make perfect sense as they glide toward the Maastricht deficit target. However, minor, realistic changes in assumptions produce a politically unacceptable deficit of 4 percent of GDP in 1997 (see Table 2). The first two columns of Table 2 strip away three unjustified assumptions embedded in the official figures for this year and present a far grimmer picture for the current budget. In the first column, the adjusted total receipts figure reflects the estimates of most official documents (including those from the French Treasury itself). In the second column, the adjusted total spending figure more closely reflects reality based on actual spending for the first quarter. Overspending in the second half of 1996 is conservatively assumed to run at less than half the rate recorded in the first. In that column, net social secu-

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rity spending is also changed to reflect estimates released by the Social Security Commission this June. The third column presents the French budget picture without the contested use of one-time revenues from the France Telecom pension system and from the "other receipts" category in Treasury documents. The fourth column lowers the economic growth assumption of 3.5 percent embedded in official French figures by half the amount that official growth was overestimated this year. The last column shows the combined effect of government spending just one percent above 1996 levels (in nominal terms) and of social security deficits in line with those predicted by the Social Security Commission.

TABLE 1. FRENCH TREASURY BUDGET ASSUMPTIONS
(in billions of francs)

	1995 Actual	1996 Planned	1996 Actual	1997 Baseline	1997 Planned
SPENDING					
GENERAL GOVERNMENT	1,553	1,569	1,552	1,596	1,553
SOCIAL SECURITY	73	17	47	5	24
TOTAL SPENDING	1,626	1,586	1,599	1,601	1,577
RECEIPTS					
GENERAL GOVERNMENT	1,230	1,281	1,264	1,328	1,269
MISCELLANEOUS	13	10	20	5	63
TOTAL RECEIPTS	1,243	1,291	1,284	1,333	1,332
NOMINAL GDP GROWTH (%)	5.1	4.9	3.1	3.5	3.5
GOVERNMENT DEFICIT	383	295	315	268	245
DEFICIT AS % OF GDP	5.0	3.6	4.0	3.2	3.0

SOURCE: FRENCH TREASURY

Even if the France Telecom transfer is included, the deficit is 4 percent of GDP for 1997. A still more dire outcome of 5 percent is forecast by dissident Treasury officials who believe the Juppé government has wildly optimistic spending and revenue expectations. Splitting the difference between official and dissident estimates also yields a deficit of 4 percent. Anything near that level would set in motion a three-way battle with Kohl and Chirac in one corner, the Bundesbank and its allies in the other, and the Club Med nations who want into EMU between them. Financial markets could not be expected to ignore such a juicy situation.

TWO WAYS OUT

In an ideal world, Kohl and Chirac would slowly let out the truth that France will not hit the deficit targets but that monetary union will go ahead regardless. Thus they would publicly acknowledge that monetary union is first and foremost a political matter. It would complete the great postwar drive for a permanent Franco-German alliance before their generation fades from the scene and takes its searing memories of world war to the grave. Continuing to ignore the problems ahead and insisting that all is well is flirting with disaster. Financial markets can seem astoundingly naive when it suits their purposes, but delusion does not last forever, and when these naifs get a whiff of trouble they will dash for the exits and leave political leaders wondering why everyone stopped believing all at once.

Before that happens late this year or early next year, Kohl and Chirac should make the 4 percent deficit for France into a political nonevent by talking it to death.

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Simultaneously, they should disarm the stability coalition, for whom that kind of talk is heresy, by quiet negotiations with southern-tier countries. Financial incentives, ex officio membership for those countries in all central bank councils, and a pledge not to begin using the euro until all countries are in EMU should go a long way toward making a two-step EMU politically acceptable for Spain and company.

But this is asking a lot of politicians. So if the politics of confession don't fly, there is another way for Kohl and Chirac to make monetary union happen. One fine Saturday morning, the sooner the better, they should make monetary union a fait accompli by announcing a permanent link between the deutsche mark and the French franc. The benefits of such a link would soon spread far beyond solidifying the Franco-German core and would create an extra-Maastricht dynamic for EMU that would break through the increasingly dangerous adherence to the arbitrary and irrelevant deficit targets agreed to in Maastricht in 1991. Both Kohl and Chirac have the temperament and experience to risk the political outrage of their European colleagues. They could defuse some of the distemper by offering the Benelux countries, Austria, and Finland instant membership in their currency link. Despite public disavowals, they would all rather join than be relegated to second-tier status. With the inner core cemented, the transition to full monetary union and the start-up of the European Central Bank could continue even if it had to be at a slower pace than was anticipated.

Offsetting the concerns of the stability coalition over this sudden move would be the obvious exclusion of the Club Med countries from this monetary union that takes place outside the Maastricht treaty. Meanwhile, bond vigilantes in the financial markets could be relied on to punish any of these countries flirting with the dangerous game of currency devaluation as a means of gaining trade advantages. The steep rise in interest rates that would result from a speculative attack on devaluers would efficiently discourage that course of action. Thus Kohl and Chirac would be able to reassure stability coalition members that the Frankfurt culture and rules would be grafted onto a mini-EMU before moving to full European monetary union.

Kohl and Chirac would also have to reassure stability coalition members by

TABLE 2. FRENCH BUDGET, ADJUSTED ASSUMPTIONS
(in billions of francs)

	1996 Lower Revenue	1996 Higher Spending	1997 Lower Revenue	1997 Slower Growth	1997 Higher Spending
SPENDING					
GENERAL GOVERNMENT	1,552	1,586	1,553	1,574	1,601
SOCIAL SECURITY	47	50	24	40	35
TOTAL SPENDING	1,599	1,636	1,577	1,614	1,636
RECEIPTS					
GENERAL GOVERNMENT	1,251	1,251	1,269	1,250	1,250
MISCELLANEOUS	10	10	8	63	63
TOTAL RECEIPTS	1,261	1,261	1,277	1,313	1,313
NOMINAL GDP GROWTH (%)	3.1	3.1	3.5	3.1	3.1
GOVERNMENT DEFICIT	338	375	300	301	323
DEFICIT AS % OF GDP	4.3	4.7	3.7	3.7	4.0

SOURCE: AUTHOR

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imposing a strong fiscal pact between the participating countries that would prevent them from using increased deficit spending to offset German-influenced monetary policy. The sticking point in ongoing talks has been sanctions against high-deficit countries. The stability coalition believes that sanctions for budget-busting countries must kick in automatically rather than depend on the unlikely prospect of political leaders voting to impose them. Chirac might accept more automatic discipline as the price of achieving an extra-Maastricht currency pact that would spare him the pain of immediate, election-threatening budget cuts in 1997. Once France agreed to German terms, any new entrants would have to sign on or remain outside the charmed inner circle.

Despite the threat of unanticipated consequences, French and German currencies ought to be linked as a necessary next step in the process of creating an EMU. Otherwise this politically important opportunity might be lost as the flagging credibility of the Maastricht criteria precipitates cataclysmic turbulence in the financial markets. Fortunately, a unique confluence of opportunity, political incentive, and personal leadership is now in place to pull off this endgame coup. Helmut Kohl has repeatedly shown himself to be ready and willing to leap before he looks when the choice is between making history and letting history unmake him. From his decision to permit deployment of American Pershing missiles in Germany in the early 1980s to his leveraged buyout of East Germany, Kohl has taken high-stake risks that leave other politicians moping in their memoirs about missed opportunities. Within a year he will confront the most imposing cliffs of his life. I hope he jumps.

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

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

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The West Unique, Not Universal

Samuel P. Huntington

MODERNITY IS NOT ENOUGH

In recent years Westerners have reassured themselves and irritated others by expounding the notion that the culture of the West is and ought to be the culture of the world. This conceit takes two forms. One is the Coca-colonization thesis. Its proponents claim that Western, and more specifically American, popular culture is enveloping the world: American food, clothing, pop music, movies, and consumer goods are more and more enthusiastically embraced by people on every continent. The other has to do with modernization. It claims not only that the West has led the world to modern society, but that as people in other civilizations modernize they also westernize, abandoning their traditional values, institutions, and customs and adopting those that prevail in the West. Both theses project the image of an emerging homogeneous, universally Western world—and both are to varying degrees misguided, arrogant, false, and dangerous.

Advocates of the Coca-colonization thesis identify culture with the consumption of material goods. The heart of a culture, however, involves language, religion, values, traditions, and customs. Drinking Coca-Cola does not make Russians think like Americans any more

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Samuel P. Huntington is the Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor at Harvard University, where he is also director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. This article is drawn from his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, to be published this month by Simon and Schuster.

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than eating sushi makes Americans think like Japanese. Throughout human history, fads and material goods have spread from one society to another without significantly altering the basic culture of the recipient society. Enthusiasms for various items of Chinese, Hindu, and other cultures have periodically swept the Western world, with no discernible lasting spillover. The argument that the spread of pop culture and consumer goods around the world represents the triumph of Western civilization depreciates the strength of other cultures while trivializing Western culture by identifying it with fatty foods, faded pants, and fizzy drinks. The essence of Western culture is the Magna Carta, not the Magna Mac.

The modernization argument is intellectually more serious than the Coca-colonization thesis, but equally flawed. The tremendous expansion of scientific and engineering knowledge that occurred in the nineteenth century allowed humans to control and shape their environment in unprecedented ways. Modernization involves industrialization; urbanization; increasing levels of literacy, education, wealth, and social mobilization; and more complex and diverse occupational structures. It is a revolutionary process comparable to the shift from primitive to civilized societies that began in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, the Nile, and the Indus about 5000 B.C. The attitudes, values, knowledge, and culture of people in a modern society differ greatly from those in a traditional society. As the first civilization to modernize, the West is the first to have fully acquired the culture of modernity. As other societies take on similar patterns of education, work, wealth, and class structure, the modernization argument runs, this Western culture will become the universal culture of the world.

That there are significant differences between modern and traditional cultures is beyond dispute. A world in which some societies are highly modern and others still traditional will obviously be less homogeneous than a world in which all societies are comparably modern. It does not necessarily follow, however, that societies with modern cultures should be any more similar than are societies with traditional cultures. Only a few hundred years ago all societies were traditional. Was that world any less homogeneous than a future world of universal modernity is likely to be? Probably not. "Ming China . . . was assuredly closer to the France of the Valois," Fernand

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Braudel observes, "than the China of Mao Tse-tung is to the France of the Fifth Republic."[1] Modern societies have much in common, but they do not necessarily merge into homogeneity. The argument that they do rests on the assumption that modern society must approximate a single type, the Western type; that modern civilization is Western civilization, and Western civilization is modern civilization. This, however, is a false identification. Virtually all scholars of civilization agree that Western civilization emerged in the eighth and ninth centuries and developed its distinctive characteristics in the centuries that followed. It did not begin to modernize until the eighteenth century. The West, in short, was Western long before it was modern.

WHAT MAKES THE WEST WESTERN?

WHAT WERE the distinguishing characteristics of Western civilization during the hundreds of years before it modernized? The various scholars who have answered this question differ on some specifics but agree on a number of institutions, practices, and beliefs that may be legitimately identified as the core of Western civilization. They include:

The Classical legacy. As a third-generation civilization, the West inherited much from earlier civilizations, including most notably Classical civilization. Classical legacies in Western civilization are many, and include Greek philosophy and rationalism, Roman law, Latin, and Christianity. Islamic and Orthodox civilizations also inherited from Classical civilization, but to nowhere near the same degree as the West.

Western Christianity. Western Christianity, first Catholicism and then Protestantism, is the single most important historical characteristic of Western civilization. Indeed, during most of its first millennium, what is now known as Western civilization was called Western Christendom. There was a well-developed sense of community among Western Christian peoples, one that made them feel distinct from Turks, Moors, Byzantines, and others. When Westerners went out to conquer the world in the sixteenth century, they did so for God as well as gold. The Reformation and Counter Reformation and the division of Western Christendom into Protestantism and Catholicism—

[1]Fernand Braudel, *On History*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 213.

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ALINARI/ART RESOURCE

Our Father, or everyone's?
Michelangelo's Creation of the Sun and the Moon, *Sistine Chapel*

and the political and intellectual consequences of that rift—are also distinctive features of Western history, totally absent from Eastern Orthodoxy and removed from the Latin American experience.

European languages. Language is second only to religion as a factor distinguishing people of one culture from those of another. The West differs from most other civilizations in its multiplicity of languages. Japanese, Hindi, Mandarin, Russian, and even Arabic are recognized as the core languages of other civilizations. The West inherited Latin, but a variety of nations emerged in the West, and with them developed national languages grouped loosely into the broad categories of Romance and Germanic. By the sixteenth century these languages had generally assumed their contemporary forms. Latin gave way to French as a common international language for the West, and in the twentieth century French succumbed to English.

Separation of spiritual and temporal authority. Throughout Western history, first the Church and then many churches existed separate from the state. God and Caesar, church and state, spiritual authority and temporal authority had been a prevailing dualism in Western culture. Only in Hindu civilization were religion and politics as clearly separated. In Islam, God is caesar; in China and Japan, caesar is God; in Orthodoxy, God is caesar's junior partner. The separation and recur-

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between church and state that typify Western civilization have occurred in no other civilization. This division of authority contributed immeasurably to the development of freedom in the West.

Rule of law. The concept of the centrality of law to civilized existence was inherited from the Romans. Medieval thinkers elaborated the idea of natural law, according to which monarchs were supposed to exercise their power, and a common law tradition developed in England. During the phase of absolutism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the rule of law was observed more in the breach than in practice, but the idea of subordinating human power to some external restraint persisted: *Non sub homine sed sub Deo et lege.* The tradition of the rule of law laid the basis for constitutionalism and the protection of human rights, including property rights, against the arbitrary exercise of power. In other civilizations law has been a much less important factor in shaping thought and behavior.

Social pluralism and civil society. Western society historically has been highly pluralistic. What is distinctive about the West, as Karl Deutsch noted, "is the rise and persistence of diverse autonomous groups not based on blood relationship or marriage."[2] Beginning in the sixth and seventh centuries these groups initially included monasteries, monastic orders, and guilds, but afterwards expanded in many areas of Europe to include a variety of other associations and societies. For more than a millennium, the West has had a civil society that distinguished it from other civilizations. Associational pluralism was supplemented by class pluralism. Most Western European societies included a relatively strong and autonomous aristocracy, a substantial peasantry, and a small but significant class of merchants and traders. The strength of the feudal aristocracy was particularly important in limiting absolutism's ability to take firm root in most European nations. This European pluralism contrasts sharply with the poverty of civil society, the weakness of the aristocracy, and the strength of the centralized bureaucratic empires that existed during the same time periods in Russia, China, the Ottoman lands, and other non-Western societies.

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[2]Karl Deutsch, "On Nationalism, World Regions, and the Nature of the West," in Per Torvik, ed., *Mobilization, Center-Periphery Structures and Nation-Building*, Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1981, p. 77.

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Representative bodies. Social pluralism gave rise at an early date to estates, parliaments, and other institutions that represented the interests of the aristocracy, clergy, merchants, and other groups. These bodies provided forms of representation that in the course of modernization evolved into the institutions of modern democracy. In some instances during the era of absolutism they were abolished or their powers greatly limited. But even when that happened, they could, as in France, be resurrected as a vehicle for expanded political participation. No other civilization today has a comparable heritage of representative bodies stretching back a millennium. Movements for self-government also developed at the local level, beginning in the ninth century in the cities of Italy and then spreading northward, wresting power from bishops and nobles and finally, in the thirteenth century, leading to such confederations of "strong and independent cities" as the Hanseatic League.[3] Representation at the national level was thus supplemented by a measure of autonomy at the local level not seen in other regions of the world.

Individualism. Many of the above features of Western civilization contributed to the emergence of a sense of individualism and a tradition of individual rights and liberties unique among civilized societies. Individualism developed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and acceptance of the right of individual choice, which Deutsch terms "the Romeo and Juliet revolution," prevailed in the West by the seventeenth century. Even claims for equal rights for all—"the poorest he in England has a life to live as much as the richest he"—were articulated if not universally accepted. Individualism remains a distinguishing feature of the West in twentieth-century civilizations. In one analysis involving similar population groups from 50 countries, the 20 countries scoring highest on the individualism index included 19 of the 20 Western countries in the sample. Another cross-cultural survey of individualism and collectivism similarly highlighted the dominance of individualism in the West compared with the prevalence of collectivism elsewhere, concluding that "the values that are most important

[3]Stein Rokkan, "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building," in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of Nation-States in Western Europe*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, p. 576.

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

BRIDGEMAN/ART RESOURCE

Modern or Western? The House of Commons, 1888

in the West are least important worldwide."[4] Again and again both Westerners and non-Westerners point to individualism as the central distinguishing mark of the West.

The above list is not an exhaustive enumeration of the distinctive characteristics of Western civilization. Nor is it meant to imply that those characteristics were always and everywhere present in Western society. They obviously were not: the many despots in Western history regularly ignored the rule of law and suspended representative bodies. Nor is it meant to suggest that none of these characteristics have appeared in other civilizations. They obviously have: the Koran and the sharia constitute basic law for Islamic societies; Japan and India had class systems paralleling that of the West (and perhaps as a result are the only two major non-Western societies to sustain democratic governments for any length of time). Individually, almost none of these factors is unique to the West. But the combination of them is, and has

[4]Geert Hofstede, "National Cultures in Four Dimensions," *International Studies of Management and Organization*, 1983, Vol. 13, p. 53; Harry C. Triandis, "Cross-Cultural Studies of Individualism and Collectivism," *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 1989*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990, pp. 44-133, quoted in Daniel Coleman, "The Group and the Self: New Focus on a Cultural Rift," *The New York Times*, December 25, 1990, p. 41.

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given the West its distinctive quality. These concepts, practices, and institutions have been far more prevalent in the West than in other civilizations. They form the essential continuing core of Western civilization. They are what is Western, but not modern, about the West.

They also generated the commitment to individual freedom that now distinguishes the West from other civilizations. Europe, as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has said, is "the source—the *unique* source" of the "ideas of individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and cultural freedom . . . These are *European* ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption. . . . "[5] These concepts and characteristics are also in large part the factors that enabled the West to take the lead in modernizing itself and the world. They make Western civilization unique, and Western civilization is precious not because it is universal but because it is unique.

CAN THE REST COPY THE WEST?

To MODERNIZE, must non-Western societies abandon their own cultures and adopt the core elements of Western culture? From time to time leaders of such societies have thought it necessary. Peter the Great and Mustafa Kemal Ataturk were determined to modernize their countries and convinced that doing so meant adopting Western culture, even to the point of replacing traditional headgear with its Western equivalent. In the process, they created "torn" countries, unsure of their cultural identity. Nor did Western cultural imports significantly help them in their pursuit of modernization. More often, leaders of non-Western societies have pursued modernization and rejected westernization. Their goal is summed up in the phrases *ti-yong* (Chinese learning for the fundamental principles, Western learning for practical use) and *woken, yosei* (Japanese spirit, Western technique), articulated by Chinese and Japanese reformers of a century ago, and in Saudi Arabia's Prince Bandar bin Sultan's comment in 1994 that "'foreign imports' are nice as shiny or

[5]Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Disunity of America*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1992, p. 127.

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high-tech 'things.' But intangible social and political institutions imported from elsewhere can be deadly—ask the Shah of Iran . . . Islam is for us not just a religion but a way of life. We Saudis want to modernize but not necessarily westernize." Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, and, to a lesser degree, Iran have become modern societies without becoming Western societies. China is clearly modernizing, but certainly not westernizing.

Interaction and borrowing between civilizations have always taken place, and with modern means of transportation and communication they are much more extensive. Most of the world's great civilizations, however, have existed for at least one millennium and in some cases for several. These civilizations have a demonstrated record of borrowing from other civilizations in ways that enhance their own chances of survival. China's absorption of Buddhism from India, scholars agree, failed to produce the "Indianization" of China; it instead caused the Sinification of Buddhism. The Chinese adapted Buddhism to their purposes and needs. The Chinese have to date consistently defeated intense Western efforts to Christianize them. If at some point they do import Christianity, it is more than likely that it will be absorbed and adapted in such a manner as to strengthen the continuing core of Chinese culture.

Similarly, in past centuries Muslim Arabs received, valued, and used their "Hellenic inheritance for essentially utilitarian reasons. Being mostly interested in borrowing certain external forms or technical aspects, they knew how to disregard all elements in the Greek body of thought that would conflict with 'the truth' as established in their fundamental Koranic norms and precepts." Japan followed the same pattern. In the seventh century Japan imported Chinese culture and made the "transformation on its own initiative, free from economic and military pressures," to high civilization. "During the centuries that followed, periods of relative isolation from continental influences during which previous borrowings were sorted out and the useful ones assimilated would alternate with periods of renewed contact and cultural borrowing." In similar fashion, Japan and other non-Western societies today are absorbing selected elements of Western culture and using them to strengthen their own cultural identity. It would, as Braudel argues,

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almost "be childish" to think that the "triumph of civilization in the singular" would lead to the end of the plurality of cultures embodied for centuries in the world's great civilizations.[6]

CULTURAL BACKLASH

MODERNIZATION and economic development neither require nor produce cultural westernization. To the contrary, they promote a resurgence of, and renewed commitment to, indigenous cultures. At the individual level, the movement of people into unfamiliar cities, social settings, and occupations breaks their traditional local bonds, generates feelings of alienation and anomie, and creates crises of identity to which religion frequently provides an answer. At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic wealth and military power of the country as a whole and encourages people to have confidence in their heritage and to become culturally assertive. As a result, many non-Western societies have seen a return to indigenous cultures. It often takes a religious form, and the global revival of religion is a direct consequence of modernization. In non-Western societies this revival almost necessarily assumes an anti-Western cast, in some cases rejecting Western culture because it is Christian and subversive, in others because it is secular and degenerate. The return to the indigenous is most marked in Muslim and Asian societies. The Islamic Resurgence has manifested itself in every Muslim country; in almost all it has become a major social, cultural, and intellectual movement, and in most it has had a deep impact on politics. In 1996 virtually every Muslim country except Iran was more Islamic and more Islamist in its outlook, practices, and institutions than it was 15 years earlier. In the countries where Islamist political forces do not shape the government, they invariably dominate and often monopolize the opposition to the government. Throughout the Muslim world people are reacting against the "Westoxification" of their societies.

East Asian societies have gone through a parallel rediscovery of indigenous values and have increasingly drawn unflattering comparisons

[6]Adda B. Bozeman, "Civilizations under Stress," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, Winter 1975, p. 7; William E. Naff, "Reflections on the Question of 'East and West' from the Point of View of Japan," *Comparative Civilizations Review*, Fall 1985-Spring 1986, p. 222; Braudel, *On History*, pp. 212-213.

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between their culture and Western culture. For several centuries they, along with other non-Western peoples, envied the economic prosperity, technological sophistication, military power, and political cohesion of Western societies. They sought the secret of this success in Western practices and customs, and when they identified what they thought might be the key they attempted to apply it in their own societies. Now, however, a fundamental change has occurred. Today East Asians attribute their dramatic economic development not to their import of Western culture but to their adherence to their own culture. They have succeeded, they argue, not because they became like the West, but because they have remained different from the West. In somewhat similar fashion, when non-Western societies felt weak in relation to the West, many of their leaders invoked Western values of self-determination, liberalism, democracy, and freedom to justify their opposition to Western global domination. Now that they are no longer weak but instead increasingly powerful, they denounce as "human rights imperialism" the same values they previously invoked to promote their interests. As Western power recedes, so too does the appeal of Western values and culture, and the West faces the need to accommodate itself to its declining ability to impose its values on non-Western societies. In fundamental ways, much of the world is becoming more modern and less Western.

Much of the world is becoming more modern and less Western.

One manifestation of this trend is what Ronald Dore has termed the "second-generation indigenization phenomenon." Both in former Western colonies and in continuously independent, non-Western countries, "the first 'modernizer' or 'post-independence' generation has often received its training in foreign (Western) universities in a Western cosmopolitan language. Partly because they first go abroad as impressionable teenagers, their absorption of Western values and lifestyles may well be profound." Most members of the much larger second generation, in contrast, receive their education at home in universities the first generation established, where the local language, rather than its colonial replacement, is used for instruction. These universities "provide a much more diluted contact with metropolitan world culture" and "knowledge is indigenized by means of translations—usually of limited

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range and of poor quality." Graduates of these universities resent the dominance of the earlier Western-trained generation and thus often "succumb to the appeals of nativist opposition movements."[7] As Western influence recedes, young and aspiring leaders cannot look to the West to provide them with power and wealth. They have to find the means of success within their own society, and hence accommodate the values and culture of that society.

Indigenization is furthered by the democracy paradox: when non-Western societies adopt Western-style elections, democracy encourages and often brings to power nativist and anti-Western political movements. In the 1960s and 1970s westernized and pro-Western governments in developing countries were threatened by coups and revolutions; in the 1980s and 1990s they have been increasingly in danger of being ousted in elections. Democracy tends to make a society more parochial, not more cosmopolitan. Politicians in non-Western societies do not win elections by demonstrating how Western they are. Electoral competition stimulates them to fashion what they believe will be the most popular appeals, and those are usually ethnic, nationalist, and religious in character. The result is popular mobilization against Western-oriented elites and the West in general. This process, which began in Sri Lanka in the 1950s, has spread from country to country in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, and is manifest in the victories of religiously oriented parties in India, Turkey, Bosnia, and Israel in elections in 1995 and 1996. Democratization is thus at odds with westernization.

The powerful currents of indigenization at work in the world make a mockery of Western expectations that Western culture will become the world's culture. The two central elements of any culture are language and religion. English, it has been asserted, is becoming the world's language. It clearly has become the lingua franca for communication in multinational business, diplomacy, international institutions, tourism, and aviation. This use of English for intercultural communication, however, presupposes the existence of different cultures; like translation and interpretation, it is a way of coping with those differences, not eliminating

[7]Ronald Dore, "Unity and Diversity in Contemporary World Culture," in Hedley Bull and Adam Watson, eds., *Expansion of International Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984, pp. 420-21.

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them. In fact, the proportion of the world's population speaking English is small and declining. According to the most reliable data, compiled by Sidney S. Culbert, a professor at the University of Washington, in 1958 roughly 9.8 percent of human beings spoke English as a first or second language; in 1992, 7.6 percent did. A language foreign to 92 percent of the world's population is not the world's language. Similarly, in 1958, 24 percent of humans spoke one of the five major Western languages; in 1992, less than 21 percent did. The situation is similar for religion. Western Christians now make up perhaps 30 percent of the world's population, but the proportion is declining steadily, and at some point in the next decade or so the number of Muslims will exceed the number of Christians. With respect to the two central elements of culture, language and religion, the West is in retreat. As Michael Howard has observed, the "common Western assumption that cultural diversity is a historical curiosity being rapidly eroded by the growth of a common, Western-oriented, Anglophone world culture, shaping our basic values . . . is simply not true."[8]

As indigenization spreads and the appeal of Western culture fades, the central problem in relations between the West and the rest is the gap between the West's, particularly America's, efforts to promote Western culture as the universal culture and its declining ability to do so. The collapse of communism exacerbated this disparity by reinforcing the view in the West that its ideology of democratic liberalism had triumphed globally and was thus universally valid. The West—and especially the United States, which has always been a missionary nation—believes that the non-Western peoples should commit themselves to the Western values of democracy, free markets, limited government, separation of church and state, human rights, individualism, and the rule of law, and should embody these values in their institutions. Minorities in other civilizations embrace and promote these values, but the dominant attitudes toward them in non-Western cultures range from skepticism to intense opposition. What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest.

Non-Westerners do not hesitate to point to the gaps between Western principle and Western practice. Hypocrisy and double stan-

[8]Michael Howard, *America and the World* (Annual Lewin Lecture), St. Louis: Washington University, 1984, p. 6.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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—Senator Sam Nunn

Among reasons for the Army's successes cited by Moskos and Butler: a commitment to invest the resources and do what it takes to assure a large pool of blacks from which to find leaders; promotion strictly by talent; strong remedial education instead of lowered standards; a cadre of veteran black sergeants who serve as a repository of values.

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dards are the price of universalist pretensions. Democracy is promoted, but not if it brings Islamic fundamentalists to power; nonproliferation is preached for Iran and Iraq, but not for Israel; free trade is the elixir of economic growth, but not for agriculture; human rights are an issue with China, but not with Saudi Arabia; aggression against oil-owning Kuwaitis is repulsed with massive force, but not so aggression against oil-less Bosnians.

The belief that non-Western peoples should adopt Western values, institutions, and culture is, if taken seriously, immoral in its implications. The almost universal reach of European power in the late nineteenth century and the global dominance of the United States in the latter half of the twentieth century spread many aspects of Western civilization across the world. But European globalism is no more, and American hegemony is receding, if only because it is no longer needed to protect the United States against a Cold War Soviet threat. Culture follows power. If non-Western societies are once again shaped by Western culture, it will happen only as a result of the expansion and deployment of Western power. Imperialism is the necessary, logical consequence of universalism, yet few proponents of universalism support the militarization and brutal coercion that would be necessary to achieve their goal. Furthermore, as a maturing civilization, the West no longer has the economic or demographic dynamism required to impose its will on other societies. Any effort to do so also runs contrary to Western values of self-determination and democracy. This March, Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia told the assembled heads of European governments: "European values are European values; Asian values are universal values." As Asian and Muslim civilizations begin to assert the universal relevance of their cultures, Westerners will come to appreciate the connection between universalism and imperialism and to see the virtues of a pluralistic world.

SHORING UP THE WEST

THE TIME has come for the West to abandon the illusion of universality and to promote the strength, coherence, and vitality of its civilization in a world of civilizations. The interests of the West are not served by promiscuous intervention into the disputes of other peoples.

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ALINARI/ART RESOURCE

When the West conquered the rest: Hans Holbein's Ambassadors

In the era that is dawning, primary responsibility for containing and resolving regional conflicts must rest with the leading states of the civilizations dominant in those regions. "All politics is local politics," Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, the former Speaker of the House, observed, and the corollary to that truth is "All power is local power." Neither the United Nations nor the United States can impose on local conflicts long-lasting solutions that deviate from the realities of local power. As anyone knowledgeable about crime knows, local law and order are best insured by a cop walking the beat, not by the potential appearance over the horizon of a squad of motorized police.

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In a multipolar, multicivilizational world, the West's responsibility is to secure its own interests, not to promote those of other peoples nor to attempt to settle conflicts between other peoples when those conflicts are of little or no consequence to the West.

The future of the West depends in large part on the unity of the West. Scholars of civilizations see them evolving through times of trouble and a period of warring states, eventually leading to a universal state for the civilization that may be either a source of renewal or a prelude to decay and disintegration. Western civilization has moved beyond its warring states phase and is heading toward its universal state phase. That phase is still incomplete, with the nation-states of the West cohering into two semi-universal states in Europe and North America. These two entities and their constituent units are, however, bound together by an extraordinarily complex network of formal and informal institutional ties. The universal states of previous civilizations were empires. Since democracy is the political form of Western civilization, the emerging universal state of Western civilization is not an empire but rather a compound of federations, confederations, and international regimes.

The future of the West depends in large part on the unity of the West.

The problem for the West, in this situation, is to maintain its dynamism and to promote its coherence. Western unity depends more on events in the United States than on those in Europe. At present the United States is pulled in three directions. It is pulled south by the continuing immigration of Latin Americans and the growing size and power of its Hispanic population; by the incorporation of Mexico into the North American Free Trade Agreement and the possibility of extending NAFTA to other western hemisphere countries; and by the political, economic, and cultural changes in Latin America that make it more like the United States. At the same time, the United States is pulled westward by the increasing wealth and influence of East Asian societies; by the ongoing efforts to develop a Pacific community, epitomized in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum; and by migration from Asian societies. If democracy, free markets, the rule of law, civil society, individualism, and Protestantism take firm root in Latin America,

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that continent, whose culture has always been closely related to that of the West, will merge with the West and become the third pillar of Western civilization. No such convergence is possible with Asian societies. Asia is instead likely to pose continuing economic and political challenges to the United States specifically and the West more generally. The third pull, toward Europe, is the most important. Shared values, institutions, history, and culture dictate the continuing close association of the United States and Europe. Both necessary and desirable is the further development of institutional ties across the Atlantic, including negotiation of a European-American free trade agreement and creation of a North Atlantic economic organization as a counterpart to NATO.

The major current differences between Europe and America arise not from direct conflicts of interest with each other, but from their policies toward third parties. Among other questions, these include the provision of support to a Muslim-dominated Bosnia, the priority of Israeli security needs in Middle Eastern policy, U.S. efforts to penalize foreign companies that do business with Iran and Cuba, the maintenance of full economic sanctions against Iraq, and the part human rights and weapons proliferation concerns should play in dealing with China. Non-Western powers, especially China, have actively attempted to exploit these differences and play one Western country off against another. The differences themselves arise largely from different geopolitical perspectives and domestic political and economic interests. Maintaining the unity of the West, however, is essential to slowing the decline of Western influence in world affairs. Western peoples have far more in common with each other than they have with Asian, Middle Eastern, or African peoples. The leaders of Western countries have institutionalized patterns of trust and cooperation among themselves that, with rare exceptions, they do not have with the leaders of other societies. United, the West will remain a formidable presence on the international scene; divided, it will be prey to the efforts of non-Western states to exploit its internal differences by offering short-term gains to some Western countries at the price of long-term losses for all Western countries. The peoples of the West, in Benjamin Franklin's phrase, must hang together, or most assuredly they will hang separately.

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Promoting the coherence of the West means both preserving Western culture within the West and defining the limits of the West. The former requires, among other things, controlling immigration from non-Western societies, as every major European country has done and as the United States is beginning to do, and ensuring the assimilation into Western culture of the immigrants who are admitted. It also means recognizing that in the post–Cold War world, NATO is the security organization of Western civilization and that its primary purpose is to defend and preserve that civilization. Hence states that are Western in their history, religion, and culture should, if they desire, be able to join NATO. Practically speaking, NATO membership would be open to the Visegrad states, the Baltic states, Slovenia, and Croatia, but not countries that have historically been primarily Muslim or Orthodox. While recent debate has focused entirely on the expansion rather than the contraction of NATO, it is also necessary to recognize that as NATO's mission changes, Turkish and Greek ties to NATO will weaken and their membership could either come to an end or become meaningless. Withdrawal from NATO is the declared goal of the Welfare Party in Turkey, and Greece is becoming as much an ally of Russia as it is a member of NATO.

The peoples of the West must hang together, or they will hang separately.

The West went through a European phase of development and expansion that lasted several centuries and an American phase that has dominated this century. If North America and Europe renew their moral life, build on their cultural commonality, and develop closer forms of economic and political integration to supplement their security collaboration in NATO, they could generate a third Euroamerican phase of Western affluence and political influence. Meaningful political integration would in some measure counter the relative decline in the West's share of the world's people, economic product, and military capabilities and revive the West's power in the eyes of the leaders of other civilizations. The principal responsibility of Western leaders is not to attempt to reshape other civilizations in the image of the West—which is increasingly

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beyond their ability—but to preserve and renew the unique qualities of Western civilization. That responsibility falls overwhelmingly on the most powerful Western country, the United States of America. Neither globalism nor isolationism, neither multilateralism nor unilateralism will best serve American interests. Its interests will be most effectively advanced if the United States eschews those extremes and instead adopts an Atlanticist policy of close cooperation with its European partners, one that will protect and promote the interests, values, and culture of the precious and unique civilization they share.

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Democracy and the National Interest

Strobe Talbott

IDEALPOLITIK AS REALPOLITIK

NEARLY FIVE years ago, early in his first campaign for the White House, Bill Clinton delivered a speech at Georgetown University about democracy as a factor in international life. Countries whose citizens choose their leaders, he said, are more likely than those with other forms of government to be reliable partners in trade and diplomacy, and less likely to threaten the peace.

As president, he has put that principle into practice by making the support of democracy a priority of his administration's diplomacy in Latin America, Asia, Africa, Central Europe, and the former Soviet Union. Even in straitened times he has pressed Congress to fund foreign assistance programs that promote elections and the rule of law, arguing that relatively modest expenditures today are an investment in the long-term interests of the United States.

Two years ago President Clinton dispatched 21,000 American troops to Haiti as the vanguard of a multinational force that restored an elected leader who had been deposed in a coup d'état. Earlier this year he urged Russia to go through with its first post-Soviet presidential election, rejecting the view that cancellation would be better than a victory by the "wrong" candidate. And on September 14 the 53,000-strong, NATO-led military force in Bosnia made possible elections that, for all their imperfections and troublesome aftermath, give that shattered land a better chance of achieving lasting peace within its borders and with its neighbors.

STROBE TALBOTT is Deputy Secretary of State.

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Those three exertions of American political will—and in two cases, of military muscle—have entailed costs and risks and, therefore, have generated controversy. In none of the three countries is the ultimate triumph of democracy certain. The last several years have provided reminders, in every corner of the globe, of how painful, suspenseful, and downright messy the transition to democracy can be. In many states emerging from decades, if not centuries, of tyranny, euphoria has given way to the sobriety of the morning after.

In the United States, criticism of the administration's emphasis on democracy overseas has come not just from isolationists but also from some internationalists who warn that a "crusade" on behalf of democracy will overstretch American resources and mire the United States in endless, debilitating brawls, often on the side of undeserving clients. The U.S. government, they argue, should concentrate on influencing other countries' foreign, military, and trade policies, since those are most germane to the United States' own national security interests.[1]

Those who hold that view often claim to be realists, to distinguish themselves from woolly-minded idealists enamored of the notion that the United States can, and should, affect other countries' internal affairs. Yet the so-called realist critique is anachronistic: it fails to take account of the growth of the global marketplace, along with the deepening and widening of interdependence among regions. It is in that sense unrealistic.

A combination of technological, commercial, and political trends is shortening distances, opening borders, and connecting far-flung cultures and economies. With this phenomenon have come new benefits and new dangers. As goods and services move more quickly and freely among countries and continents, so do viruses, narcotics, criminals, and terrorists, as well as the causes and consequences of ecological degradation.

In an increasingly interdependent world Americans have a growing stake in how other countries govern, or misgovern, themselves. The larger and more close-knit the community of nations that choose democratic forms of government, the safer and more prosperous Americans

[1]See, for example, Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1996, pp. 16-32; and Henry Kissinger, "Beware: A Threat Abroad," *Newsweek*, June 17, 1996, p. 42.

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will be, since democracies are demonstrably more likely to maintain their international commitments, less likely to engage in terrorism or wreak environmental damage, and less likely to make war on each other.[2]

That proposition is the essence of the national security rationale for vigorously supporting, promoting, and, when necessary, defending democracy in other countries. It is the basis for asserting, in rebuttal to some self-described realists' insinuations to the contrary, that American values and interests reinforce each other.

This conviction reflects the political realities on the home front of U.S. foreign policy. The American people have never accepted traditional geopolitics or pure balance-of-power calculations as sufficient reason to expend national treasure or to dispatch American soldiers to foreign lands. Throughout this century the U.S. government has explained its decisions to send troops "over there" with some invocation of democracy and its defense. America's participation in both world wars and in the Cold War was not just about the international behavior of states, i.e., stopping or deterring aggression. It was also about adversary visions of the relationship between the individual citizen and the government. Fundamentally, it was about freedom versus tyranny.

The American people want their country's foreign policy rooted in idealpolitik as well as realpolitik. The United States is uniquely and self-consciously a country founded on a set of ideas, and ideals, applicable to people everywhere. The Founding Fathers declared that all were created equal—not just those in Britain's 13 American colonies—and that to secure the "unalienable rights" of life, liberty, and the

[2]This principle has been prominent in the thinking of American statesmen in the twentieth century. Woodrow Wilson called democracy "the best preventive of such jealousies and suspicions and secret intrigues as produce wars," and Franklin Roosevelt said that "the continued maintenance and improvement of democracy constitute the most important guarantee of international peace." A substantial body of empirical evidence and political science scholarship supports the premise that democracies are less likely to fight wars with each other—and more likely to win wars against autocratic states. See, for example, David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review*, March 1992, pp. 24-37. For the case that democracies make better international partners, see G. John Ikenberry, "The Myth of Post–Cold War Chaos," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1996, pp. 79-91. However, there has been considerable debate over whether democracies are more or less likely to go to war against nondemocratic states. The issue has been examined in depth in *International Security*. See, for example, Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of Democratic Peace," Fall 1994, pp. 5-49; and Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," Summer 1995, pp. 5-38.

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pursuit of happiness, people had the right to establish governments that derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed."

THE CURRENT WAVE

WHEN THAT idea became the foundation of the American political system in 1776, democracy had been largely in abeyance for more than two millennia, since the Age of Pericles. For much of its own history the United States was one of a small group of nations that had institutionalized the right of citizens to govern themselves. But that characteristically American ideal has gathered force over the last two decades. In 1974 less than 30 percent of the world's countries were democratic. Today the figure is over 61 percent. For the first time in history a slim but clear majority of the world's population—54 percent—lives under democracy.[3]

The current, so-called third wave of democratization started in the mid-1970s with the demise of right-wing dictatorships in Portugal, Spain, and Greece, and in the 1980s it gathered momentum and spread.[4] Technology was a major factor. Even the most heavily fortified borders became increasingly permeable to the onslaughts first of radio, then of television, and eventually of fax machines and E-mail.

To cite just one example: In May 1992, when Thailand's military tried to suppress student-led pro-democracy demonstrations, the army-controlled television stations blocked all reporting on the violence. But the Thai business and professional classes saw what was happening on CNN and took to the streets of Bangkok in protest. By September, elected civilian government returned to Thailand.

Modern technology may be a mixed blessing, since it has also increased authorities' ability to keep citizens under surveillance and pry

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[3]Freedom House's most recent survey of political rights and civil liberties found that the breakdown in 1995 was between "radically divergent polities—generally free societies characterized by democratic governance and unfree societies characterized by arbitrary rule." See Adrian Karatnycky, "Democracy and Despotism: Bipolarism Renewed?" *Freedom Review*, January-February 1996.

[4]Samuel P. Huntington characterizes the expansion of democracy around the globe since 1974 as the most recent of three waves of democratization that have shaped the modern world. The first lasted from 1828 to 1926 and the second from 1943 to 1964. See *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

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

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into their private lives. But the net effect has been positive. George Orwell's prediction for 1984 was wrong; the electronics and communications revolution has weakened Big Brother rather than strengthening him.

Democracy has also spread because it can help countries modernize their economies, ameliorate social conditions, and integrate with the outside world. Under a representative system of government, leaders are more likely to be accountable to their people. While corruption is all too common in democracies, including well-established ones, an independent parliament and judiciary, along with a free press, can check abuses of power.

Authoritarian regimes and their apologists sometimes claim that democracy is economically inefficient, and that, particularly in impoverished nations, "enlightened authoritarianism" is a more effective means of generating economic growth. Here the record is ambiguous, but it is far from vindicating dictatorial rule. A strong hand may steer a nation out of misery and chaos, but even the most benevolent dictator is likely to end up proving Lord Acton's dictum about the corrupting influence of power—and if not the enlightened strongman himself, then his distinctly unenlightened successor.[5]

In some of the world's poorest countries, such as Nicaragua and Malawi, elected leaders have proved more inclined than their authoritarian or totalitarian predecessors to adopt policies that benefit their people. Democratic authorities, because of the way they came to power, have an important additional source of legitimacy that can reinforce their ability to make painful but necessary economic choices, including allocation of scarce natural resources.[6] Amartya Sen, an economist at

[5]Nicéphore Soglo, the former president of Benin, wrote after his defeat in an election in March that too many African leaders have tried to justify their repressive rule in the early years after independence by claiming to be enlightened authoritarians: "We have been living with their legacy of economic devastation and political violence ever since. Africa can't afford to be held to a different democratic standard by the world." Although he lost the election to former President Mathieu Kerekou, Soglo called the vote a victory for democracy and noted that turnout was nearly 80 percent. Kerekou had first ascended to power in an army coup in October 1972, but, Soglo observed, "this year it was by way of the ballot box." See Soglo, "An African Election: I Lost, but Democracy Is Winning," *The Washington Post,* August 21, 1996, p. A25.

[6]See Huntington, "Democracy for the Long Haul," *The Journal of Democracy,* April 1996, and Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," *American Political Science Review,* September 1993.

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Harvard University, has argued that "no substantial famine has ever occurred in a country with a democratic form of government and a relatively free press." He points out that throughout its history India endured widespread famines, including one in 1943 that claimed between two million and three million lives. But since becoming the world's largest democracy in 1947, the country has not had a single substantial famine, despite frequent crop failures and food scarcities. Similarly, famine prevention programs run by democratically elected governments in Botswana and Zimbabwe enabled those nations to withstand crop failures in the early 1980s. During the same period, Sen notes, Sudan and Ethiopia, faced with relatively smaller declines in food output but ruled by authoritarian regimes, suffered severe famines.[7]

A WIDENING CONSENSUS

FOR THE United States, the attractions and advantages of supporting democracy abroad must be balanced against other strategic interests—and against the difficulty of sponsoring transitions that will inevitably entail a degree of disruption, if not instability. Arguing 178 years ago for U.S. support of independence movements in the Spanish colonies of Latin America, Henry Clay articulated a standard that holds up today: "I would not force upon other nations our principles and our liberty, if they did not want them. But, if an abused and oppressed people will their freedom; if they seek to establish it; if, in truth, they have established it; we have a right, as a sovereign power, to notice the fact, and to act as our circumstances and our interest require."

Support for democracy is not an absolute imperative that automatically takes precedence over competing goals; rather, it is a strong thread to be woven into the complex tapestry of American foreign policy. In the last 20 years, under both Republican and Democratic presidents, the United States has at a number of key moments adjudged "our circumstances and our interest" to justify giving priority to the promotion of democracy.

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[7]Sen, "Freedoms and Needs: An Argument for the Primacy of Political Rights," *The New Republic*, January 10, 1994, pp. 34-35.

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In the mid-1980s, during the largely peaceful uprising against Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, the U.S. Congress and private human rights groups prevailed on the Reagan administration to back the forces of "people power" and help ease Marcos into exile. Even the Reagan administration's most controversial foreign policy initiative, its backing of the *contra* guerrillas in Nicaragua, turned out well for the cause of democracy: U.S. pressure contributed to the Sandinista regime's decision in 1990 to submit to a free and fair election. The opposition candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, won, and the Sandinistas accepted the results. Nicaraguans have just gone to the polls again to choose their leaders at every level of government, passing one of the critical tests for a young democracy: holding a second election.

When America promotes democracy, values and interests reinforce each other.

The Bush administration led the United Nations in its sponsorship of the first free, fair, comprehensive elections ever held in Cambodia. When the Cambodian people had the chance to vote in early 1993, more than 90 percent of those eligible cast ballots. Many defied death threats from the Khmer Rouge and walked through minefields to the polling places.

In Latin America, the trend that began in the 1980s when Argentina, Brazil, and Chile made the transition from military dictatorship to civilian, parliamentary rule has proved to be not only durable but self-reinforcing. In 1991 the Organization of American States, at Washington's urging, adopted Resolution 1080, which requires the foreign ministers of member states to convene in the event of any interruption of the democratic process in the hemisphere. When President Jorge Serrano of Guatemala suspended constitutional rule in 1993, the OAS invoked Resolution 1080 to condemn the action and to raise the specter of economic and political sanctions. In the face of that threat, Serrano resigned and constitutional order was restored.

In January 1995 a flare-up of fighting on the border between Peru and Ecuador challenged the rule that democracies do not go to war against each other. But a wider war was averted with the assistance of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and the United States. One of the main forces

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for peace was that neither of the conflicting parties wanted to be ostracized from the hemisphere's community of market democracies.

In April 1996 the United States, the OAS, and Mercosur, the South American customs union, helped to defend democracy in Paraguay from overthrow by the commander of the armed forces. Mercosur has since amended its charter to exclude any member country that "abandons the full exercise of republican institutions."

With the exception of Israel, the political, religious, and cultural terrain of the Middle East has not been fertile ground for democracy. But in that region, too, there are tentative signs of progress. With American encouragement, a number of Arab states—notably Kuwait, Yemen, and Jordan—have conducted successful competitive parliamentary elections. In January 1996 Palestinians elected the governing council called for in their peace accords with Israel.

Even in Africa, where democratization has faced some of its biggest obstacles and suffered some of its most discouraging reversals, there is reason for hope—and for sustained American engagement. South Africa, now that it has finally emerged from apartheid, is a powerful and positive example throughout the region. In Sierra Leone, elections in March brought a respite in the country's five-year-old civil war; the civilian leadership and the rebels have responded to the voters' demand for an end to the fighting.

Progress in individual African countries has led to cooperative efforts to consolidate the trend. When the monarch of Lesotho threatened to disband parliament in August 1994, the elected presidents of South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana banded together to pressure him to uphold democracy. Later that year the leaders of the former front line states, which had opposed white rule in South Africa, joined those of post-apartheid South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Malawi in persuading the competing parties in Mozambique to participate in and then respect the results of U.N.-supervised elections there.

The most dramatic burst of democratization has come in the former Soviet empire. There, too, Orwell had it wrong, and some hawkish theoreticians of the Cold War had it only half right: the Soviet communist system collapsed not just because it was contained by Western military power but also because it was penetrated and ultimately subverted by information and ideas, including the big idea of

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Helpless, she dangled below.

Arm numb, he clutched her hand with weakening fingers.

Sensing their plight, the woman's voice echoed through the empty canyon, "Save yourself, my darling!"

Her golden Royal Oak glistened in the raw afternoon sun.

Their eyes met; he smiled and pulled his knife to cut the rope that held them.

But wait—that sound.

Was it just the wind? Or was it the rescue chopper?

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
Pam Jones is a chemical engineer
mother of two, nature lover and
part of a team that pioneered a
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seat belt, then a designer shirt.
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democracy. After the collapse of the Iron Curtain, the disbandment of the Warsaw Pact, and the dissolution of the U.S.S.R., the domino theory operated in reverse: one formerly communist country after another held free elections. The most recent example came in June, when the Mongolians participated in their country's third democratic election. Over 92 percent of those eligible cast ballots, many after traveling for hours on horseback to vote, and they handed an unexpected and overwhelming victory to the democratic opposition.

This globe-spanning sequence of events—which has included the grassroots Chinese democracy movement of 1989, the elections in the Philippines, Thailand, and Cambodia, and the more recent voting that legitimized the Palestinian Authority in Gaza and Jericho and gave Taiwan its first freely chosen president—should have discredited the claim that democracy is an exclusively Western idea. It should have laid to rest the contention that some peoples and cultures are unsuited to democracy—that Asians are predisposed to live under Confucian authoritarians, Latin Americans under *caudillos* or *comandantes,* Africans under tribal chiefs, Arabs and Persians under repressive theocrats, Russians under czars or commissars. Allowing stereotypes of national character to become the basis for policy would consign whole nations to despotism on the perverse theory that it is the fate they deserve, or that it is encoded in their genes.

A GLASS HALF FULL

WHILE THE idea of democracy is potentially viable everywhere, the process of democratization is long and hard, especially for countries where political progress is hostage to economic disadvantage. Poverty, underdevelopment, and stagnation are not alibis for tyranny, but they are obstacles to freedom. In many countries the gap between the poor and the wealthy is widening as the state undergoes a double transition—from authoritarian to democratic politics and from centralized to market economies. Some regions have the added burden of unsustainable population growth. Even with freely elected and well-intentioned leaders, a country where a rising birthrate outpaces economic growth and exhausts natural resources is unlikely to sustain democratic rule.

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Many newcomers to the democratic fold qualify only as partly free.[8] In fledgling democracies, especially countries where the wounds of civil war are still raw and the memory of oppressive rule still weighs heavy, politics can be especially volatile. The old regime's surviving elites divide into factions and vie for advantage in the new order, or for the spoils of the new disorder. Newly elected leaders, unsure of their hold on power or too sure of their infallibility and indispensability, use a heavy hand to silence the opposition, loyal and otherwise.

In Albania, after five years of progress toward democracy, the government of Sali Berisha presided in May over parliamentary elections that were marred by ballot-box stuffing, intimidation of voters, and irregularities in the vote count. Cambodian politics, while a vast improvement on the not-too-distant past of Khmer Rouge brutality, continue to be turbulent, often to the point of violence.

Throughout the post-communist world, especially in the former Soviet Union, relief and a sense of good riddance at the dismantling of the inefficient, top-heavy command system has given way to widespread resentment at what often seems to be the capriciousness and inequity of the market, and to insecurity over the absence of a safety net. Without the prospect of broad-based economic development, voters are likely to become disillusioned with politics and politicians, and thus with democracy itself. Newly enfranchised citizens tend to have unrealistically high expectations about what their elected leaders can accomplish, how long it will take, and how much hardship will be involved. When those expectations are disappointed, voters become vulnerable to demagogic purveyors of foolish or dangerous nostrums based on nostalgia or fear.

In short, the third wave has created an undertow in many countries that have embarked on democratization.

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[8]See Larry Diamond, "Democracy in Latin America: Degrees, Illusions, and Directions for Consolidation," in Tom Farer, ed., *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in a World of Sovereign States,* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. In its annual survey of democracy and freedom around the world, Freedom House divides countries into three broad categories based on their support for political rights and civil liberties: "free," "partly free," and "not free." Partly free countries have extended significant political power or civil rights or both to their citizens but remain less free than liberal democracies such as the United States. The 1996 survey lists Sri Lanka, Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala, for example, as "partly free" democracies.

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There are also hard-core holdouts. Cuba is the Western hemisphere's lone authoritarian regime, and North Korea stands in stark contrast to the thriving democracy to its south. In Burma, a junta of military strongmen suppresses the democracy movement; Aung San Suu Kyi, whose party won a resounding electoral victory in 1990, remains under house arrest.

Then there is China, by virtue of its size the most notable exception to the worldwide trend toward democracy. Chinese leaders maintain that economic development must precede democratization, and they cite the recent history of South Korea, Taiwan, and other "Asian tigers" to support their case for authoritarian rule in China. In fact, the experience of those nations conveys a more complicated lesson: promoting economic growth while monopolizing political power is an almost impossible balancing act over the long term, especially in a world increasingly linked by communications and trade. As people's incomes rise and their horizons broaden, they are more likely to demand the right to participate in government and to enjoy full protection under the rule of law. The pro-democracy demonstrations that culminated in the bloody crackdown by the military in Tiananmen Square in 1989 suggested that China's urban dwellers were impatient with their leaders' timetable for extending political freedoms.

The third wave of democratization has created an undertow.

U.S. policy toward the People's Republic is predicated on the conviction that continued economic and cultural engagement is the best way to induce democratization. That approach does not mean giving the Chinese authorities a pass on human rights, but it does mean recognizing how far China has come in the relatively recent past, and taking the long view on the future. The powers that be remain fearful about loosening political controls, but ordinary Chinese are much freer today than when China began opening to the outside world in the 1970s. It is by no means certain that the liberalizing trend will culminate in full democracy, but the prospects would be worse without active American engagement.

Precisely because the future of democracy is not assured in much of the world and because its survival is in the American interest, the

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United States, in collaboration with its democratic allies, must work hard helping nascent democracies through their phase of greatest fragility. In many of those countries, U.S. support is indispensable to the continuation of democratization.

Through a combination of government programs and cooperation with American and foreign nongovernmental organizations, the Clinton administration has provided technical assistance on the conduct of elections and institution-building. It has worked especially closely with the Asia Foundation, which has been promoting democracy since 1956, and with the National Endowment for Democracy, which has been active around the world since 1984. American assistance has been critical to democratic transitions in countries from South Africa to Nicaragua. The allocation of relatively modest amounts of money has often made an important, even decisive, difference.

GIVING PEOPLE A CHANCE

BUT SOMETIMES more is required. When the Clinton administration came into office in January 1993, Haiti was an acute challenge. That country, the poorest in the hemisphere and one of the poorest in the world, had held the freest and fairest election in its history in December 1990. Sixty-three percent of eligible voters had gone to the polls, giving Jean-Bertrand Aristide 67 percent of the vote in the presidential race, only to see him overthrown in a military coup nine months later.

Under the ensuing dictatorship, economic collapse and brutal repression impelled tens of thousands of refugees to take to the sea in rickety boats, fleeing toward the United States. President Clinton's desire to defend democracy and his obligation to protect American borders combined to justify the use of military force. In July 1994 the United States prevailed on the U.N. Security Council to authorize "all necessary means" to remove the coup leaders and restore Aristide to the presidency. It was a landmark: for the first time the United Nations had called for international action to restore a democratically elected leader.

Skeptics predicted that Aristide, once returned to power, would set himself up as president-for-life. Instead, he stuck to a constitutionally mandated schedule for elections, and this February he turned over the presidency to René Preval. It was the first time in Haitian history that

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one democratically elected leader peacefully succeeded another. In spite of continued poverty and recurrences of political violence, the Haitian government is moving ahead with efforts to reform its economy, address its people's needs, and strengthen—or in some cases build virtually from scratch—the institutions of a civil society.

Russia has been another major test. As recently as the beginning of this year, the prospects could hardly have been bleaker. The Communists had just won big in the parliamentary elections of December 1995. President Boris Yeltsin's approval rating was in the single digits, and polls showed him trailing at least four of his likely challengers. In the months that followed, the conventional wisdom in the West moved through a progression of gloomy predictions: first, that Yeltsin would lose the election; next that he would cancel it; then that he would steal it; then that he would not survive it; then that no matter who won, Russia would return to the territorial offensive.

The U.S. had no crystal ball, but it believed in elections for Russia.

The realists were out in force. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger worried, "As in 1930s Germany, it is quite possible that an elected Russian leader might pursue a most unsettling foreign policy," and suggested that "what passes for Russian democracy too often encourages an expansionist foreign policy." He and others argued that the Clinton administration's focus on building democracy in Russia was misguided, and that the United States should confine itself to concern about Russia's conduct abroad.[9]

Throughout this long period of uncertainty, the U.S. government was prepared for any outcome. We recognized that, particularly in a country emerging from tyranny, civil war, or economic depression, elections can produce a winner who then suspends democracy and exploits newly acquired power to suppress his opponents. We were well aware that Hitler established Nazi rule in the aftermath of an election. That is why the United States always included in its endorsement of the election in Russia—as it does for elections everywhere—

[9]Henry Kissinger, "Moscow and Beijing: A Declaration of Independence," *The Washington Post,* May 14, 1996, p. A15.

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the qualification that the process must be sustained to serve the citizenry's needs and to merit American support.

With that caveat, we stuck by the conviction that Russians should be given their first chance in the thousand-year history of their state to choose their leader. How the Russian people answered the questions facing them was up to them and no one else. The United States did not have a vote in the Russian election, nor a crystal ball. But the United States did have an interest in the policies that the victor would pursue. It had mattered deeply to the United States that Russia, for most of the century, was a communist dictatorship that repressed its own citizens and many of its neighbors and tried to intimidate American allies. By the same token, it will matter deeply to the United States what course Russia's leaders take in the 21st century.

That course is still uncertain, but the Russian election was nonetheless a provisional vindication of both Russian democratization and American support for the process. On July 3 more than 72 million citizens, over 67 percent of eligible voters, turned out at 96,000 polling places across 11 time zones. Those figures were nearly as significant as the 14-point margin of Yeltsin's victory.[10]

The election provided some reassurance about the direction of Russian foreign policy. In March, with ominous parliamentary fanfare, Communists had pressed for the reconstitution of the Soviet Union. This display of the Communists' true colors backfired with Russian voters, who cared more about pocketbook issues, and it contributed to Yeltsin's extraordinary comeback. The jury is still out on what sort of state Russia will be in the next century. But in rejecting the Communists' irredentist program, the Russian people offered at least partial, preliminary refutation of Dr. Kissinger's apprehension that Russian democracy would necessarily abet Russian expansionism.[11]

A more recent test of democracy was the round of voting in Bosnia on September 14. Many commentators opposed holding these elections on schedule because of widespread limits in the country on freedom of

[10]Turnout was particularly impressive given that 70 percent of Russian voters had already gone to the polls in the first round of the election two and a half weeks earlier, on June 16.

[11]For a forceful rebuttal of the idea that Russia is inherently, incurably expansionist and that Russian democracy will fuel that tendency, see Stephen Sestanovich, "Geotherapy: Russia's Neuroses, and Ours," *The National Interest,* Fall 1996.

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movement, of the media, and of expression. The Clinton administration, however, believed it was essential to proceed. Postponement would have further impeded the establishment of the central government and the institutions envisioned under the Dayton peace accords—a collective presidency, a national assembly, a national constitution, and judicial authorities—that were to be the principal venues for gradual reconciliation and cooperation among Bosnia's ethnic communities. Delay would also have encouraged the political parties that represent those communities to believe they could ignore other important deadlines for progress toward democratic rule.[12]

When they were finally able to vote, under the watchful eyes of 1,200 international election supervisors and other observers, a sizable majority of eligible Bosnians went to the polls. If there is one rule of democratization it is that, given a chance, and particularly if given a new chance, people like to vote; they take seriously the opportunity to have a say in their country's governance. This was the lesson of Haiti in 1990 and 1995, Cambodia in 1993, and Russia in July, and Bosnia emphasized it again.

These four cases also illustrate a more somber point: elections are necessary but by themselves insufficient to ensure that democracy becomes a permanent condition of national life. If elections become the vehicle for politicians who pander to separatist or ultranationalist sentiment, they can expose or, worse, aggravate the divisions in society. But even in regions where ethnic-based parties win, such as the Balkans, the democratic process is still better than any alternative: if leaders with popular support are not given opportunities at the ballot box, they may well resort, once again, to bullets. As H. L. Mencken put it, in one of his less dyspeptic comments on the subject, "The cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy."[13]

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[12]The International Crisis Group, which monitored the lead-up to the elections, argued vigorously for postponement, as did many observers in the press. See, for example, "Mr. Clinton's Dayton Deal," *The Wall Street Journal,* August 28, 1996, p. A12. In August, Robert Frowick, chairman of the Provisional Election Commission and chief representative of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, postponed Bosnian municipal elections because of flagrant Serb attempts to manipulate registration and rig the outcome. Ambassador Frowick's swift and decisive action sent a strong signal of international resolve and helped keep on track the more important elections at the national, "entity," and cantonal levels.

[13]Reinhold Niebuhr made the same point in *Children of Light and Children of Darkness:* "Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes democracy necessary."

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A WORK IN PROGRESS

MORE DEMOCRACY means, first, letting the people vote fairly and frequently. But it goes beyond that. Elections are an important part of the treatment for what ails a country, but they are neither an overnight nor a guaranteed cure. No society can easily or quickly transform the way it governs itself. Tearing down a wall, like the one that divided Berlin, or a statue, like the monument to Felix Dzerzhinsky in central Moscow, is much easier than building institutions like a nonpolitical police force and an independent judiciary. Structural reforms, if they are to take hold, must be matched by a corresponding change in public attitudes, or what is sometimes called political culture.

In his 1991 book *Pericles of Athens and the Birth of Democracy,* Donald Kagan, a professor of classics at Yale, propounds a principle that is as valid today as it was 2,500 years ago. Democratic governance, he writes, relies on three conditions: "The first is to have a set of good institutions; the second is to have a body of citizens who possess a good understanding of the principles of democracy, or who have developed a character consistent with the democratic way of life; and the third is to have a high quality of leadership, at least at critical moments." All this takes time—not just years but decades, the passing of a generation or more.

As Sergei Kovalyov, the human rights activist and Yeltsin adviser-turned-critic, put it after the Russian election, "The quality of democracy depends heavily on the quality of the democrats. We have to wait for a critical mass to accumulate—a critical mass of people with democratic principles . . . Without this, everything will be like now, always in fits and starts." Looking back on the tumult and exasperations of the past year, he concluded, "Our era of romantic democracy is long over. We have finally fallen to earth."[14]

The American response to democrats in Russia and everywhere should be: Welcome to the terra firma of real politics, which for us is terra cognita; as you find your way, we'll be with you, through all the fits and starts, so long as you keep moving in the right direction.

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[14] Quoted in David Remnick, "Letter from Russia: The War for the Kremlin," *The New Yorker,* July 22, 1996, p. 57.

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America's own experience should make us patient, persistent, and respectful with those who are in the early stages of the transition from colonialism and autocracy. After the United States became a "new independent state" in 1776, it took 11 years to draft a constitution, 89 to abolish slavery, 144 to give women the vote, 188 to extend full constitutional protections to all citizens. And four score and seven years along the way, we were in the midst of a civil war.

As Americans go to the polls on November 5 to choose a president for the fifty-third time and to elect the 105th Congress, we should keep in mind that modern democracy is a work in progress, even in its birthplace—but that the world continues to look to the United States for leadership not just because of our economic and military might, but also because we are at our best when promoting and defending the same political principles abroad that we live by at home. To sustain the support of the American public for international leadership, American foreign policy must continue to be based on the nature of our society and on our character as a people as well as on our interests as a state. Only in an increasingly democratic world will the American people feel themselves truly secure.

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Defense in an Age of Hope

William J. Perry

PREVENT, DETER, DEFEAT

RALPH WALDO Emerson noted that in times of revolution, "the energies of all men are searched by fear and by hope." We are living in such an age of revolution. Our hopes are stimulated by the success of democracy around the globe since the end of the Cold War, the growth of new trade relationships, and the expansion of communications worldwide. Our fears are stimulated by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic hatreds that rip states asunder, terrorism by extremist groups, and regional aggression by rogue nations. The stark contrast between these hopes and fears makes clear that this new era is characterized by humankind's increased capacity for both good and evil. This in turn makes clear that in addition to revolutions in politics, economics, and technology, there must also be a revolution in our thinking about security strategy. The United States, as the world's sole superpower, militarily and economically, must lead the way.

During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear holocaust hung over our heads like a dark cloud, the West prepared to meet an armored assault in Central Europe, and proxy wars flared all over the world. These daunting threats have gone away, but they have been replaced by new dangers. Nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of rogue nations or terrorists who—unlike the nuclear powers during the Cold War—might not be deterred by the threat of retaliation. In Central and Eastern Europe, the difficult transition to democracy and market economies could lead to civil wars or even the reemergence of totalitarian regimes hostile to the West. Around the world, an explo-

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sion of local and regional conflicts, often rooted in deep-seated ethnic and religious hatreds, brings suffering to tens of millions. These conflicts do not directly threaten the survival of the United States, but they can threaten American allies and vital interests, particularly if the regional aggressors possess weapons of mass destruction.

These new dangers make protecting America's security a different and in some ways more complex task than it was during the Cold War. Then, the United States structured its forces to deter a global war with the Soviet Union. All other threats, including regional ones, were considered lesser-but-included cases, and the United States assumed that its forces were capable of handling them. Today, while global conflict is far less likely, the danger of regional conflict is neither lesser nor included and must be taken explicitly into account in structuring U.S. forces.

In the post–Cold War security environment, U.S. strategy for managing conflict rests on three basic lines of defense. The first line of defense is to prevent threats from emerging; the second is to deter threats that do emerge; and the third, if prevention and deterrence fail, is to defeat the threat using military force. Like the Cold War strategy of deterrence, the strategy of prevent-deter-defeat relies on close cooperation with American friends and allies.

PREVENTIVE DEFENSE

TODAY THE United States has a unique historical opportunity to foster peace through preventive defense. As preventive medicine creates the conditions that support health, making disease less likely and surgery unnecessary, so preventive defense creates the conditions that support peace, making war less likely and deterrence unnecessary.

Twice before in this century America had a similar opportunity. After World War I, it rejected the League of Nations and chose to isolate itself from the world. Isolationism, coupled with the European victors' strategy of reparations and revenge toward the defeated Central Powers, failed to prevent the conditions for future conflict. Indeed, it helped create them, and over 300,000 Americans died in a second world war.

After World War II, America chose the path of engagement, taking a leading role in creating the United Nations and promoting a postwar

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program of reconciliation and reconstruction in both Europe and Japan. The economies of Western Europe and Japan rebounded, democracy grew deep roots, and America's military cooperation and strategic alliances flourished. The Marshall Plan, combining a vision of American world leadership with a deep understanding that what happens abroad affects America's security, stands as the epitome of preventive defense.

But George Marshall's vision was only half realized, because Joseph Stalin slammed the door on Marshall's offer of assistance. Within a few years the world was divided into two armed camps and nuclear weapons had made global war too terrible to contemplate. Thus deterrence, not prevention, became the overarching security strategy of the Cold War.

The Cold War is over, but the peace is not yet secure. While the world does not need another Marshall Plan, the United States is building on Marshall's core beliefs that the United States must remain a global power and that the best security policy is one that prevents conflict. The U.S. program of preventive defense rests on the premises that fewer weapons of mass destruction in fewer hands makes America and the world safer; that more democracy and more free-market economies in more nations means less chance of conflict; and that defense establishments have an important role to play in building democracy, trust, and understanding in and among nations.

REDUCING THE NUCLEAR DANGER

NOWHERE IS preventive defense more important than in countering the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. A potential aggressor's possession of weapons of mass destruction increases not only the lethality of any conflict but the chances of conflict arising in the first place. A nuclear-armed Iraq or North Korea would not just be a more deadly adversary in combat; it would be harder to deter and more likely to coerce its neighbors or to start a war in the first place.

Rogue nations' aspirations to obtain weapons of mass destruction are set against the backdrop of the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. Instead of one nuclear empire, the region suddenly had four new states with nuclear weapons on their soil: Russia, Kazakstan,

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Ukraine, and Belarus. The depressed economies of those nations created a potential buyers' market for weapons of mass destruction, including the materials that go into them and the work force and infrastructure that produce and support them. Unsettled political conditions in the four countries made safeguarding the weapons and materials potentially more difficult.

All this required the United States to augment its Cold War nuclear strategy of deterrence with a post–Cold War strategy of prevention. The most effective way to prevent proliferation is to dismantle existing arsenals—what former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin dubbed "defense by other means." Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, created by Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) in 1991, the United States has helped Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakstan remove over 4,000 nuclear warheads from deployment and dismantle more than 800 bombers and ballistic missile launchers. In January, I joined my Russian and Ukrainian counterparts in personally demolishing an SS-19 silo at the Pervomaysk missile complex in Ukraine. Pervomaysk was the crown jewel of the former Soviet ICBM system, housing 700 nuclear warheads aimed at targets in the United States. By June the missile field was a sunflower field (the flowers are a cash crop in Ukraine) and Ukraine had become nuclear-weapons-free. All nuclear weapons were removed from Kazakstan last year, and by the end of 1996 Belarus will be rid of nuclear weapons. Nunn-Lugar funds also help the former Soviet nuclear states secure the weapons and materials to keep them from finding their way into the global marketplace. Under Project Sapphire, for instance, the United States removed 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium from Kazakstan to safe storage in Oak Ridge, Tennessee.

America must not miss its third chance to make the world safer through preventive defense.

Ultimately, preventing proliferation means more than just dismantling Cold War nuclear arsenals. It also means leading the fight, as the United States did last year, for the indefinite extension of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; working to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force; seeking ratification of the Chemical

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Weapons Convention; working to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention and the Missile Technology Control Regime; taking the lead in a range of international export controls to limit the flow of goods and technologies that could be used to make weapons of mass destruction; and enforcing sanctions against rogue nations bent on acquiring the weapons.

Sometimes preventing proliferation means employing "coercive diplomacy"—a combination of diplomacy and defense measures. In 1994 the United States used such a combination to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The diplomatic measures consisted of threats by the United States and other nations in the region to impose economic sanctions if North Korea did not stop its program and the promise of assistance in the production of commercial electrical power if it did. The defense measures consisted of a simultaneous beefing up of U.S. military forces in the region. The result is that while Pyongyang continues to pose a conventional military threat on the Korean peninsula, its nuclear weapons program has been frozen.

All in all, since 1991 the United States has been instrumental in eliminating or reversing nuclear weapon programs in six states: Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakstan, Iraq, North Korea, and South Africa.

DEFENSE ENGAGEMENT AND DEMOCRACY

The United States has long maintained extensive contacts with the defense establishments of allies as part of an overall policy of maintaining overseas presence in times of peace. Today, however, the United States is expanding these ties to other nations to help enlarge the community of free-market democracies, understanding that this is good for America's national security. Such engagement is a key element of U.S. preventive defense strategy.

Many nations around the world have come to agree that democracy is the best system of government. But important steps must be taken before worldwide consensus can become a worldwide reality. Most of the new democracies are fragile. Elections are a necessary but insufficient condition for a free society; democracy is learned behavior. Democratic values must be embedded in the key institutions of these nations if they are to flourish as democracies.

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The Defense Department has a pivotal role to play in that effort. In virtually every new democracy—in the former Soviet Union, in Central and Eastern Europe, in South America, and in Asia—the military is a major force. In many cases it is the most cohesive institution in the country, containing a large percentage of the educated elite and controlling important resources. In short, it is an institution that can help support democracy or subvert it.

Societies undergoing the transformation from totalitarianism to democracy may well be tested at some point by a crisis, whether economic, a reversal on human rights and freedoms, or a border or an ethnic dispute with a neighboring country. If such a crisis occurs, the United States wants that nation's military to come down on the side of democracy and economic reform and play a positive role in resolving the crisis, not a negative role in fanning the flames or using the crisis as a pretext for a military coup. This administration has sought to exert a positive influence on these important institutions through regular, working contacts with U.S. military and civilian defense personnel—a task made easier by the fact that every military in the world looks to the U.S. armed forces as the model to be emulated.

Washington wants armies to come down on the side of democracy in a crisis.

In this effort, preventive defense employs a variety of tools that not only show nations how armed forces function in a democracy but also serve to build openness and trust between nations. For instance, the International Military Education and Training program, a joint Defense-State undertaking, sponsors officers from the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries (and elsewhere) at American institutions while they study the fundamentals of civil-military relations, such as how to operate a military in a democratic society under civilian control and with legislative oversight. Other officers attend the Marshall Center in Germany and the Asia-Pacific Center in Hawaii.

Another tool is teams of American military officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian defense officials dispatched to newly democratic countries to help them build modern, professional military establish-

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ments under strong civilian defense leadership. Since 1992 such teams have made thousands of contacts in more than a dozen newly independent nations. The contacts have encouraged Hungary to enact new laws placing its military under civilian, democratic control; assisted Romania in developing a new code of conduct for its armed forces based on the American Uniform Code of Military Justice; and helped Polish, Hungarian, Czech, and Bulgarian officers and senior military and civilian defense officials master techniques of national defense planning.

Multinational training exercises in peacekeeping, disaster relief, and search-and-rescue operations are an invaluable tool in promoting trust and reducing tensions among nations that have long been at odds. In addition, they enable forces from different countries to operate together more effectively, a vital benefit given the increasing frequency of combined peacekeeping operations.

Finally, confidence-building measures build trust between countries. Among the most important of such measures are ones promoting openness about military budgets, plans, and policies—something Western defense officials take for granted but which is entirely foreign to the traditions of many countries. Openness, after all, is an unusual concept in defense, for the art of war involves secrecy and surprise. The art of peace, however, involves exactly the opposite—openness and trust. Through openness about security matters, nations gain insights into each other's strategic intentions, reducing pressure to engage in arms competition and chances for miscalculation.

REALIZING MARSHALL'S DREAM

In Europe and Central Asia, these tools of preventive defense all come together in NATO's Partnership for Peace, proposed by the United States in 1993 and inaugurated in 1994. PFP is integrating the fledgling democracies of Eastern and Central Europe, Russia, and the Newly Independent States into a new overall European security architecture. But the effects reverberate well beyond the security realm. Partners are also working to uphold democracy, tolerate diversity, and honor the rights of minorities and freedom of expression. They are working to build market economies, develop democratic control of their military forces, and respect the sovereignty of bordering countries.

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

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

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

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

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In many of these nations, aspiration to NATO membership has become the rock on which all major political parties base their platforms. Consensus on that unifying goal makes compromise and reconciliation on other issues possible. Indeed, PFP is not just "defense by other means" but "democracy by other means," and it is helping turn George Marshall's dream of a democratic and unified Europe into a reality. To lock in these gains, NATO must ensure that the ties created under PFP continue to deepen, and proceed with its program of gradual but steady outreach and enlargement to the east. Equally important, for nations that do not aspire to NATO membership in the near term, PFP provides a continuing framework for security cooperation with NATO.

The art of war requires secrecy and surprise; the art of peace, openness and trust.

Preventive defense policies are also helping integrate Russia into a new European security architecture. Russia has been a crucial part of the European security picture for over 300 years and will remain a key player in coming decades, for better or for worse. The United States, NATO, and Russia are seeking to make it for the better through the U.S.-Russian "pragmatic partnership" (including Nunn-Lugar and other cooperative efforts), Russian participation in PFP, and the nascent special NATO-Russia security relationship.

Ironically, the blueprint for the special NATO-Russia relationship followed from working together during the course of 1996 in Bosnia, where Russian troops have served in the American Multi-National Division of NATO's peace Implementation Force (IFOR). This participation has demonstrated Russia's commitment to participating in a positive way in the future security architecture of Europe. At meetings in June in Brussels, NATO and Russia agreed to station Russian officers at alliance headquarters and subordinate commands and to send NATO officers to the Russian General Staff in Moscow, thus institutionalizing the liaison program begun through IFOR. More recently, Secretary of State Warren Christopher has proposed formalizing the emerging relationship between Russia and NATO.

Other positive signs are emanating from Bosnia. There, NATO and PFP nations are seeing the first benefits of combined peacekeeping

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exercises, which have allowed many partner nations to make valuable contributions to IFOR. The killing in Bosnia has stopped, elections have been held, and together, the 32 nations of IFOR are holding open the door to Marshall's Europe for the peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Until late last year, to say that "the future history of Europe is being written in Bosnia" was to make a profoundly pessimistic statement. Today, however, it qualifies as guarded optimism.

PREVENTIVE DEFENSE WORLDWIDE

SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLES of preventive defense are by no means confined to Europe, Russia, and Central Asia. Last year in Williamsburg, Virginia, for example, the United States hosted the first-ever Defense Ministerial of the Americas, allowing the 34 democracies of the Western hemisphere—all the nations save Cuba—to join in building a zone of stability in a region once destabilized by Cold War tensions. Again, the tools include joint training and education programs, information sharing on defense, and confidence-building measures. Whereas in Europe the United States and NATO have taken the lead in promoting these activities, in the Americas a consensus has shaped them and Washington has encouraged them. The process continued this year with Argentina hosting the second Defense Ministerial of the Americas in early October.

In the Asia-Pacific region, preventive defense means maintaining strong alliances with America's democratic allies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Australia; fully participating in multilateral security dialogues, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum; and pursuing a policy of comprehensive engagement with China, including the Chinese military. In the best case, engaging China's military may allow the United States to have a positive influence on this important player in Chinese politics. At the very least, engagement between the military establishments will improve mutual understanding and lower the chances of a conflict arising from a misunderstanding.

What makes preventive defense work, whether in Russia, Europe, the Balkans, the Americas, or the Asia-Pacific, is American leadership. No other country in the world has the resources, the will, and

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the prestige to reach out to so many corners of the globe. At the same time, no one should think that preventive defense is a philanthropic venture—it is not. Preventive defense involves hard work and ingenuity today so that the United States does not have to expend blood and treasure tomorrow.

DETERRING THREATS

WHILE PREVENTIVE defense holds great promise, it is a strategy for influencing the world, not compelling it to America's will. Simply put, it will not always work. That is why, as Secretary of Defense, my top priority is maintaining strong, ready forces to deter and defeat threats to America's security interests.

The risk of global conflict is greatly reduced from the time of the Cold War, but as long as nuclear weapons still exist, some risk remains. The United States, therefore, retains a reduced but highly effective nuclear force as a deterrent. This deterrent hedge is compatible with significant reductions in American (and Russian) nuclear forces under START I and START II (after the latter's ratification by the Russian parliament), and with American support for the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The nuclear hedge strategy is complemented by a program to develop a ballistic missile defense system that could be deployed to protect the continental United States from limited attacks, should a strategic threat to the nation arise from intercontinental ballistic missiles in the hands of rogue states or terrorists.

To deter regional conflict, the United States must maintain strong, ready, forward-deployed, conventionally armed forces; make those forces' presence felt; possess the credible capability to project decisive military force where American interests are threatened; and demonstrate the will to use it. The United States is the only nation on earth today whose security interests are truly global in scope. Hot spots in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia can erupt with little warning, threatening vital American interests. Thus the size and composition of U.S. military forces are based on the need to deter and, if necessary, fight and win, in concert with regional allies, two major regional conflicts nearly simultaneously. The guiding princi-

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ple is that the United States will fight to win, and win decisively, quickly, and with a minimum of casualties.

While the diminished threat of global conflict has allowed the United States to reduce its force structure by one-third from the Cold War high, the increased risk of regional conflict prevents further significant reductions. One of the paradoxes for defense planning in the post–Cold War era is that the increased risk of regional conflict necessitates very substantial conventional forces just when the diminished risk of global conflict is undermining the political rationale for a large standing army, air force, or navy.

The solution lies in innovative leveraging of forces, enabling the military to do more with less. Such leveraging allows the United States to execute its strategy with a force structure of about 1.5 million active duty personnel and 900,000 reserve personnel. The most important way the United States leverages its force structure is by maintaining a significant portion of it overseas where it can positively shape the international environment and more effectively deter aggression. Approximately 100,000 U.S. forces are forward deployed in Europe, with another 100,000 in the Pacific and 12,000 to 20,000 in the Arabian Gulf region, all in a high state of readiness. This presence demonstrates U.S. security commitments, underwrites regional stability, provides initial crisis response capability, and improves coalition effectiveness in the event deterrence fails.

In some regions, however, lack of basing facilities, political sensitivities, or cost considerations make other means of establishing overseas presence more advantageous. These include:

Pre-positioned equipment afloat and ashore in the Arabian Gulf region, for example, that allows the United States to insert a substantial deterrent force into the region, when needed, in a fraction of the time it took in 1990 when Iraq invaded Kuwait. In addition to the gulf, the United States also maintains pre-positioned equipment in the Indian Ocean, Korea, and Europe.

Carrier battle groups give the United States highly mobile deterrent forces ready for deployment anywhere in the world.

Marine Expeditionary Units and *Air Expeditionary Forces* fulfill a similar function, giving the United States almost immediate, self-reliant, self-sustaining presence tailored to and trained for the crisis

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scenarios they are likely to face. The units are also able to operate in the most austere environments, as shown in recent deployments in Liberia, Jordan, and Qatar. These forces demonstrate U.S. resolve and help prevent crises from developing into full-blown conflicts.

Central to the United States' ability to leverage its force structure is its airlift and sealift capability, which makes possible rapid transportation of troops and their equipment to distant theaters. Quick deployment of forces to a crisis decreases the likelihood that they will actually have to be used and increases chances for success if force is necessary. No other country in history has had the ability to project force to any corner of the globe as quickly and as efficiently as the United States in the 1990s.

While being able to fight and win is essential, that ability alone cannot deter conflict. Deterrence stems from military capability coupled with political will, both real and perceived; credibility is as important as military capability. Deterrence failed in 1990, when Iraq doubted America's political will to defend Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. America demonstrated that will through a costly but highly successful war to evict Iraqi forces from Kuwait. In contrast, deterrence succeeded in October 1994 when Iraq again moved forces to the Kuwaiti border. This time, within a few days the United States had deployed 200 fighter aircraft, an armored brigade, a Marine Expeditionary Unit, and a carrier battle group to the theater, creating a presence that had taken many weeks to assemble in 1990. Faced with that presence and the lessons of Operation Desert Storm, Saddam Hussein sent his brigades back to their barracks.

DEFEATING THREATS

Deterrence can fail, however, particularly against an irrational or desperate adversary, so the United States must be prepared to actually use military force. America's ability to fight and win conflicts in the post–Cold War era rests on two attributes of U.S. forces: readiness to fight and the capability to employ modern technology.

Readiness comes from recruiting high-quality people, training them to succeed, and retaining them for full careers. The worldwide shift to all-volunteer forces from conscription-based ones reflects

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other nations' appreciation of what the United States has achieved through its all-volunteer force. Recruiting requires an investment in time, energy, and resources. The U.S. military is able to compete with civilian employers by offering fair salaries, solid benefits, challenging work, and an opportunity to serve. A decent quality of life, including adequate housing, health care, and other benefits, is critical to retaining top-quality recruits for the duration of their careers.

Bringing troops to a competitive edge requires a commitment to intensive training that makes full use of growing simulation capabilities, integrated with realistic field experiences. Whether engaging in armored combat at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, a Red Flag exercise at Nellis Air Force Base, "virtual reality" urban warfare training at Fort Polk, or any other of a wide variety of training experiences, military personnel prepare for missions in realistic "scrimmages" designed to be "harder than the game." Knowing that most mistakes occur in the first experience of battle, the U.S. military attempts to ensure that that first experience is actually a practice. It also ensures that troops are trained, ready, and equipped to protect themselves against attacks by terrorists and those who would use, or threaten to use, nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons to counter the United States' conventional military superiority.

EXPLOITING TECHNOLOGY

WELL-TRAINED, high-quality, professional forces allow the United States to fully exploit modern technology. The lesson of Desert Storm was that the United States should seek not only an edge but an "unfair" competitive advantage over its opponents. It saves lives, not only of American troops but also among allies, noncombatants, and even adversaries. Technology can give the United States such an advantage while introducing revolutionary changes in other areas that will affect force planning, costs, and strategy.

The way U.S. military leaders regard technology has changed profoundly over the last 20 years. During the Cold War the United States developed the concept of the reconnaissance strike force, key to its "offset strategy": a combination of stealth aircraft, precision-guided munitions, and advanced surveillance technology to offset superior

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

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

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

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numbers of Soviet forces. Some military leaders and outside experts believed that such advanced technology was too delicate or would not work in the fog of war. But the concept proved itself in Desert Storm, crushing the Iraqi military force with very low U.S. losses. Skeptics became believers. Today military commanders are finding myriad uses not only for smart weapons but also for smart intelligence, smart communications, and smart logistics, which are built on the same advanced information and telecommunications technology.

Some critics, including the U.S. General Accounting Office, continue to question the effectiveness of high-tech weaponry, particularly precision-guided munitions. In examining the cost and impact of these weapons in isolation, the critics ignore the synergy created when precision weapons are combined with air dominance, superior battlespace awareness, and focused logistics—the vital elements of what is called Force Dominance:

Air dominance allows U.S. strike forces to devastate opposition ground and naval forces, while ensuring that U.S. ground and naval forces can operate without fear of opposing air forces. Key to air dominance are stealth technology (which allows many U.S. aircraft to evade opposing air defenses and interceptors), the superior performance of U.S. interceptors and their air-to-air missiles, and the U.S. ability to quickly suppress the enemy's ground-based air defenses.

Precision strike forces permit the United States to destroy enemy fixed targets with one or two weapons instead of engaging in barrage bombing of area targets. They also permit the destruction of critical mobile targets including missile launchers and armored columns. Desert Storm amply demonstrated the overall effectiveness of the first generation of precision-guided weapons, despite their vulnerability to opposition countermeasures and adverse weather. The second generation will overcome these limitations and allow the achievement of true "fire and forget" capability.

Superior battlespace awareness means giving U.S. commanders complete, real-time knowledge of the disposition of all enemy and friendly forces and denying such knowledge to enemy commanders. The U.S. military is working to achieve this superior awareness by tying together information gained from national sensors, the Global Positioning System, and tactical sensors and delivering the

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resulting picture into the hands of tactical commanders through digital encrypted communications.

Focused logistics results from applying advanced technologies to logistics efforts, giving rise to the ability to track supplies around the globe, knowing what each shipment contains, its location, and time of arrival at the location where it is needed. That capability can provide a decisive warfighting edge. It can also be a real manpower and cost saver, cutting the "tail to tooth" ratio by at last freeing the military from the need to maintain large stockpiles at every echelon in a theater. Precision-guided munitions will also indirectly affect logistics because ratios of one or two shots per kill (instead of dozens or hundreds) mean that old estimates of weapons supplies go out the window. If a target can be hit on the first few shots, the military can achieve huge savings in costs and manpower, since there is little need to build, store, transport, and guard massive supplies of weapons.

Force Dominance is the military's goal—not just an edge but an "unfair advantage."

Desert Storm demonstrated that when the numbers of forces were roughly equal, American technological advantages gave the U.S. military the ability not just to offset an opponent's power but to dominate. Today Force Dominance is the goal of the U.S. military, and there is little question that it can be developed to great effect. Desert Storm showed the potential with only the first generation of systems and concepts. Today the United States is moving to the second generation and developing the operational concepts, doctrine, and tactics that go with it. Nevertheless, we have still, in my estimate, accomplished only a fraction of what is possible with the new technologies already within reach.

To access the new information technology that makes Force Dominance possible, it is absolutely critical that defense acquisition reform proceed. The current acquisition system limits the Defense Department's access to the largely private commercial sources where the new technologies are being developed—directly, by erecting regulatory barriers, or indirectly, by decreasing the ability to purchase and employ new generations of technology in a timely way. Full implementation of legislative and regulatory changes enacted two years

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ago will allow the department to save literally billions of dollars as well as to rapidly incorporate cutting-edge technology into the military's weapons systems.

THE AMERICAN OBLIGATION

IN THE unstable environment of the Cold War's wake, the United States has not only the opportunity but the responsibility to help ensure a safer world for generations of Americans. President Clinton has said, "As the world's greatest power, we have an obligation to lead and, at times when our interests and our values are sufficiently at stake, to act."

The prevent-deter-defeat strategy supports American global leadership in this new era. Important parts of the program, however, need to be better understood by both the national security community and the American public. We as a nation need to gain a firmer grasp of the pivotal role of preventive defense and the complexities of deterring and defeating threats in the world today. Only such understanding can give rise to the broad-based public support within our own democracy that is crucial to achieving the strategy's ultimate goal: a safer post–Cold War world characterized not by the realization of our darkest fears but of our greatest hopes.

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Germany's New Right

Jacob Heilbrunn

LIBERATING NATIONALISM FROM HISTORY

WHEN THE Berlin Wall collapsed in 1989, a number of observers predicted that a reunited Germany would begin experimenting with its newfound power and revert to the bellicose habits of the past. The Bonn political elite, however, has been remarkably resistant to change. While Chancellor Helmut Kohl has flirted with attempts to "normalize" Germany's Nazi past and create a self-confident nation, and the Bavarian Christian Social Union has bucked the pro-Europe course, he and his Christian Democratic Union (CDU) have not deviated from their efforts to submerge a unified Germany in a federal Europe that boasts a common currency. Nor have any of the other major political parties, from Kohl's coalition partner, the liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP), to the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Even the antinomian Greens embrace the idea of a centralized Europe as a means of diluting German economic and military power. In his new book, *The Wrong Path of Nationalism,* Heiner Geissler, former general secretary of the CDU, expresses the conventional wisdom: "Germany has achieved its great successes in economic, social, and foreign policy not as a classical nation-state, but rather as a democratic, cosmopolitan, and European-oriented country."[1] Konrad Adenauer's famous campaign slogan, "No Experiments!" remains the unofficial motto of postwar Germany.

Since 1989, however, this doctrine has begun to be challenged by the elite that first created, in the nineteenth century, the idea of a unified German nation: German intellectuals. A change is taking place in Germany, not at the political but at the intellectual level. Whether or not it turns into a political movement or is taken up by

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one of the established political parties, the change will have a serious impact on Germany's redefinition of its identity and interests in the new Europe. Fought largely over the lessons of the past, today's and coming battles about national pride could well shape Germany's future. In modern Germany politics does not make history; history makes politics.

A profound move to the right has been taking place among Germany's best-known novelists, such as Hans Magnus Enzensberger and Martin Walser. Bonn University political scientist Hans-Peter Schwarz, the biographer of Adenauer, has recently written a book entitled *The Central Power of Europe,* calling for a recognition of German power. But no heretics have attacked the dogmas of the old Federal Republic of Germany more passionately than the nationalist intellectuals who lead what has become known as the *Neue Rechte,* or new right. The German new right consists not of skinheads in jackboots but journalists, novelists, professors, and young lawyers and business executives. Its champions include former Chancellor Willy Brandt's widow, Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt, the filmmaker Hans Jürgen Syberberg, the playwright Botho Strauss, the historian Ernst Nolte, CDU parliamentarian Heinrich Lummer, and sympathizers such as the self-described "German-Jewish patriot" and historian Michael Wolffsohn. Paradoxically, the new right is made up of nationalists from both ends of the political spectrum. Nationalists on the left hope to remake the SPD; nationalists on the right, the Free Democratic Party. Everyone from former Social Democratic Chancellor Helmut Schmidt to Heiner Geissler has denounced the movement, and dozens of alarmist books with such titles as *Is the Republic Capsizing?* have appeared in the past two years.

Underlying new right positions is a deep hatred of the westernization of Germany under the influence of the United States over the last five decades. The advent of an American-style multicultural society is perceived to pose a great threat to Germanness. Hatred of the United States is what binds the right nationalists and defectors from the left who make up the movement. But above all, whether the topic is World War II or current immigration, the new right

[1]Heiner Geissler, *Der Irrweg des Nationalismus,* Weinhem: Beltz Athenäum, 1995, p. 9.

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seeks to rehabilitate German nationalism by seizing on communist and leftist excesses to elide Germany's own misdeeds.

1968 AND ALL THAT

THE NEW RIGHT calls itself the generation of 1989, and its main foe is the leftist generation of 1968. The '89ers do not seek to become a mass movement. They hope to emulate the tactics of the '68 generation, which "marched through the institutions," as the '60s phrase had it, to win influence in newspapers and magazines like *Die Zeit* and *Der Spiegel,* in think tanks, and in the SPD. Such figures as Rainer Zitelmann, an editor at the conservative newspaper *Die Welt,* accuse the '68 generation led by left-wingers including the philosopher Jürgen Habermas, the novelist Günter Grass, and the historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler of having infiltrated the media and universities where they wield a "fascism cudgel," enforcing a moralistic and "politically correct" version of history that emphasizes the uniqueness of Nazi crimes so as to suppress German national pride. The stranglehold this self-accusatory history has on Germans, they say, makes it almost heretical to attack the Maastricht Treaty on European Union or the influx of immigrants. In a kind of rhetorical jujitsu, they depict themselves as revolutionaries seeking to overthrow a "totalitarian" society ruthlessly run by an ossified '68 generation.



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Rainer Zitelmann

Ultimately, the struggle between the '68ers and '89ers might be dubbed one between the antifascists and the anti-antifascists. Both define the past in terms of the present. Antifascists see the Bonn republic as a vibrant liberal democracy that broke with the *Sonderweg,* or anti-Western German special path that ended in Nazism. The antifascist '68ers have created what is known in Germany as a *Betroffenheitskultur*—a culture of contrition in which every conceivable political issue is viewed through the prism of the Nazi past.

Anti-antifascists will have none of this. In their version of history, the real historical detour was the creation of a westernized Bonn republic that substituted self-flagellation for an assertion of German national

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interests and honor. Anti-antifascists do not deny the reality of the Holocaust; instead, they seek to depict Nazism in a milder light by portraying Hitler as a social modernizer and harping on the crimes of Stalin. The anti-antifascists argue that the self-effacing Bonn republic that based its identity on antifascism must be replaced by a self-confident Berlin republic that returns to nationalist doctrines respectable before the Nazi regime took power. A "normal" Germany freed of the albatross of the Nazi past will be able to assert its interests like any other nation. With the collapse of the self-proclaimed East German antifascist utopia, the way has been cleared for a return to German nationalism.

ADENAUER'S GERMANY

THE SOURCES of the postwar German right actually lie on the left. The westernized Federal Republic was shaped by two forces: Chancellor Konrad Adenauer and the 1968 generation of student revolutionaries. Adenauer's great accomplishment was breaking with the radical conservatism espoused by such Weimar intellectuals as the Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt and the writer Ernst Jünger to found a new political tradition called West German conservatism. It was the SPD, led by Kurt Schumacher, a survivor of 12 years in Nazi concentration camps, that espoused continuity with the German past. The SPD rejected Adenauer's efforts to anchor Germany in NATO and the European Community in the hope of creating a neutral and unified nation. Schumacher, who memorably described Adenauer as "Chancellor of the Allies," saw Adenauer's policies as betraying German interests—a theme that the new right has revived in returning to the Weimar-era tactic of jockeying between East and West that Adenauer jettisoned.

If Adenauer grounded Germany in the West politically, the successor generation in the SPD led by Willy Brandt completed Germany's cultural westernization. Brandt supported the efforts of the '68 student revolutionaries to break with the stern, patriarchal style of the Adenauer years. The '68 generation confronted the crimes of the Nazi past that their parents had suppressed and produced an overdue cultural revolution. Jürgen Habermas, among others, imported American and European exile social thought into Germany to legitimize a

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

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

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Kurt Schumacher

break with the established German order. But part of the '68 movement degenerated into the terrorism of the Baader-Meinhof Red Army Faction, and others went on from anti-Nazism to pacifism and anti-Americanism, on the one hand, and to denouncing "consumer terror" on the other. They claimed that the Federal Republic was not a real democracy but, in some ways, a continuation of the Nazi regime. The '68ers consolidated their ideological revolt in the universities, schools, churches, trade unions, and the media. Schoolchildren who refused to attend peace demonstrations were given lower marks, and in 1977 one in five professors reported being attacked in some form—personal violence, classroom disruption—by the radical left.[2] Berlin, which was exempt from the military draft, became a hotbed of left-wing anarchists who took over entire sections of the city. Instead of facing down the new left, Brandt and his éminence grise Egon Bahr adopted it, compounding the mischief. They presided over an SPD and an Ostpolitik that abandoned the idea of reunification and blurred the moral boundaries between democracy and communism.

In the mid-1970s such figures as the philosopher Hermann Lübbe and the historian Michael Stürmer led a neoconservative backlash. In dismissing the idea of a single Germany and embracing permissiveness, argued Stürmer, a gifted historian and later a speechwriter for Chancellor Kohl, the '68ers had left Germany without a sense of pride in its past. When in 1986 the historian Ernst Nolte followed up Stürmer's writings with an essay in the mainstream *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* entitled "The Past that Will Not Pass Away," the *Historikerstreit*, or historians' dispute, was born. Centered on the uniqueness of the Holocaust, the *Historikerstreit* adumbrated the themes that have preoccupied Germany since 1989. In the essay, Nolte

[2]Jeffrey Herf, *War by Other Means: Soviet Power, West German Resistance, and the Battle of the Euromissiles*, New York: Free Press, 1991, pp. 102-103.

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depicted Lenin's Red Terror as a dress rehearsal for the Holocaust and the Holocaust itself as a defensive response to "Asiatic terror."

At that time Nolte spoke for a small minority in maintaining that the Holocaust was simply one among a number of horrific historical events. His violation of the taboo in Germany on depreciating the uniqueness of the Final Solution outraged liberal West German sensitivities particularly because he had been on the left in 1963 when his seminal book, *Three Faces of Fascism,* was published. Today Ernst Nolte is nothing less than the *spiritus rector* of the new right.

The passions seething beneath the patina of Nolte's scholarship became manifest when he explained to me, in the beautifully refined German of an older generation, that the nation's identity crisis revealed itself in the way Germany was whipping itself into a lather over the firebombings of shelters for Third World refugees seeking asylum. "When someone throws burning material into a house, they don't necessarily want to kill a human being, but could have completely other intentions," he maintained. They might simply be expressing social frustration, just as left-wing anarchists had expressed their dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the 1960s. Dropping his voice to a whisper, he concluded, "And to characterize it as attempted murder—our justice system has done that—seems highly questionable to me." To Nolte and the new right, the danger is that Germany will be swallowed up in a larger Europe filled with alien races. The United States has inflicted the notion of a multicultural society on Germany—one that is designed to "root out the classes and groups in Germany to whom the responsibility for the First World War and the victory of National Socialism are ascribed."[3]

THE WAR OF MEMORIES

FEW TOPICS bring into relief the tactics of the new right as clearly as the traumatic one of foreign immigration. The rash of neo-Nazi attacks on refugee shelters in the early 1990s delivered a black eye to the Federal Republic's efforts to present a new Germany to the outside world.

[3]Ernst Nolte, *Streitpunkte: Heutige und künftige Kontroversen um den Nationalsozialismus,* Berlin: Propyläen, 1993, p. 428.

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Although the American media exaggerated the extent of the violence, the response of the Bonn government was tardy and flaccid. In January 1996 the torching of a shelter in Lübeck ripped open the German psyche once again. The fire, which killed ten and injured dozens more, took place on the same day that Israeli President Ezer Weizman addressed the Bundestag as part of the new Holocaust Remembrance Day, which German President Roman Herzog had inaugurated to demonstrate that Germany would continue to mark the liberation of Auschwitz even though its 50th anniversary had passed. The country went into a state of collective shock. Mass demonstrations took place, the mayor of Lübeck called for "civil disobedience," and Herzog announced that his patience was "finally coming to an end." Then came a fresh surprise: police suspicions shifted from the neo-Nazis to a disgruntled resident of the shelter.

Firebombing a house, says historian Ernst Nolte, is not always attempted murder.

There the matter would have rested in the old Federal Republic. But this time the German right went on the offensive. Konrad Adam, a journalist sympathetic to the new right, editorialized in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* that Germans' rush to condemn themselves as Nazis epitomized the hold of the "guilt mythology." Figures such as former President Richard von Weizsäcker, the paper said, were members of a "moralizing caste" and "emissaries of a culture of contrition." CDU parliamentarian and former West Berlin Interior Minister Heinrich Lummer wrote in the nationalist weekly *Junge Freiheit* (Young freedom) that it was time to start asking, "How often are Germans the victims of foreign assailants?"

In January the Charlottenburg town hall in Berlin afforded me a ringside seat for what one *Die Zeit* editor called "the war of memories." Meeting there, led by the young historian Rainer Zitelmann, was a faction of the FDP seeking to transform the liberal party into a right-nationalist one, as Jörg Haider did with the Austrian Freedom Party in the mid-1980s. Under the charismatic 46-year-old chairman, who has described immigrants as "social parasites" and concentration camps as "punishment camps," the Freedom Party increased its electoral support from about 10 percent in 1986 to 22 percent in 1995. The

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immediate occasion for the Berlin meeting was the publication of a collection of new right essays entitled *For Freedom.* Echoing Haider, the speakers rose to denounce European monetary union, a multicultural society, and a German obsession with the Nazi past. The most unbuttoned speaker was Klaus Rainer Röhl. Formerly a communist married to a Red Army Faction leader, Röhl now exemplifies the move to the right among many German intellectuals. He fired up the audience of several hundred young Berliners with the news that the "danger comes from the left. We've had enough of this stigmatizing, of this media dictatorship, of this political correctness." After pausing foppishly to finger the pocket watch in the vest of his designer suit, he bellowed, "It is President Herzog who should be apologizing to the inhabitants of Lübeck since everyone presumed that they were Nazis."

Once the meeting ended tumultuously, with the audience hooting down a representative of the mainstream Berlin FDP, we trooped into the beer hall adjoining the meeting room. I sat next to Alexander von Stahl, former attorney general of Germany. After Stahl ordered a round of beers, I asked him about the popular German reaction to Lübeck. "This people is sick! This people is sick!" he erupted. The reaction to Lübeck is incomprehensible, he said, for anyone who is not a German. At the end of the table a young man was explaining how he had taken over FDP meetings in the Spandau and Tempelhof sections of Berlin. "Those boys in Tempelhof are great," a middle-aged woman told me excitedly. "The Germans lie to themselves about their nationhood. These boys are ready to shed their blood for the fatherland." As the evening wound down, I found myself talking to Ansgar Graw, 34, a historian and official at Radio Free Berlin, who ordered a round of schnapps. "In four minutes an Austrian has his birthday at midnight," he said. Glasses clinked to toast Jörg Haider.

THE PAST IS OUR COUNTRY

THE GERMAN new right does not have a politician like Jörg Haider. What it has are intellectuals like Rainer Zitelmann of *Die Welt,* founded by newspaper magnate Axel Springer. Zitelmann is the impresario of the new right. Like Nolte, he has twice had his car firebombed by left-wing anarchists. His notoriety is such that when I

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attended a Bonn conference on the economy, he had merely to rise to ask a question to set some five hundred attendees whispering furiously. A Maoist in high school, he aims to use the tactics of generational conflict and cultural war on behalf of the right. Zitelmann is an indefatigable publicist who has written a score of books on German history and politics. His Ph.D. dissertation transformed the Führer into a social revolutionary deeply influenced by the American New Deal. Zitelmann's goal is to normalize German nationalism by first normalizing the Nazi past.

For most people, argues Karlheinz Weissmann, everyday life in the Third Reich was normal.

When I met him outside the Ullstein Building—Springer built it so that it would tower over the Berlin Wall during the Cold War—Zitelmann brandished an article from Germany's biggest tabloid, *Bild Zeitung*. "Here's an article on the average German," he said. He began reciting the statistics on weight, height, and hobbies, declaring triumphantly after each, "That's me!" At lunch, Zitelmann painted a dire portrait of Germany. Daily politics, he explained, should no longer be determined by the memory of National Socialism. What is popularly known as a *Schlussstrich,* a line under the past, did not need to be drawn. Rather, "a line has to be drawn against this permanent self-flagellation and self-hatred, which produces neo-Nazis in the end. We must become normal." According to Zitelmann, the '68 generation has prevented this from occurring: "The ideology of the '68ers has settled like fine dust . . . into every nook and cranny of society."[4] Zitelmann was previously an editor at the mainstream Ullstein publishing house, where he presided over the publication of a seemingly endless stream of books by young German historians that make for eyebrow-raising reading.

The most vivid example so far of how the new right would palliate the Nazi past is *The Way Into the Abyss.* Because it was published in 1995 as part of the distinguished Propyläen German history series, it created a furor. For weeks the pages of German newspapers were filled with analyses and denunciations of the book. Its author, Karlheinz Weissmann, a high school teacher in Göttingen, had previously written

[4]Rainer Zitelmann, *Wohin treibt unsere Republik?* Frankfurt am Main: Ullstein, 1995, p. 37.

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a book called *Recall Into History* that attacked both the Soviet Union and the United States for dismembering Germany after World War II. *The Way Into the Abyss* builds on that "insight."

The theme of the book is that in neither its intentions nor its actions did Nazi Germany differ from its enemies. In his introduction, Weissmann explains that a moralistic '68 generation has refused to allow historians to depict the Nazi era as it was actually experienced by the German people. After the demise of communism and with the reunification of Germany, the moment has arrived for a demystification of Nazism and a "normalization of historical understanding." While Weissmann never shrinks from depicting the horrors of the concentration camps, he devotes as much space to discussing sports in the Third Reich as he does to the murder of Jews. The constant emphasis is on how everyday life in Germany remained unaltered under the Nazis: the population outside the camps supposedly had full access to foreign newspapers, went dancing, and listened to the radio. Hitler's rise to power was the result of "completely comprehensible political decisions." The entire Nazi era is described in coldly neutral terms, the conclusion being that since some seven million Germans died in World War II, "no people had done so much penance for the deeds that it carried out, or that were carried out in its name."

When I spoke with Weissmann, he went still further. Sherman in Atlanta and the British in South Africa, he said, had engaged in wartime massacres. The Germans were no exception. Anyway, it was not so much ordinary Germans who were at fault during World War II as the Allies. Their failure to aid the German resistance during the July 20, 1944, plot against Hitler, he explained, "completely discredits them." The "Habermas faction" had propagated a version of history that shamed Germans into thinking that they now must accept foreigners and hand out welfare benefits. But economic pressures, coupled with a more objective history, were changing things. No longer would Germans be tyrannized into putting up with an American version of a multicultural society. They would return to their traditional values. "It's all going much more quickly than people realize," he crowed.

For Weissmann's new right followers, his book has become a sacred text. Criticism of it is dismissed as a new instance of political correctness. One young historian defended the book to me as we ate

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dinner in a steak house; waving his knife in the air, he complained, "The German left always accuses us of counting numbers. But they count how many pages Weissmann writes about the Holocaust. If German historians could determine that we killed eight rather than six million Jews, they would jump for joy."

GERMANY AND THE WEST

THE NEW RIGHT is shot through with self-pity. The ambition of Weissmann, Zitelmann, and others is to construct a lachrymose history in which Germans are victims of the United States as much as of the Soviet Union. This became obvious in the first programmatic statement of the new right, *Ties to the West.* A volume of essays edited by Zitelmann, Weissmann, and Michael Grossheim, its appearance in 1993 created something of a sensation in Germany. In the introduction, the editors coyly stated that they were posing questions, not advocating that Germany abandon NATO and the European Union. They even interspersed a few Atlanticist contributors, but it was crystal clear that the new right was less anti-Eastern than anti-Western.

The editors boasted that only a "younger generation" freed of the burdens of the past that bedeviled both conservative Atlanticists and liberal '68ers could objectively assess the drawbacks as well as the benefits of Germany's Western alliance. They envisioned a Germany that would return to old-fashioned geopolitics to maneuver, as it had in the past, between East and West. In a play on Joseph Goebbels' famous 1943 speech in the Berlin Sportpalast calling for "total war," the editors bemoaned the "utopia of a *Totalwestintegration,*" or integration with the West that has assumed a totalitarian character.

Reunification, according to the book, provides a second chance. Jochen Thies, a former assistant to Helmut Schmidt, observed that "in terms of power politics the Federal Republic finds itself . . . in a cloaked, half-hegemonic position like the Bismarckian Reich of 1871 or the Weimar Republic in 1922 after the conclusion of the Rapallo pact [which established relations with the Soviet Union]." Yet in his view, the Bonn political elite remains an emasculated one that cannot summon up the courage to exploit new possibilities.

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Instead, traumatized by the crimes of the Nazi past, it is bent on handing over sovereignty to the European Union.

At the core of the book is the notion that despite Auschwitz, Germany must recognize that it is once again a great power in the middle of Europe. "One precondition is coming to terms with history, whose dark sides cannot be forgotten, but which also cannot determine daily politics," writes Ansgar Graw. There is nothing particularly objectionable about this statement, but it is part of a pattern of equivocation that employs what might be called the "but" technique. Auschwitz was a terrible event, but . . .

Remembrance of the Holocaust is equated with leftist oppression.

The barely suppressed anger that underlay the book spilled over in spectacular fashion in an advertisement signed by several hundred prominent Germans in an April 1995 issue of *Frankfurter Allgemeine.* Appearing on the 50th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, the ad, drafted by Zitelmann, Weissmann, and Heimo Schwilk, stated that the liberal German media's "one-sided" focus on the German surrender as an act of liberation from the Nazi dictatorship obscured the fact that May 8, 1945, was the "beginning of the expulsion, terror, and new oppression in the East and the division of our nation." Insidiously employing the traditional language of German approaches to the history of Nazism, it concluded that "a conception of history that is silent, represses or relativizes these truths cannot serve as the foundation of the self-understanding of a self-confident nation, something we Germans must become within the family of European peoples if we are to prevent similar catastrophes from occurring in the future." Among those attacking the advertisement were Rita Süssmuth, the CDU president of the Bundestag, and Ignatz Bubis, the leader of the Central Council of Jews in Germany, the country's principal Jewish cultural and religious organization. In response, Zitelmann, Weissmann, and Schwilk ran a second advertisement in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* denouncing the "opinion terror of political correctness." The advertisements caused such a furor because they shifted the emphasis from German culpability for World War II to what Germany suffered at the hands of the Red Army, ending up with the Germans as the real victims of the war.

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The ambiguous character of the new right, its skillful maneuvering in what is called in Germany the "gray zone" between conservatism and the radical right, exasperates the German liberal media. Members of the new right claim that they are simply adding a long-suppressed voice to the political spectrum, and that they are only saying Germany needs to rethink its relationship to Europe and the United States. No new right outlet strives harder to project a democratic image than the newspaper *Young Freedom.*

As its spiffy offices attest, *Young Freedom* has strong financial backing from German industrialists. It is attractively designed and publishes a variety of authors writing on everything from foreign policy to rock music. To buttress its democratic credentials, it tries particularly hard to give space to authors on the nationalist left. Its editorials praise Ignatz Bubis' denunciations of anarchists. ("They want to co-opt me," Bubis told me.) The paper, which recently celebrated its tenth anniversary, is a prime target of leftist anarchists, who have firebombed its printing plant in Weimar. Kiosks in Berlin that carry it have received similar treatment. Thus the new right can depict the left, with a grain of truth, as the real repository of authoritarian German tendencies.

With his close-cropped brown hair, jeans, and windbreaker, the 29-year-old editor in chief, Dieter Stein, could pass for an American college student. But Stein, who founded *Young Freedom* while a high school student in Freiburg, has followed in the footsteps of his father, a revisionist military historian. He and his publication have close ties to Jörg Haider and the Austrian Freedom Party; one of Haider's lieutenants sits on the board of the paper. For Stein, as for most other members of the new right, it is German subservience to the United States that provokes ire. The West Germans, he told me, are dishonest. They wish to appear harmless to foreigners. They have a despicable bearing. They lie about their own nationality. East Germans, by contrast, did not suffer from these hang-ups. Whereas the Soviets "chopped off Nazi heads in Leipzig and then stopped," Stein explained, the Americans put the entire nation under "suspicion." West Germans were deprived of their Germanness. "Every West German had to fill out a questionnaire on their activities during World War II," sputtered Stein. "Everyone had to lie."

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THE SELF-CONFIDENT NATION

A PERSISTENT theme of the new right is that Germany must become not only normal, but self-confident. New right history holds that the pliant political class installed by the Western allies after 1945 was replaced by an even more "degenerate" and self-loathing one in 1968. The '68ers have created a politically correct version of history that they enforce through the media with totalitarian efficiency. The idea is that the Bonn republic is as illegitimate as the Weimar Republic or the German Democratic Republic.

GERMAN INFORMATION CENTER

Botho Strauss

The '68ers who have defected to the new right and former East Germans disillusioned with the Federal Republic enunciate these themes most vociferously. One such defector is Botho Strauss, a poet and Germany's leading playwright, winner of the Georg Büchner Prize, the nation's most prestigious literary award. In 1993 Strauss sent shock waves through intellectual and political circles with an essay in *Der Spiegel* entitled "The Swelling Song of the Billy Goat"—the goat being the symbol of the new right in France and Germany. The "Strauss controversy," as it became known, succeeded the *Historikerstreit.* Strauss defended the neo-Nazis as the inevitable product of a deformed '68 generation and attacked the "sinister aeries of the Enlightenment." The Germans, Strauss lamented, had become a deracinated people. They had exchanged a sense of nationhood for rampant consumerism. The neo-Nazis understand that it is necessary to protect German ethnicity, but "that a people wishes to assert its legal customs against another and is prepared to sacrifice blood we no longer understand, and, in our liberal-libertarian self-delusion, view as false and damnable." Strauss concluded by asking whence the next Führer.

Strauss' defection sent the '68ers into a frenzy. For more than a year German papers and magazines were filled with discussions of Strauss and his polemic. "Botho Strauss is a dangerous madman. . . . One had hoped that this kind of farrago had been washed away by the bloodbath of 1945," former SPD General Secretary Peter Glotz wrote. Strauss

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allowed his essay to be used as the lead in a new right manifesto, *The Self-Confident Nation.* Like *Ties to the West,* it consisted of essays by intellectuals and journalists and provided further evidence of the extent to which the new right is made up of former leftists. One contributor, the editor Ulrich Schacht, was born in a women's prison in the German Democratic Republic and later extricated from the east by Willy Brandt. A noted poet, Schacht first joined the SPD, then grew disgusted with its close relations with the regime in East Berlin. Other contributors to the volume include Brigitte Seebacher-Brandt and Wolfgang Templin, a leader of the pro-democracy citizens movement in the GDR.

Like Strauss, these writers view the westernized Bonn republic and the liberal media with contempt. For them Bonn was a deviation from the true course of German history, an excrescence to be replaced by a self-confident Berlin republic. "The time has disappeared, the time from which sorrow, shame, and timorousness arose," wrote Seebacher-Brandt. "It does not exist, and it never has existed—the 'Bonn republic.'" Klaus Rainer Röhl portrays the Bonn political class as quislings who sold out to the United States. Röhl maintains that Jewish emigrants such as the philosopher Theodor Adorno carried out these reeducation efforts. The message is clear.

Underlying this contempt for the Bonn republic is fury at the failure of Willy Brandt's 1968 *Enkel,* or grandchildren, in the SPD to embrace reunification in 1989. In her book *The Left and Unity,* for instance, Seebacher-Brandt excoriated the antipathy toward the German nation among the '68ers: reunification revealed that the "soul of the people" and its "dreams, instincts, and moods" run far "deeper than a superficial left-wing rationality" can comprehend. Tilman Fichter, chief educator at the SPD party school in Bonn, echoes Seebacher-Brandt. In his book *The SPD and the Nation,* Fichter attacks his own '68 generation for suppressing the theme of "national identity" and clinging to the Bonn republic. He calls for a "modern social-democratic understanding of the fatherland." Among former East Germans, the hatred of the westernized Federal Republic is even more pronounced: Frank Castorf, a leading theater director in East Germany, revealed his sympathies for "fascist ideas" in an interview with *Junge Welt.*

While we waited for the subway at the cavernous Friedrichstrasse station, I asked Jens Falk, a former East German and an editor at *Young*

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Freedom, about life in the GDR. "Some things were better," he replied. "Things were regulated." The strapping six-footer pointed at an iron catwalk and laughed. "I probably would be up there patrolling the border. Today no one cares about anybody." He paused. "If I beat you to a pulp here," he said, "no one would lift a finger. There was a feeling of solidarity in the GDR, just as there was in the Third Reich." I looked curious. Was there such a feeling of solidarity? Jens snorted. "Of course, just look at the Wehrmacht, at what kind of men we had there."

WILL IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENCES?

THE EXTENT to which these anti-Western ressentiments gussied up in the language of the new right have penetrated the mainstream is the concern of Heiner Geissler and other Atlanticists in the CDU. Geissler remains a CDU parliamentarian and in *The Wrong Path of Nationalism* warns against a recrudescence of new right doctrines. The 36-year-old Friedbert Pflüger, who studied at Harvard and served as an assistant to former President Weizsäcker, is a member of the Bundestag and a CDU spokesman for disarmament. In 1994 Pflüger wrote a book warning against the inroads the new right was making into traditional conservatism. He called it *Germany Is Drifting.*

Pflüger believes that his warnings helped take some of the wind out of the sails of the new right. When I met him in the spacious, airy new quarters of the Bundestag in Bonn, which seemed to epitomize the liberal spirit of postwar Germany, it was hard to imagine that Germany could drift anywhere. But Pflüger noted that a change has taken place in the political landscape. "In the 1970s," he explained, "he who was for the West and NATO was on the right. Today in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* there are people who say, 'Let's not make an ideology out of the West.'"

The *Frankfurter Allgemeine,* Germany's most distinguished newspaper, plays a key role for the new right. The paper is as ambiguous in its approach to the new right as the movement is about its own intentions. Writers such as Zitelmann and Weissmann sometimes write for it. One of the paper's editorial writers, Eckard Fuhr, contends, "The almost libidinous attachment to the guilty history of Germany . . . directs itself negatively against anyone who views 'ties to the

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West' as a simple and sensible fact, not as the basis for a new therapeutic national cult. . . . There is no reason to carry 'the West' around like a monstrosity."[5]

Perhaps the most important figure at the paper is Frank Schirrmacher, the editor of its feuilleton section. The 40-year-old Schirrmacher is the cultural doyen of Germany. A thoughtful intellectual whose politics are those of Chancellor Kohl, Schirrmacher is no friend of Zitelmann and Co., but, as he put it, "if they write something we like, we'll print it." But as our talk stretched into three hours, it took on an increasingly metaphysical cast, and it became clear that a yearning for an unbroken German tradition is scarcely confined to the fringes of the new right. Schirrmacher too seemed to represent a new, younger generation in Germany, impatient with the verities of the Cold War.

DPA/PHOTOREPORTERS

Frank Schirrmacher

Germany, Schirrmacher told me, exists "in a situation where it is actually the hegemonic power of Europe. The whole political scene does nothing else but say that we aren't. Even though we are." Schirrmacher had a point. The refusal of the Bonn political class to face up to Germany's new position was creating an opening for the new right. The strategy of the new right, he pointed out, was to usurp traditions, and it was first off the mark in "thematizing" the question of a united Germany's position in Europe. Schirrmacher's hope, as he expressed it, is that Germans will return to the texts of such Weimar oracles as Carl Schmitt and Ernst Jünger and "confront" them. Germans need to think in terms of power again as they did in the past, he argued. Schmitt's work on geopolitics, *Land and Sea,* was the "greatest literature." "There was the age-old dream of a fusion between the Roman-Spanish world and the Slavic-German world," he said, "and I could imagine that a new cultural flowering might emerge."

This is the sort of language that troubles Ignatz Bubis and other opponents of the new right. Bubis' affability, tolerance, and directness have made him one of the most popular figures in Germany. His refusal to

[5] *Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,* "Westen, was sonst?" June 8, 1994, p. 1.

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exaggerate the extent of neo-Nazism and his defense of Jews who have chosen to remain in Germany have earned him laurels across the political spectrum. A few weeks before our interview, Bubis was shouted down as, of all things, a Nazi by left-wing anarchists at the University of Hamburg when he admonished students not to assume that neo-Nazis had firebombed the shelter in Lübeck. Yet he fears the right more than the left. To Bubis, the new right is a growing menace that must be confronted. "I see it as a real danger, a very real danger," he said. Bubis stressed the "elegant manner in which they proceed. They do it on an intellectual level." In his view, the danger is a relativization of the Nazi past and a trend toward populism in the major parties. In both the CDU and FDP, he noted, there are "elements that would be happy to make a coalition with new right figures."

Some on the left experience a cathartic bliss in denouncing Germany.

Nevertheless, the criticisms of Bubis, Pflüger, and others mean that an unsavory whiff still clings to the new right. The political future of the movement is murky. For all his ingenuity when it comes to garnering publicity, Zitelmann will not be able to take over the FDP at the federal level. The attempt of Manfred Brunner, the former leader of the Bavarian FDP, to create a new citizens party opposed to European monetary union flopped. The SPD's attempt to campaign on anti-Europe themes in state elections in Baden-Württemberg was no more successful. The CDU, for now, remains fixed on the pro-Europe politics of Chancellor Kohl. Officials at the federal chancellery say that what is most disturbing are the "diffuse anti-Western sentiments in the East."

To think of the new right as a new mass party, however, is a mistake. The new right is no cause for panic. It can be seen as a natural development in Germany after 1989. Perhaps the Germans need to rouse rather than suppress the demon of nationalism in order to exorcise it. Nor does the new right's contention that a moralistic left-wing media dominates the German cultural landscape miss the mark. There is an excessive preoccupation with the Holocaust in Germany, which the left, a little unwittingly, exploits for present political purposes. Some Germans experience a kind of cathartic bliss in denouncing themselves and their nationality.

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But the new right represents the other extreme. It too exploits the Holocaust—although in a more pernicious fashion—by scanting its importance. Its most likely accomplishment will be to push the boundaries of what is considered permissible in German political discourse. The rapidity with which new right themes are being taken up by members of the CDU's youth movement, for example, is a source of concern to party officials of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, the CDU's leadership organization. The FDP is already moving toward a more austere economic program, and the issue of foreigners' rights looms large. Kohl's likely successor, Wolfgang Schäuble, indulges in new right rhetoric, asserting that Germans gain their identity "not from commitment to an idea, but from belonging to a particular nation, a *Volk*." He has written about returning to the "emotional, connective power of the nation."[6]

"What do these revisionists really want, these shrewd, sturdy young lads that one sees everywhere," asks the journalist Harald Martenstein in the February 11 *Der Tagesspiegel,* based in Berlin. For the moment, they seem to want a rethinking. Robert von Rimscha, a young editor and coauthor of a new book, *'Political Correctness' in Germany,* gave me an answer. "In the next 20 to 30 years," he cheerfully proclaimed, "there will be a flood of revisionist books. I am sure of it."

In February 1996 *Der Spiegel* ran a cover story on the war on the eastern front written by its publisher, Rudolf Augstein. One of the revisionist books Augstein reviewed was *Stalin's War of Annihilation.* Written by Joachim Hoffmann, a former director of the military history research division of the Bundeswehr, the book claimed that Stalin, not Hitler, was responsible for World War II. A few weeks earlier *Young Freedom* had gone into ecstasies over the book. The *Der Spiegel* cover showed Hitler squaring off against Stalin. The article's title asked, "Aggressor Hitler, Aggressor Stalin?" *Spiegel* was hardly endorsing the book, but a new soft revisionism has begun putting question marks after what were once certainties.

[6]Wolfgang Schäuble, *Und der Zukunft zugewandt,* Berlin: Siedler, 1994.

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Banning Ballistic Missiles

Alton Frye

FROM BUILD-DOWN TO STAND-DOWN

MALCOLM MUGGERIDGE once wrote of reaching a moment when he discovered that success was the hallmark of failure. That insight may yet prove to be true for the remarkable achievements in arms control in recent years.

After decades of diplomatic wrangling, breakthroughs have come on many fronts, both bilateral and multilateral. Not only have Soviets and now Russians joined Americans in agreements to make massive reductions in strategic arms, but the overwhelming majority of nations have signed on to indefinite extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Leaders in Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus have greatly contributed to the nonproliferation regime by returning thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia for safekeeping and elimination, a process to be completed this fall with the departure of the last few warheads from Belarus.

The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty has ratified and reinforced the transformation of the military balance on the continent, although the altered political landscape after the collapse of the Soviet empire will require nettlesome changes in its provisions. The long-sought Chemical Weapons Convention should enter into force shortly, and, despite India's recalcitrance, a comprehensive nuclear test ban enjoys nearly universal support.

Woven through these and other arrangements are unprecedented procedures for strict and effective verification. Particularly in the first and second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and START II),

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the United States and Russia are perfecting inspection techniques of far-reaching significance. Similar methods are being applied in the most difficult case of a hostile, uncooperative country, Iraq, where they have yielded crucial lessons for enforcement as well as disturbing revelations of Baghdad's habitual deceit. This progress in on-site and remote surveillance is indispensable to sustaining arms control over the long haul.

Yet these heady days in arms control have bred dangerous complacency. Many citizens and their leaders take for granted that arms control deals now require little care and feeding. Some strategists argue, not so sotto voce, that a weakened Russia has no alternative but to continue reducing its forces and that the United States can therefore follow its own strategic preferences with little regard for Moscow's desires. This blend of inattention, indifference, and calculation is a recipe for misplaced confidence in a process that remains highly vulnerable to political disruption.

The structure of restraint that recent arms accords have erected is fragile. Reaping its promised benefits will require meticulous implementation over many years. It will also demand an exceptional degree of political sophistication, particularly on the part of American leaders. There are worrisome signs that both Congress and the executive branch may fail the test.

In their understandable determination to cut the budget deficit, members of Congress chopped $65 million—17 percent—from the 1996 budget for the prudent and farsighted program Senators Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Richard Lugar

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(R-Ind.) crafted to help Russia manage its complex cutback in nuclear forces. Congress has also been reluctant to fund the Korean Energy Development Organization, the body created to carry out the agreement to head off North Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons. Many remain skeptical of the latter deal's merits, but, as House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) has said, "It is possible that it may work." Lacking a better alternative, it behooves the United States to follow through on its part of the bargain, so long as Pyongyang is meeting its commitments to shut down its other nuclear operations. At the same time, the renewed disputes on Capitol Hill over strategic defense and the utility of the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 veer off in ideological directions, hindering cautious assessment of possible tradeoffs appropriate to the post–Cold War strategic situation.

Clinton has followed through, but has not gone to the next stage.

The Clinton administration's shortcomings are of a different kind. The president's team is well staffed with experienced talent in the field of arms control, and its experts have followed through commendably on the work of their predecessors. That is especially true of their effort to salvage the START agreements and protect the nonproliferation regime by persuading several former Soviet republics to give up their nuclear arsenals.

So consuming has the old agenda been, however, that the administration has done too little to craft a program for the next stage of negotiated restraint. Indeed, the timidity of its early review of the nation's nuclear posture opened few avenues for the kind of initiatives likely to be necessary. Many observers see the administration's relatively stand-pat approach to retaining large nuclear deployments as out of kilter with its statements on arms control. It invites the suspicion among foreign governments that for the United States, control arrangements are merely a convenient way of maintaining a perpetual nuclear advantage. That suspicion in turn will probably stall force reductions in Russia and spur proliferation elsewhere.

The next administration, whether headed by President Clinton or former Senator Bob Dole, will face serious tests on these fronts, both in domestic politics and in foreign policy. To preserve the vital

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gains of recent years, it will need fresh initiatives to renew the momentum of the arms control enterprise. And those initiatives will have to rally bipartisan support. In short, the United States needs a program of action to curb the nuclear menace. Here is one. It would accelerate progress toward a stable strategic environment by adding a more general stand-down of nuclear forces to the gradual build-down now beginning.[1]

LENGTHENING THE FUSE

A NUMBER of present or foreseeable agreements, while by no means guaranteeing an end to violence between their parties, can enhance deterrence by impeding surprise attack and increasing the likelihood that potential victims will have time to bolster their defenses. As a first step to lengthen the fuse on possible nuclear strikes, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty removed intermediate-range ballistic and ground-launched cruise missiles from the superpower inventories in Europe. While submarine-launched ballistic missiles remain central to mutual deterrence, the United States and Russia have undertaken to remove nuclear weapons from their surface fleets (much to the satisfaction of naval officers, who considered such weapons unlikely to be usable and a waste of precious storage space for conventional weapons). Tactical nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from forward deployment in Central Europe, with NATO retaining only a modest number of air-deliverable theater nuclear weapons to balance residual capabilities in Russia. NATO has modified its doctrine to underscore the concept that nuclear weapons are strictly weapons of "last resort"—not a "no-first-use" pledge, but definitely a different emphasis from the previous approach.

The first stages of reductions under START I have seen the removal of thousands of warheads from Russian and American strategic

[1]The term "build-down," coined in 1983, denotes a process of reducing the number of strategic forces while permitting their continued modernization—fewer but newer is the concept, as advanced by Senator William Cohen (R-Me.) and embraced by President Reagan in October 1983. "Stand-down" describes the actual separation of warheads from delivery systems to make them unusable without overt, time-consuming, and detectable operations.

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

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

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

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forces, and if the START II pact finally comes into force, both sides will be moving toward levels of total deployed warheads in the 3,000 to 3,500 range. But that process, scheduled to run into the next century, is so protracted that it weakens the political impact on other states weighing their own nuclear prospects.

In the meantime Moscow and Washington have assured each other that they have "detargeted" their missiles—that is, stopped aiming them at each other—and have lowered the alert status of their strategic forces, signaling that neither plans an attack. Those changes are sensible and welcome, but they are too easily reversed to have more than symbolic value. Far more is required in bilateral accords to realize the potential for strengthening stability in the military balance and the behavior of states. To offer maximum reassurance that they are turning away from reliance on nuclear options and to demonstrate dramatically their commitment to nonproliferation, the United States and Russia should take nuclear warheads off delivery vehicles and store them under mutual surveillance to prevent their covert return to active service.

Moving nuclear weapons into this kind of "strategic escrow" would have profound advantages, not least that it can be accomplished more promptly than the slow-motion tasks of elimination planned under the START agreements. It would in fact represent a phased approach to the START reductions, but one that gains in the short term most of the benefits sought from full implementation of the treaties. As an example of leadership in the nonproliferation campaign both countries regard as vital to their security, it would be a step of unprecedented boldness.

Coupled with that boldness, however, would be an essential degree of reversibility. Storing the warheads and locking the door would not mean their immediate elimination. If strategic relations deteriorated and a return to active nuclear deployments seemed necessary, the United States and Russia could still bring the weapons out of storage. They could do so, however, only with the foreknowledge of the other party, which could compensate with its own redeployment.

Needless to say, applying the escrow principle to all U.S. and Russian strategic forces would require early participation in similar arrangements by Britain, China, and France, the other nuclear powers. Indeed, the current START agreements, if implemented, carry the

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two major powers to force levels at which further progress would depend on engaging those governments. With strategic deployments ranging from fewer than 300 warheads (China) to slightly more than 500 (France), those countries should find an intermediate escrow stage more acceptable than a requirement that they destroy portions of their more meager forces. Though slower than the timetable India demands for the nuclear haves to give up their arsenals, escrow would maximize incentives for New Delhi to modify its hostility to a test ban and accept restraints on the covert nuclear programs in India, Pakistan, and Israel.

An escrow system could end hair-trigger postures for nuclear forces.

Escrow is a hedging scheme, designed to eliminate the hair-trigger postures of strategic forces while affording states confidence that they have not irrevocably sacrificed their ability in extremis to go nuclear within a reasonably short time. It does not meet the demands of those insisting on abolition of nuclear weapons, but it is compatible with whatever reduction and destruction of nuclear weapons future circumstances warrant and diplomacy can produce.[2]

Another feature of the escrow concept deserves highlighting. At present the most worrisome aspect of warhead reductions is the difficulty of handling and protecting the nuclear materials that warheads contain. Once fissile components are removed from weapons, safeguarding them becomes even more of a challenge. The large quantities of such materials in non-weapon form in Russia and the United States are more likely to leak into the wrong hands, more difficult to track, and potentially easier to divert than fissile elements left in warheads. It makes no sense to increase the risks by adding fissile material removed from weapons to material already more susceptible to diversion.

This simple technical fact gains significance in view of the bureaucratic relations within and between the Russian and American governments. Bluntly stated, there is more reason to be confident in the ability of the Russian military to safeguard these materials than in that of the nuclear enthusiasts at Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy.

[2]Bruce G. Blair, *Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces*, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995.

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MINATOM's top officials have demonstrated a disturbing proclivity to promote the use of nuclear technology even at the risk of increased proliferation, as in their insistent campaign to complete nuclear reactor deals with Iran and their rather resentful response to suggestions for improved safeguards at their own facilities. Cooperation between American and Russian military professionals has come a long way. For some years hence it could well be wise to encourage the Russian military to retain custody of the nuclear materials now in warheads. The straightforward way to do that is to leave the materials in the weapons and subject those weapons to the strictest possible scrutiny. Strategic escrow is a practical means of preventing dispersal of the raw materials of nuclear weapons into less trustworthy hands.

PLAYING REAGAN'S OTHER CARD

RONALD REAGAN'S passionate plea for technological breakthroughs to provide an effective strategic defense against ballistic missiles is well known and still controversial. Usually overlooked, however, is the other element in his approach: a ban on ballistic missiles. Reagan proposed such a prohibition to Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at Reykjavik in 1985, picking up ideas from Undersecretary of Defense Fred Iklé and START negotiator Max Kampelman. (In a 1973 *Foreign Affairs* article, Iklé had depicted the distinctive threat ballistic missiles pose to stability, terming them "doomsday catapults.")

At the time, few strategists thought Reagan's notion of a missile ban feasible. But with the fundamental shifts in world politics since then, it has become both more practical and more desirable. Indeed, as worries flare regarding proliferation to rogue states, a global ban on long-range ballistic missiles seems increasingly attractive, even urgent. From a national security standpoint, it is more important that other states not acquire such weapons than that their present owners retain them. Rendering these lethal weapons even more dangerous is that they strike so swiftly that they deny leaders any opportunity for the deliberate decisions and diplomatic maneuvers on which stable peace depends.

In terms of technical feasibility and reliability, a prohibition on the testing, production, and deployment of ballistic missiles is incompa-

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rably simpler than an active defense against them. Moreover, as the world made progress toward such a ban, the burdens on a strategic defense would diminish markedly, since any defensive deployments would only have to serve as a hedge against violation of the ban. The extraordinary advances Russians and Americans have made in on-site inspection and monitoring of missile capabilities open the door for a comprehensive approach to banning these uniquely destabilizing instruments of warfare. What was implausible in an era of strategic confrontation could work in the era of systematic, verifiable cooperation that is now unfolding.

Together with observation satellites and other national surveillance technologies, implementation of START I and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty has already tried and proved most of the operating procedures required for enforcement of a global ban on ballistic missiles. No state could hide for long the testing and production facilities needed to field a substantial force of long-range missiles. Left untested, and with meaningful training for launch crews impossible, present inventories of shorter-range missiles scattered across several troublesome regions should gradually become inoperable or unreliable.

If the advantages of a missile ban are evident, so are the obstacles in its way. The least serious of these is the need to isolate missile capabilities from the space-launch activities that states will certainly wish to continue. With careful, transparent management of the design, testing, production, and operations of space-launch vehicles, containing the danger of clandestine missile deployments would pose no insuperable difficulties. The graver challenges to establishment of an effective missile prohibition are not technical, but strategic and political.

Foremost among them is the question of whether the Russians would be amenable to the plan. Although many Russian analysts favor cutting strategic forces to quite low levels—a few hundred warheads is a range commonly suggested—some influential advocates contend that Moscow must retain a sizable number of missiles since it cannot afford to shift its deterrent posture to more costly, slow-flying systems (aircraft and cruise missiles) available to the United States. That makes sense in the current protracted transition away from the massive deployments the superpowers fielded.

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In the context of an agreement on strategic escrow, however, phasing in a ban on ballistic missiles would have very different implications for Russian as well as American security. It would offer immediate payoffs in crisis stability, and liberate resources for additional aircraft (and air defenses, if deemed worthwhile). The idea has added appeal when Russia looks ahead to the shift from multiple-warhead to single-warhead land-based missiles scheduled to occur under the START II accord. That commitment points toward a drastic, albeit mutually advantageous, shift away from the giant strategic rockets in which Russia has invested far more heavily than the United States.

While American missile strategists, like their Russian counterparts, will probably have mixed feelings about that shift, there are reasons to expect important changes in their attitude as the presently planned reductions proceed. The U.S. Air Force is headed toward a small number of single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles based in silos, and is bound to give priority to its traditional missions based on airplanes and other airborne systems. As for the Army, nothing would do more to strengthen its capacity to defend its forces on the ground than a constraint on missiles capable of long-range strikes, since such a constraint would shrink potential attacks to shorter-range and slower missiles against which defenses could be concentrated.

In the Navy's case, giving up sea-launched ballistic missiles, the pillars of stable deterrence, would be wrenching, but doing so would not require abandoning its favorite strategic platforms. In the Persian Gulf War, submarines performed outstandingly as cruise-missile launchers, and they could remain in service for the purpose. In that capacity they would be valuable complements to the so-called "arsenal ships" the navy is now exploring as advanced technology systems for launching hundreds of cruise missiles or other weapons. All these considerations suggest that trends the build-down has already set in motion could lead the armed services to support a ballistic missile ban.

No one can know in advance how successful a campaign by Americans and Russians to establish a global prohibition on long-range ballistic missiles would be, since regional factors drive a number of states to acquire such weapons. Yet the impetus toward restraint

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imparted by the two powers' commitment to move in this direction would surely be powerful. It would exemplify both their recognition that these systems are more dangerous than useful and their readiness to forgo presumed strategic advantages over states not in a position to compete in the most advanced of these technologies.

PREVENTIVE ACTION

CONCERN OVER acquisition of long-range missile capabilities by the rogue regimes of North Korea, Iraq, Iran, and Libya fuels much of the congressional interest in rapid erection of strategic defenses. Intelligence estimates rate the possibility of intercontinental missile threats from those quarters as slender and long-term. Yet threats of such uncertain nature and timing oblige policymakers to consider all options, including the provocative possibility of preemptive strikes against incipient missile development programs. Such preventive action would become both more workable and more legitimate once Americans and Russians agreed to a cooperative approach on banning ballistic missiles.

There are precedents for preemptive action against would-be proliferators. The United States demonstrated its readiness to strike directly at Libya when President Reagan ordered a military response for the 1986 terrorist attack on Americans at a Berlin discotheque. More recently, Secretary of Defense William Perry publicly declared that the United States would not allow Libya to complete work on a suspected chemical weapons facility. The United States has mounted cruise missile attacks on Iraq for terrorist activities and for actions against its Kurdish minority. Both Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) and President Bush's national security adviser, Brent Scowcroft, have intimated that a North Korean refusal to abandon its nuclear program would warrant preemptive attacks. Israel actually mounted such an attack with its 1981 strike on Iraq's Osirak reactor. These episodes call to mind Soviet overtures in the 1960s sounding out U.S. attitudes toward a possible preemptive attack on China's embryonic nuclear capabilities.

In February 1995 the U.N. Security Council underscored the "paramount importance" of halting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, describing it as "a threat to international peace and security"—language that connotes a situation warranting a military response.

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The New York Times has urged a ban on acquisition of ballistic missiles (as well as weapons of mass destruction) and, if necessary, coercive action "to eliminate the production capability and destroy any stocks produced or bought." A latent, surprisingly broad consensus may now exist that supports preemption against the most reckless renegades.

This is not to suggest that a policy of preemption against emerging ballistic missile capabilities would win ready acceptance, although technically it would be far easier to execute with conventional weapons than strikes against more concealable nuclear activities. The precedents indicate that in dire circumstances there will be intense political pressure to destroy complexes for testing and production of long-range missiles well before they can function. It would make a great deal of difference whether such an attack was an attempt to preserve a privileged position for states possessing such weapons or a means of enforcing a program aimed at eliminating the weapons worldwide. Unlike the situation during the era of all-out strategic competition, a cooperative program to segregate nuclear weapons from delivery systems and to ban ballistic missiles could create a more tolerant environment for preemption against violators.

> The gravest challenges to an escrow system are political and strategic, not technical.

One must compare the preemptive option with strategic defenses pursued unilaterally. Active defenses may eventually be necessary, but they could have consequences, not so much for outlaw states over the long term as for the partners on whom nuclear and missile restraints depend in the short term. Installing anti-missile defenses could spur an increasingly prosperous China, for example, to increase its long-range missile deployments from a few score to several hundred. Is it worth building thin defenses against an indeterminate threat of a few missiles in North Korea in the distant future at the price of provoking a much more substantial deployment by China in the short term? Preemption to enforce a missile ban against would-be proliferators has its attractions, particularly if it can be endorsed multilaterally. It is not an option to be recommended or adopted lightly, especially when one assesses possible countermeasures by a government with the huge conventional forces at Pyongyang's disposal. But lesser dangers have provoked such

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actions in the past. In the setting of an international campaign to abolish ballistic missiles, preemption would become more justifiable.

ANOTHER START

THE PROPOSALS outlined here may at first glance appear too ambitious, too hard to execute for American and Russian governments already struggling to digest a full plate of arms control agreements. In crucial respects, however, combining an escrow plan for nuclear weapons with a movement to ban long-range ballistic missiles could help cut the Gordian knot in which nuclear diplomacy is now entangled. Changing operational deployments in these ways would take time, but far less than current projections for force dismantlement. Offloading warheads and placing them in secure storage would be simpler, faster, and cheaper than destroying them, and safer than feeding their nuclear components into channels less reliable than those the military provides. Banning ballistic missiles is not a one-size-fits-all panacea, but the concept is strategically wise and technically feasible and could be politically critical to building a global regime of restraint for such destabilizing technologies.

The place to introduce these novel concepts is the next round of strategic negotiations between Moscow and Washington. The United States has been reticent on the subject of such discussions, which has aroused a suspicion among Russian strategists that Washington may be content to pause at START II levels. That suspicion in turn has led some of those strategists, as well as Russian politicians, to argue that ratification of START II could have serious disadvantages for Russia. Among others, the agreement's ban on multiple-warhead ICBMs imposes on the Russians expensive investments for reconfiguring their forces with single-warhead missiles.

With such concerns in mind, analysts in Moscow have stressed the need to set force levels below the 3,000 to 3,500 warheads permitted under START II, partly because it will be hard for Russia to afford a force posture of that scale. To some American observers, that fact is a temptation difficult to resist. Why not exploit Russia's current economic hardships by demurring on further negotiations in the expectation that the United States will be able to maintain START II force

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levels while Russia has to trim its deployments well below the authorized limits? That inclination is old-think, rooted in the competitive attitudes that sought unilateral advantage rather than the preference for mutual benefits that has guided the START endeavor. It is a disposition that simultaneously makes a return to counterproductive strategic antagonism more likely and makes collaboration to stem the most pernicious strategic threat to both countries—nuclear and missile proliferation—less likely.

If, as many who have studied the matter closely believe, it is possible to design more stable strategic postures at much lower levels than START II calls for, there is no sufficient reason to postpone further discussion. A willingness to begin START III talks now would help smooth the way for the Russian Duma to ratify START II, as the U.S. Senate has already done. Since more far-reaching START arrangements hinge on approval of those previously negotiated, preliminary discussions could start now without conditions or commitments and on the explicit understanding that actual agreement must await Russian ratification of the pending treaty.

Since additional major reductions raise novel problems, including the need to extend controls to British, French, and Chinese strategic forces, they require thorough preparation. But START III negotiations would also permit exploration of the concepts and rationales described here. The resulting ideas would challenge the parties to look beyond the conventional, linear approach to reductions, however valuable it may be, to more imaginative innovations that can accelerate progress toward the fundamental goal of a stable, reliable strategic relationship.

International pressure is mounting for more decisive measures to deal with weapons of mass destruction. Against the urgings of the United States, Britain, and a few other countries, on July 8 the International Court of Justice responded, nearly unanimously, to a request by the U.N. General Assembly for an advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons. On the merits, the judges split evenly, with seven of fourteen concluding that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to law (although they did not offer a definitive opinion on whether the extreme case of a threat to a state's survival might permit an exception). Significantly, judges from Russia and China, as well as ones from Germany, Italy, and Hungary,

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were among those ruling that the threat to use such weapons would be unlawful in most circumstances. The court was unanimous in concluding that states possessing nuclear weapons are legally obligated to pursue and conclude negotiations in good faith "leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control."

The thrust toward abolition of nuclear weapons is likely to gain momentum this fall with the so-called Canberra Commission's report to the United Nations. The commission's discussions have clearly run in that direction and will carry added weight because of the participation of retired U.S. Air Force General George Lee Butler, the former commander in chief of the U.S. Strategic Command. The sentiment is widespread that last year's indefinite extension of the NPT obliges the nuclear powers to phase out their existing arsenals of such weapons. These political trends reinforce the strategic arguments for initiatives that will ease countries away from the persistent risks of current nuclear and ballistic missile force postures.

In politics, strategy, and technology, trends rarely move in phase. More often than not they advance out of step with each other, interacting disjointedly, with lag times and repercussions that impose strains on governments and societies. It is the task of statecraft to harmonize their movement, so far as possible, and otherwise manage the disruptions they generate. The extraordinary successes of strategic diplomacy in the Reagan-Gorbachev and the Bush-Yeltsin-Clinton years represent statecraft of a high order. They make it possible to consider still more remarkable departures. And without bolder innovations, the achievements so far recorded will remain in jeopardy.

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Is the World Ready for Free Trade?

Charles R. Carlisle

CHARTING A COURSE

How to move forward on liberalizing global trade? By incremental steps of an already agreed-upon agenda or by one great leap to free trade in a grand new negotiation? This question arises as trade ministers from the World Trade Organization's 120 member countries prepare to meet in Singapore in December to chart the course of further trade liberalization. This will be their first gathering since they met in Marrakesh in April 1994 to bring GATT's Uruguay Round of negotiations to a successful conclusion.

A long series of preparatory meetings at the WTO's headquarters in Geneva, which began in the spring and may continue until the eve of the Singapore conference, has foreshadowed what will probably happen in December. They suggest that the world is not ready for a leap to global free trade by a set date early in the next century.

Unless an important issue disappears during the preparatory work, the ministers will be asked to decide four major questions. Three of these, although potentially important to the long-term development of the trading system, raise collateral issues not directly related to trade liberalization. There is perhaps a 50-50 chance that the WTO will decide to address, although not through negotiations, the question of international rules for investment and the new question of "competition policy," covering government and industry practices that restrict

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competition. The third and most hotly contested question will be whether the WTO should take up internationally recognized labor rights. The United States, France, and other European countries have pushed the issue, but it has met with considerable resistance from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, Australia, and others. Its opponents' expressed concern is that the proposal could lead to veiled protectionism, but some governments may hold other, unspoken objections. Either way, the odds that the ministers in Singapore will decide to address the matter in any significant way are slender to nonexistent.

The Uruguay Round was about freer trade, not free trade, yet it nearly failed.

The fourth and most important issue is the pace, depth, and breadth of the liberalization of global trade. The WTO already has an extensive "built-in agenda," decided in the Uruguay Round, that calls for major trade liberalization negotiations over the next decade. It is highly probable that the ministers will stay with that agenda, but should they? Some economists advocate a more ambitious course that would lead to completely free trade in the early decades of the next century. Prominent among them is C. Fred Bergsten, director of the Institute for International Economics. He argues that an agreement to achieve global free trade by 2010, or possibly 2020 for the poorest countries, could be achieved by a "grand bargain" that would insure lower-income countries against reversion to protectionism by the "old rich" in return for full access to their markets and those of Japan. He believes the grand bargain would create well-paid export-related jobs and check regional trading arrangements, bringing gains to the United States and the world economy.[1]

Earlier this year, Renato Ruggiero, the WTO's director-general, and Donald Johnston, secretary-general of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, separately voiced conditional support for some aspects of Bergsten's idea. Both men have also expressed serious concerns about regional trading blocs. But the *Financial Times* of April 25 reported that Ruggiero and Sir Leon Brittan, the EU's trade commissioner, "responded coolly" to Bergsten's proposal that the WTO

[1]C. Fred Bergsten, "Globalizing Free Trade," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 1996, pp. 105-120.

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commit itself to global free trade by 2010. WTO representatives this past spring quietly discussed the possibility of pursuing a more ambitious trade liberalization program and calling a trade summit in Washington around the end of 1997, but neither idea found much support. Neither the European Union nor the United States seems to support trade liberalization beyond the built-in agenda, although the EU might support preparatory work for a new round of trade negotiations. And if the Uruguay Round taught the world anything, it was that no major initiative in the WTO stands a chance of success unless the United States and the EU are united behind it.

Proposals to achieve global free trade in the first decades of the 21st century clearly have visionary appeal, but vision must be tempered by a keen sense, based on experience, of what is achievable. The Uruguay Round was not about free trade, but freer trade, yet it almost failed. Ministers at the Singapore meeting would show good sense and a strong appreciation of political reality in avoiding any giant leaps to global free trade. Few countries share the laissez-faire faith of the United States and the United Kingdom, and even in those two countries powerful lobbies would oppose completely free trade. The WTO has an ambitious built-in agenda that will continue to reduce barriers to trade well into the 21st century. A premature effort to force countries out from all protection would almost certainly fail and would probably seriously damage WTO negotiations already under way.

THE WORLD IS FAR FROM READY

WHATEVER THE appeal of global free trade, the political support for the idea is just not there. The Uruguay Round, for instance, almost collapsed because of U.S.-European differences over agriculture. The United States proposed early in the round that all agricultural support and protection be abolished over a 10-year period, though making it clear that it could consider a longer time frame. The EU's reaction was extremely negative. When the United States refused to abandon its position, exchanges occasionally became bitter, and negotiations, not just on agriculture but on other subjects as well, came to a virtual standstill. The United States gradually softened its position and

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reached an agreement on agriculture with the EU a year before the end of the round. This agreement, which other governments accepted with some modifications, was a notable achievement but fell far short of free trade. The EU, especially France and some of the southern member states, is probably no more ready to accept free trade in agriculture today than it was at the end of the Uruguay Round.

The EU was hardly alone in its opposition to the zero protection option in agriculture. Japan and Korea fought desperately against opening their rice markets. Only in the last weeks of the negotiations did they agree to any opening at all. Japan finally acquiesced to initial imports of four percent of the market, rising in annual increments to eight percent after six years. Korea, treated as a developing country, negotiated an initial opening of one percent, rising annually to four percent after ten years. Can anyone seriously believe that either country would accept unlimited rice imports in the 2010-2020 period?

Nor do the recent WTO services negotiations give proponents of free trade much hope. The United States has refused to enter into agreements on services, claiming that many offers on the table, especially from developing countries, were inadequate. And the United States was not seeking free trade, only improved access for its service industries. Recent reports from Geneva have indicated no enthusiasm in Europe for making a sweeping new commitment to enter into a global free trade pact. In fact, EU officials privately report that some of their member states believe negotiators went too far in the Uruguay Round.

From the standpoint of American domestic politics, any agreement that would strip away all protection from the textiles industry—traditionally one of the most heavily protected in the country—is difficult to imagine. While the industry's attitudes are changing, and it may not have as much political influence as it once did, neither the industry nor its congressional supporters are likely to agree to free trade early in the next century. Furthermore, while the United States is significantly lowering agricultural support and protection, passage of the recent farm bill revealed that not all American agricultural groups are ready to move to completely free markets.

All the industrial countries now are struggling in one way or another with serious economic and social problems. The extent to which in-

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creased international competition contributes to job losses in various industries can be debated. There can be little doubt, however, that it is a significant factor, and political objections to job losses are being raised in Europe and America. Increased international trade brings benefits, but it creates losers as well as winners. The burden of adjustment tends to fall most heavily on those least able to handle it—those who have few skills and little education, or lack job mobility because of their age, health, or economic circumstances. In short, the burden falls on those unable to move into high-paying export-related jobs.

To press China to open its markets completely would be as unwise as it would be futile.

Europe is tightening its belt to meet the Maastricht targets, while in the United States, whether Bill Clinton or Bob Dole wins the November election, many social programs will probably remain under pressure. In most of the major industrial countries economic growth will apparently be in the 2.0-2.5 percent range over the next two years; satisfactory, perhaps, but hardly vigorous enough to contribute in any substantial way to resolving joblessness and other serious social problems.

But the problems of the industrial countries are not the only concern. China has been negotiating for years, first to enter GATT and now the WTO. It has not yet been able to convince the WTO's members, especially the United States, that it will accept the rules and grant sufficient access to its markets. China will not enter the WTO this year, but the hope in Geneva is that it can enter in 1997. To press China, just as it is entering the WTO, to commit to opening its markets completely to foreign competition would be as unwise as it would be futile.

Russia, the other major country still outside the WTO, has also begun its accession process. Knowledgeable people in Geneva believe that if things go well, Russia could enter the WTO in the next two or three years. As with China, Russia's tradition of a command economy will make negotiations difficult. Could Russia be expected to make a free-trade pledge as the century ends? James H. Billington, the librarian of Congress, has warned that "no mistake has been greater in the West than to assume that the only alternative to Russia's largely authoritarian history and identity must be a total conversion

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to Western democracy and market economics."[2] Jack F. Matlock, Jr., former American ambassador to the Soviet Union, writing about Boris Yeltsin's election as Russian president, notes that "even economic liberals are calling for protectionist measures to revive industrial production."[3] Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Kazakstan, and other former Soviet states are preparing to enter the WTO but would almost certainly be unprepared to enter into an arrangement leading to global free trade. Nor would the world's low-income, developing countries, which constitute more than two-thirds of the WTO's membership.

Although there has been a major movement around the world in the last decade toward freer markets and less regulation of economic activity, the developing nations, grappling with social and economic problems that dwarf those in the West, are not about to accept completely free trade. No country in the world embraces the belief in free markets and free trade to the degree that the United States, Britain, and the other English-speaking democracies do. Many would see global free trade as contrary to their traditions, doctrines, and interests.

FEAR OF REGIONALISM

FREE TRADE worldwide is a distant goal, fraught with difficulties, but regional trading arrangements have been somewhat easier to attain. Many well-informed observers fear that they could go too far and that the world could break up into hostile trading blocs. Anxiety about regionalism goes back to the early 1980s, when the United States, waging an uphill battle to get the Uruguay Round started, made it clear that if global negotiations did not begin it would take a regional approach. At the time the United States was negotiating free trade agreements with Israel and Canada and the EU was expanding its membership. Since then, the creation of NAFTA, U.S.-led efforts to create regional arrangements in the Americas and in the Asia-Pacific area, and further expansion of the EU have kept the concern

[2]James H.Billington, "Let Russia Be Russian," *The New York Times*, June 16, 1996, p. 15.
[3]Jack F. Matlock, Jr., "The Struggle for the Kremlin," *The New York Review of Books*, August 8, 1996, pp. 28-34.

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about regional arrangements very much alive. Yet an examination of the WTO's trade statistics and a sober assessment of what is likely to happen in the Pacific Rim, the Western Hemisphere, and elsewhere suggest that this fear, if not baseless, is much exaggerated.

In 1995 the WTO published a report titled "Regionalism and the World Trading System" that deserves to be better known. The organization's Secretariat notes that comparing trade within regions before and after the completion of regional trade agreements does not support the conclusion that world trade is increasingly regionalized (see Table 1). The report's statistics show that intraregional trade declined somewhat between the late 1920s and the years immediately following World War II, then rose dramatically until the early 1970s, but grew only a minuscule amount between then and 1993 in Western Europe while declining slightly in North America. Only in Asia did intraregional trade grow significantly in those years. This latter development can be explained not by a nonexistent regional trade arrangement but by a large shift of direct investment, much of it Japanese, into manufacturing facilities in Asia.[4] Indeed, Japan's total trade (exports plus imports) with the rest of Asia rose by more than 23 percent, or $66.4 billion, from 1992 to 1994 alone, more than the increase in Japan's trade with any other area, in both absolute and relative terms.[5] If this is regionalism, it is of the healthiest kind, driven by commercial considerations.

TABLE 1. SHARE OF INTRAREGIONAL TRADE IN TOTAL TRADE, 1928-93

(exports plus imports as a percentage of merchandise trade)

	1928	1948	1973	1993
WESTERN EUROPE	50.7	41.8	67.7	69.9
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND FORMER SOVIET REPUBLICS	19.0	46.4	58.8	19.7
NORTH AMERICA*	25.0	27.1	35.1	33.0
LATIN AMERICA*	11.1	20.0	27.9	19.4
ASIA	45.5	38.9	41.6	49.7
WORLD	38.7	32.9	49.3	50.4

**Mexico is included in Latin America.*

SOURCE: WTO

The WTO's statistics, of course, cannot predict the future. A 1994 summit meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum

[4]See Martin Wolf, "Japan Looks to Asia," *Financial Times*, June 11, 1996, p. 14.
[5]"International Trade, Trends and Statistics," Geneva: WTO, 1995, p. 166.

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(APEC) in Bogor, Indonesia, set a goal of "free and open trade and investment" by 2010 for the region's developed countries and 2020 for developing nations, although it defined neither free and open trade nor developed and developing nations. Similarly, a 1994 Summit of the Americas in Miami, Florida, adopted a U.S. proposal to construct a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005, with substantial progress to be achieved before the end of the century.

Are either of these proposed regional arrangements likely to achieve their goals by the announced target dates? Both look as if they will fall far short. Neither of the 1994 declarations is a legally binding commitment; the two are, at best, statements of political intent. And the definitional problems are hardly technical matters. Whether, for example, global free trade is defined to include everything that moves in international commerce or to exclude such sectors as agriculture or services, the resulting debates, domestic and international, are likely to be fierce.

In North America, regional trade has fallen since 1973.

In the case of the FTAA, two ministerial-level meetings have been held since the Miami meeting and several working groups have been established, but continuous, detailed negotiations are not in sight. The United States has reportedly been attempting to schedule a second Americas summit in late 1997 or early 1998, but Brazil, which may be more immediately concerned about the already established Mercosur customs union (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, with Chile an associate member), and other nations seem reluctant to move swiftly on the FTAA. (Customs unions, such as the EU, have common external trade barriers; free trade areas, such as NAFTA, do not.) Brazil had liberalized its economy in recent years, but after running a trade deficit in 1995, it imposed sharply higher duties on motor vehicles and raised barriers to other imports. While these actions affect only a small percentage of imports and can easily be reversed, they raise questions about whether Brazil would be prepared to accept hemispheric free trade by 2005. For that matter, would the United States and other nations in the hemisphere? If it took an all-out effort to get NAFTA through Congress, what kind of political effort would be required to secure congressional approval of a hemispheric trade pact?

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

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After a bold start in Bogor, the November 1995 APEC summit in Osaka ended, noted an editorial in the November 25, 1995, *New York Times,* with a "loosely worded agreement" that did not set a deadline for "eliminating protection from agriculture and other sensitive industries." It is hard to believe that China and Japan want across-the-board free trade with the United States and other Pacific Rim countries. It is also difficult to imagine that the American public and Congress or their counterparts in developed nations would support an arrangement that requires the United States and other affluent countries to open their borders wide to imports of textiles, clothing, electronics, and other manufactured goods, as well as farm products, while their own exporters wait another ten years before developing countries, presumably including China, do the same.

Meanwhile, Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other countries in the Asia-Pacific region may start to turn away from trade liberalization as export growth slows and merchandise trade balances decline or go into deficit. On October 3 the *Financial Times* reported that Japan and the United States would soon file complaints with the WTO over Indonesia's "national automobile" program, which they claim will discriminate against their vehicle exports. President Suharto has reportedly warned that increased imports of foreign goods might have a "far-reaching impact on growth and equitable distribution." Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad is reported to have said that if import purchases are not restrained, duties should be raised and quotas imposed on "certain non-essential" goods.[6] Attitudes can change and barriers that have been raised can later be lowered, but if the growth rates of certain Asian economies decline and large trade surpluses disappear—a not unlikely development—the task of putting an APEC trade arrangement into place will not be any easier.

The APEC proposal for regional free trade has a unique aspect dubbed "open" trade or "open regionalism" that will make the agreement both more difficult to achieve and more benign in its impact on the global trading system if it is achieved. As internal or intraregional barriers are reduced, external barriers, or barriers affecting nations that are not part of APEC, will also be reduced. The new arrangement would

[6] *The Economist,* August 10, 1996, p. 57.

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not be a free trade agreement as customarily understood, in which internal barriers are eliminated while external barriers are maintained, but a vast, open trading area of 18 members. However admirable this goal may be, there is little chance that APEC will even come close to fully achieving it. In the realpolitik of trade negotiations, where reciprocity is a fundamental and universally held notion, negotiators driven by domestic pressures score exports and imports based on the mercantilistic notion that exports are good and imports are bad. Whatever the theoretical arguments for openness, what the concept entails makes the Bogor goals even more unlikely to be met.

The World Trade Organization's built-in agenda sets out an ambitious program.

Both the proponents of regional trade agreements and those who fear them may believe that difficult problems can be overcome by leaving some products and sectors out of the pacts and by writing in long transition periods for still others. Certainly there is some flexibility under the WTO rule that permits preferential agreements, but the rule does not permit wholesale exceptions or inordinately long transition periods. It requires that barriers be eliminated on "substantially all" trade among an agreement's members, and over a period not to exceed ten years, other than in "exceptional cases." If agriculture, for example, were left out of a free trade agreement, the WTO would probably find the agreement illegal.

Although neither an FTAA nor a regional arrangement between the APEC nations is likely to come into being anytime near the target dates now being discussed, this should not suggest that regional integration will make no progress over the next 10 to 15 years. The Mercosur customs union has already included Chile, and will probably soon add Bolivia. Certain nations in Central and Eastern Europe, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia, will likely enter the EU. Negotiations to bring Chile into NAFTA have been frustrated by the U.S. Congress, but that setback can probably be overcome. Nor is it inconceivable that other Latin American countries may enter NAFTA. In Asia, the ASEAN nations are making progress toward creating an ASEAN Free Trade Area by 2003, although difficult problems remain, particularly in agriculture. None

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of these developments, however, would pose a serious threat to the global trading system, where barriers will also be lowered. These countries account for a small fraction of world trade. For instance, the total merchandise trade of the ASEAN nations, whose economies have been growing rapidly, accounts for only around five percent of the world total.

Statistics aside, the world's manufacturers and service providers, aided by falling trade barriers, swiftly expanding transportation networks, and an explosion of technology, have established links between the world's regions too numerous to count and almost too difficult to conceive of. These links virtually ensure that the world will not break up into trading blocs or slide backward into large-scale protectionism.

WTO'S BUILT-IN AGENDA

NOT ONLY are the dangers of regionalism exaggerated, but the WTO's built-in agenda sets out an ambitious program calling for major negotiations. Compared with previous successfully completed rounds of trade talks in the almost half-century since GATT's founding, the current agenda is much more ambitious than any but the Uruguay Round, lacking only a component on manufactured goods, which could still be added in Singapore at Australia's behest. In any case, tariff reductions on manufactures were agreed on at Marrakesh, and tariffs in the industrial nations are already quite low, while developing nations have brought tariffs down from the sky-high levels common just a decade ago.

During the last two years negotiations have been held on financial services, telecommunications, and maritime transport, perhaps the most important sectors of the services industry. These negotiations, which were too difficult to complete during the Uruguay Round, have not gone particularly well. Last year the United States, claiming that other countries' offers to reduce barriers were inadequate, withdrew new offers that it had made in financial services and refused to take part in a partial agreement put together by the EU. Negotiations on basic telecommunications and maritime transport have not been completed in accordance with the 1996 deadlines established in the Uruguay Round. New, 1997 deadlines have been set

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for basic telecommunications and financial services, and there is some optimism in Geneva that they will be met. Maritime transport negotiations, however, will not be resumed until 2000, when there will be a fresh burst of successive rounds of talks on specific commitments to further liberalize trade in services. Likewise, new negotiations to reduce agricultural protection and support are scheduled to start at the end of the century. Agriculture brought the Uruguay Round to the brink of failure, and the new discussions promise to be difficult.

The WTO must review the rules on trade-related investment measures and propose any amendments that might be appropriate not more than five years after the WTO's entry into force on January 1, 1995. Negotiations on investment have begun in the OECD and, as noted, it is quite possible that this Singapore meeting will decide that the WTO should begin discussions on investment soon. In addition, the WTO is to complete a full review of dispute settlement rules by January 1, 1999, and a ministerial meeting will decide whether those rules should be continued or changed.

The Uruguay Round agreement on government procurement is one of four that do not bind all WTO members, only signatories to the agreements. Although it has only 11, predominantly industrial members, including the United States and the EU, the agreement is one of the more important to emerge from the Uruguay Round, and its negotiation was hard-fought. Talks to improve and broaden the agreement are scheduled to begin by the end of 1998. As this incomplete list suggests, the WTO already has a heavy and difficult negotiating schedule. If successfully completed—and success is not assured—it will provide a fresh impetus to world trade growth through the opening decades of the next century.

NO GRAND BARGAIN

IF THERE were a need for Bergsten's grand bargain, perhaps the political difficulties of achieving free trade could be overcome. Fortunately, the possibility of a major reversion to protectionism by the "old rich" is remote. A major move to protectionism by any large industrial nation would be enormously disruptive, perhaps irreparably damaging a vast web of commercial relationships among not only

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importers and exporters, but also producers and distributors. It would be like dropping a boulder on a table set with fine crystal.

The United States is the only major industrial country that might revert to large-scale protectionism, but the danger is slight. Like most peoples, Americans may support protecting particular industries from time to time, but most of them would not follow the prescriptions of Pat Buchanan, erstwhile candidate for the Republican presidential nomination, because they understand protectionism's consequences. The governments of Japan and other countries are well aware of this political fact of life.

But suppose the unthinkable were to happen and a WTO member retreated into serious protectionism. That country would be in violation of countless WTO commitments, and an effective mechanism to address such a situation now exists. Under a new procedure negotiated in the Uruguay Round, every WTO member has the right to bring a complaint alleging violation of the WTO's rules to an independent, expert dispute settlement panel. A defendant country cannot block or unduly delay the process. If it loses such a case (it also has the right to have the case reviewed by an appellate body), it must either change the offending practice, which is the preferable outcome, or offer compensation by lowering some other trade barrier. If it does neither, the complainant has the right to raise trade barriers against certain exports. In the final analysis, a government could refuse to accept any of this and withdraw from the WTO on six months' notice. But doing so would place its exporters of goods and services at great risk.

TABLE 2. WORLD MERCHANDISE EXPORTS, BY VOLUME, 1980-95

(annual percentage change)

1980-85	1985-90	1990-94	1994	1995
2.0	6.0	5.0	9.5	8.0*

**preliminary*

SOURCE: WTO

While further insurance against a reversion to protectionism by the "old rich" is unnecessary, the other side of the grand bargain—full access by the United States and other high-income nations to the markets of lower-income nations and Japan—would likely have limited appeal. In the United States and elsewhere, the concern would be that although formal, governmental barriers might disappear, exporters would still confront hidden and subtle practices restricting trade that

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private companies maintain. The WTO's rules do not provide adequate remedies, and the countries where firms engage in such practices have virtually no incentive to negotiate changes. The United States and other industrial countries have little trade protection left to use as bargaining chips on the subject.

THE RIGHT COURSE

THE UNITED States must boldly lead any move toward global free trade if the initiative is to have a chance of success. The Clinton administration has been wise to resist calls to follow a course that would be divisive at home and vigorously opposed abroad. Just as the controversy over what was widely seen as America's extreme proposal on agriculture nearly derailed the Uruguay Round, so an effort to abolish global trade barriers could well interrupt, and would probably seriously damage, the WTO negotiations already under way. If those negotiations can be successfully completed, they will give a further stimulus to global trade, which now is expanding impressively (see Table 2).

In a March 22 press release, the WTO predicted that merchandise trade would grow at a "robust level around 7 percent" in 1996. If it continues to grow at current rates, it will double in ten years to about $10 trillion. And that is just merchandise trade; exports of commercial services could easily total $3 to $4 trillion 10 years from now. To put the total gain in perspective, $13 to $14 trillion is about half of current total global output.

The glass is not half full; it is more than half full. The success of the Uruguay Round, rapidly expanding trade, and an agreed-on list for further trade liberalization together should allow the victor of the 1996 U.S. presidential election to emphasize international issues that are crucial to peace and stability, secure in the knowledge that an agenda is already in place that will keep negotiators busy and trade expanding well into the early years of the 21st century.

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Reviews



THE GRANGER COLLECTION

French cartoon, 1898, with the world in the hands of the Jews, personified by James (Jakob) Rothschild

Before 1914 French antisemitism was more pervasive than German.

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The Goldhagen Controversy

One Nation, One People, One Theory?

Fritz Stern

Holocaust literature abounds, as survivors seek to bear witness and historians try to understand. So far the very magnitude of the satanic murder has inspired a kind of awed reticence about pronouncing overarching explanations. Now a 37-year-old political scientist from Harvard claims: "Explaining why the Holocaust occurred requires a radical revision of what has until now been written. This book is that revision." *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust*, published in this country in April and in Germany in early August, has become an international sensation, a bestseller on both sides of the Atlantic.

The book is a deliberate provocation—I consider this a neutral judgment. Provocations can shock people out of their settled, comfortable views; they can also be self-promoting attacks on earlier work and professional standards. Goldhagen's title is provocative and delivers his thesis: the executioners of Jews were willing murderers, who willingly chose to torment and kill their victims; they were ordinary Germans, not Nazi monsters, not specially trained or indoctrinated by party membership or ideology, but simply acting out of what Goldhagen calls the common German "eliminationist mind-set." And being "ordinary" Germans responding to a common "cognitive model" about Jews, their places could have been taken by millions of other ordinary Germans.

Goldhagen's book comes in two related parts: the explanatory model, or "the analytical framework," as he also calls it, and the empirical evidence. The parts are joined by a single intent: the indictment of a people. The duality of presentation marks the style as well. Goldhagen depicts horror and renders judgment in evocative and compelling phrases. He bolsters polemical certainty with concepts drawn from the social sciences, relying on the vaporous, dreary jargon of the worst of academic "discourse." Unintelligible diagrams distract, even as horrendous photographs confirm. "The book's intent is primarily explanatory and theoretical," he notes. Theory explains and, as there is a persistent mismatch between the powerful, unsparing description of Holocaust bestiality and simplistic theoretical explanation, theory

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triumphs. Astoundingly repetitive, the book has 125 pages of notes but, regrettably, no bibliography.

To say it at once: the book has some merit, especially in the middle section, which depicts three specific aspects of the Holocaust, and it has one overriding defect: it is in its essence unhistorical. It is unhistorical in positing that one (simplistically depicted) strain of the past, German antisemitism, explains processes that the author strips of their proper historical context; it is unhistorical in over and over again presenting suppositions as "incontestable" certainty. Sir Lewis Namier, a great English historian, once remarked that " . . . the historical approach is intellectually humble; the aim is to comprehend situations, to study trends, to discover how things work: and the crowning attainment of historical study is a historical sense—an intuitive understanding of how things do not happen. . . . " Goldhagen's tone mocks humility, and he seems to lack any sense "of how things do not happen," of how complex human conduct and historical change really are.

THE GERMAN IDEOLOGY

Goldhagen begins with a disquisition of some hundred pages on what he believes is the peculiar character of German antisemitism, emphasizing medieval Christian hostility to Jews and concluding that in the largely secularized Germany of the nineteenth century this doctrinal hostility sharpened into a racial one, demonizing Jews as alien, as the enemy that needed to be eliminated. This version is of course dangerously close to the old cliché that a clear line of authoritarian, antisemitic thought runs from Luther to Hitler and was largely responsible for the triumph of Nazism.

Goldhagen draws on the rich literature about German antisemitism even as he dismisses it, distills what is useful for his thesis while ignoring whatever might contradict or complicate it, and then celebrates the originality of his own version. The result is a potpourri of half-truths and assertions, all meant to support his claim that German antisemitism was unique in its abiding wish to eliminate Jews, its "eliminationist mind-set." He suggests that one needs to look at Germans as anthropologists look at preliterate societies; they are not like "us," meaning Americans or Western Europeans.

He considers but dismisses the need to compare German antisemitism to other varieties, although we know that antisemitism was endemic in the Western world. Some scholars, including George L. Mosse and Zeev Steinhell, have plausibly argued that before 1914 French antisemitism was more pervasive and more aggressive than German antisemitism (on the other hand, French defense of Jews was more vigorous than similar efforts in Germany). Or take a perhaps even more revealing comparison: a leading historian of Germany, James J. Sheehan, wrote in 1992 that "animosity towards Jews [in the pre-1914 era] was substantially stronger in Austria than in Germany," and estimated "that whereas Austrians made up less than 10 per cent of the population of Hitler's Reich, they were involved in half the crimes associated with the Holocaust." Goldhagen certainly knows that thousands of non-Germans were willing executioners, willing auxiliaries to the Holocaust. But their motivation or, indeed, their historical role, is of no interest to him.

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Even in his discussion of German antisemitism he fails to make the necessary distinctions. There was a wide range of attitudes toward Jews, from those few who did indeed see them as the enemy and chief corrupters of their society—as "vermin" to be exterminated—to those men and women who welcomed Jews but regretted what they saw as Jewish "pushiness" or preeminence in some realms. Goldhagen takes remarks out of context and treats almost equally the ranting of the rabble-rouser and the private musings confined to a writer's diary. Everything is grist for his mill.[1]

A Goldhagen version of antisemitism in twentieth-century America might lump Eleanor Roosevelt's early remarks about "Jew-boys" in Franklin's law school class with Henry Ford's championing of the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* or Father Coughlin's tirades. Only by summary judgment and indifference to nuance can Goldhagen contend that in the nineteenth century "German society . . . was *axiomatically* antisemitic." And hence, "It is thus *incontestable* that the fundamentals of Nazi antisemitism . . . had deep roots in Germany, was part of the cultural cognitive model of German society, and was integral to German political culture . . . It is *incontestable* that this racial antisemitism which held the Jews to pose a mortal threat to Germany was pregnant with murder" (my italics). Incontestable? I would say unprovable and implausible.

GERMAN JEWS

The very Germany Goldhagen discusses was the country in which Jews had made the most extraordinary leaps to cultural and economic prominence. But Goldhagen omits this integral element of history.

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[1]A sample of Goldhagen's modus operandi is his only reference to Thomas Mann: "Thomas Mann, who had already long been an outstanding opponent of Nazism, could nevertheless find some common ground with the Nazis . . . 'it is no great misfortune that . . . the Jewish presence in the judiciary has been ended.' The dominant cultural cognitive model of Jews and the eliminationist mindset that it spawned was dominant in Germany." A note indicates that he takes the citation from an essay of mine in which I quoted passages from Mann's journal.

I consider Mann, married to Katia Pringsheim, the daughter of a prominent Jewish family, perhaps the best example of the ambiguity and complexity of German antisemitism, and I cited this passage, written in the early months of the regime, precisely because of its fascinating vacillation of tone and meaning. The very next—indeed, inseparable—sentence, which Goldhagen omits, suggests Mann's own distaste at his thoughts, which he characterizes as "secret, disquieting, intense," but the passage concludes with his musing that the process of historical change, just recently initiated by the Nazis, had in it "nonetheless things that are revoltingly malevolent, base, un-German in the highest sense. But I am beginning to suspect that their process could well be of that kind that has two sides."

Another example: he mentions the late Israeli scholar Uriel Tal's comment on liberal disappointment with Jews in the late nineteenth century but omits that Tal observed in the same context: "Political and racial antisemitism during this period [the Second Reich] failed to exert any appreciable public influence, and whatever effectiveness it had was limited to short intervals and restricted regions."

Such procedures from someone who can be so censorious of others. In 1989 Goldhagen reviewed an earlier thesis-driven book on the Holocaust saying: "But it is itself an artful construction of half-truths, itself in the service of an ideology. And it is riddled with extraordinary factual errors which amount to a pattern of falsification and distortion."

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After emancipation and after legal equality was decreed in 1869, German Jews began their astounding ascendancy. Their achievements were the envy of Jews elsewhere. It is perfectly true that any hope they had for complete acceptance remained unfulfilled. They knew that they were being treated as second-class citizens, and their very successes heightened their vulnerability. But this was a society at once dynamically expanding and severely weakened by internal strains; it seems odd to single out "eliminationist antisemitism" as the key social dynamic and say nothing of the still sharp antagonisms between Protestants and Catholics, or the intense class conflict that Germans called "the social question" and that weighed on them far more than "the Jewish question" did.

The salience of German antisemitism varied with the mood and condition of German politics. During the Great War these politics became radicalized, and by 1917, when hope for total victory turned to apprehension of defeat, an enraged right wing fastened on violent, chauvinist, antisemitic beliefs; but for many other Germans defeat was the result of internal enemies, the Weimar Republic was a Jewish excrescence in German politics, and both Marxism and Bolshevism were Jewish machinations. Men and women on the left or liberal end of the German political spectrum rejected these delusions and defended the Republic, in which Jews had achieved a certain political prominence. Of all this Goldhagen says very little; the Great War, during which both Jewish patriotism and German antisemitism flourished as never before, is mentioned in only one paragraph. This distorted view of German political culture is unconvincing in its simplicity.

HITLER AND ANTISEMITISM

Scholars have long debated whether Hitler's antisemitism was central to his electoral victories at the end of the Weimar years. It is generally accepted that the more the National Socialists tried to widen their appeal, the more they muted their antisemitic theme. In one of Hitler's key addresses in 1932, for example, he hardly alluded to Jews at all. Yet Goldhagen insists: "The centrality of antisemitism in the Party's world, program and rhetoric—if in a more avowedly elaborated and violent form—mirrored the sentiments of German culture." Actually, it exposed the sentiments of only *some* Germans. In the last free elections in 1932, some 67 percent of the German electorate did not vote for Hitler, although no doubt even among these there were groups that harbored suspicion and dislike of Jews. Perhaps many Germans had some measure of antisemitism in them but lacked the murderous intent that Goldhagen ascribes to National Socialism. Put bluntly: for Goldhagen, as for the National Socialists, *Hitler was Germany*.

But was antisemitism the sole or even the most important bond between Hitler and the Germans? Was it responsible for the failure of Germans to protest the first terrorist measures of the regime, the suppression of civil rights, the establishment of concentration camps in March 1933? The existence of the camps was made public specifically because they were intended to destroy political enemies and to intimidate potential opposition. From the very beginning the Nazis used every vicious means of humiliation and terror—in public sometimes, within the insulated realm of the camps always—against all opponents, real and imagined,

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German or German Jew, man or woman. They unleashed their pent-up savagery on Socialists and Communists (with the greatest brutality if they happened to be Jews as well). Men were beaten in these camps, and murdered—yet silence was pervasive among the Germans, who had begun to exult in their society's outward order and slowly returning prosperity and power. Would Goldhagen not acknowledge the likelihood of some link between Germans so sadistically falling upon their fellow Germans and their treatment of people whom they came to demonize—Jews and Slavs in particular?

The silence, and in some cases the easy acquiescence of the German elites, including those in churches, universities, and the civil service, have long been considered moral and civic failures of portentous importance. They saw their own freedoms threatened, their own principles violated; yet they showed, in Norbert Elias's phrase, "a lust for submission." They met with silence the first extrusionary acts against Jews; only very few protested when colleagues were removed from their posts or lost their jobs, when friends were ostracized, when all Jews were made the target of steady abuse. One must remember that active protest against the National Socialist regime in the spring of 1933 would not have demanded martyrdom—far from it. The price for the exercise of decency rose only when the regime became stronger.

Goldhagen argues that the road to Auschwitz was straight, and he pays little heed to the improvisations and uncertainties of the regime's first five years. Yet policies during that period aimed at the extrusion, not the extermination, of Jews, at their isolation and impoverishment, so as to drive them out of the country. Goldhagen rightly emphasizes both the antisemitic propaganda of the time and the way Jews were already to some degree "fair game"; yet in Germany there were few acts of spontaneous violence against them, as compared to the explosion of sadistic antisemitism in Austria immediately following the Anschluss. Nevertheless, for Goldhagen it is in Germany that the "eliminationist" mindset was most virulent.

Goldhagen rightly ponders the Germans' responses to the Reich pogrom in November 1938 known as Kristallnacht, with its burning of synagogues, smashing of Jewish property, and public arrest of some 30,000 male Jews who were then herded into concentration camps. He notes that "the world reacted with moral revulsion and outrage, the German people failed to exhibit equivalent revulsion and outrage—and principled dissent from the antisemitic model that underlay the night's depredation—even though what had occurred was done in their name, in their midst, to defenseless people, and to *their* countrymen" (Goldhagen's italics). But Goldhagen has been at pains to demonstrate that Germans had never regarded Jews as their countrymen. He continues: "This, perhaps the most revealing day of the entire Nazi era, the day on which an opportunity presented itself for the German people to rise up in solidarity with their fellow citizens, was the day on which the German people sealed the fate of the Jews by letting the authorities know that they concurred in the unfolding eliminationist enterprise, even if they objected, sometimes vociferously, to some of its measures." What a historical aberration! What chance was there for a people "to rise up" against a firmly entrenched terrorist regime

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THE GRANGER COLLECTION

Torturing of Jews during the Spanish Inquisition, 1475

that, moreover, had just scored the most extraordinary peaceful triumphs of incorporating Austria and emasculating Czechoslovakia—and all this with the passive or even active support of the western democracies. The November horror occurred six weeks after the Munich Conference and a month before the signing of a special Franco-German friendship treaty. If Germans "concurred in the unfolding eliminationist enterprise," why did the National Socialist regime make such strenuous efforts to hide its later crimes from them, to carry them out, as the famous phrase put it, "in night and fog," to place the early extermination camps outside the borders of the Reich? Was it afraid of phantoms?

Moreover, Goldhagen slights the acts of decency that did occur, every act at the risk of horrible retribution. (In general, these acts of decency and defiance have received too little attention, especially in Germany itself.)

American readers will soon be able to read German works in translation that either supplement or balance Goldhagen's version of events. The diaries of Victor Klemperer, kept in secret from 1933 to 1945 and only now published, have been a best-seller in Germany. They record the sentiments and sufferings of a Jewish professor married to a Christian; they offer a nuanced picture of both the Germans' brutality and callousness toward Jews and their moments of decency and quiet help. Wolfgang Sofsky's *The Order of Terror: The Concentration Camp*, appearing in the United States this fall, is a major study

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that characterizes the camp as the emblematic institution of the Nazi regime and insists "that the universe of the concentration camp is unprecedented in its torture and destruction," in its organized effort at degradation and murder. Goldhagen's one-sided remarks about the antisemitic attitudes and even murderous complicity with the regime of some of the heroic men who tried to kill Hitler in July 1944 receives more thorough and balanced attention in Joachim Fest's *Plotting Hitler's Death: The Story of the German Resistance*.

FOLLOWING ORDERS?

Less than half of this irksomely repetitive book deals with Goldhagen's own research into three specific aspects of the Holocaust: the murderous conduct of police battalions (the ordinary men of the title), the misnamed work camps that were way stations on the road to death, and the death marches at the end of the war. Goldhagen focuses on the perpetrators, particularly on their putative motives, and gives most terrifying, memorable accounts of their wanton cruelty. He reminds us that a very large number of Jews perished not in the gas chambers but by means of executions, planned starvation, and induced disease, always amidst unspeakable bestiality.

Goldhagen examines the lives and cruelties of the men of the 101st Police Battalion—a reconstruction made possible by the thorough record of a German prosecutorial investigation conducted after 1945. These men, most of them from the lower or lower-middle class in Hamburg, tended to be older than soldiers; most of them were family men and only a few of them were members of any Nazi organization. In 1992, Christopher R. Browning published *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*, a meticulous study of precisely this same police battalion of 500 men, in which he examined their backgrounds and vicious deeds, their massacres of Jews—men, women, and children in Poland—just because they were Jews. The commander offered his men nonpunitive exemption from such horror as killing mothers and babies, but most men participated (as happened elsewhere), some with apparent sadistic satisfaction, some even though they had wives with them in Poland who knew and on occasion saw what their husbands did.

Goldhagen analyzes much of the same material but fiercely rejects Browning's account of the murderers' motives. Browning acknowledges the effect of the relentless Nazi propaganda against the Jews but wisely considers what other factors may have been responsible, including the fear of breaking ranks, acknowledging "weakness," and, in a few cases, considerations of career advancement. Goldhagen will have none of this. He insists on a monocausal explanation: antisemitic beliefs alone accounted for this behavior. Browning thinks that "the historian who attempts to 'explain' [this behavior] is indulging in a certain arrogance." True.[2]

[2]In an extremely odd note, Goldhagen dismisses Browning, saying that the plausibility of "his explanation depends upon a person's own understanding of the cynicism of people. Scholars who believe that for a promotion or for a few marks, these Germans were willing to slaughter Jews by the thousands should also believe that for tenure at a university . . . virtually all their colleagues today, and they themselves, would mow down innocent people by the thousands."

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Next Goldhagen analyzes some of the so-called work camps, in which Jews were treated as worse than slaves, whipped to perform such senseless tasks as carrying rocks from one end of the camp to the other and back again. They were meant to die at hard, purposeless labor; they were starved, beaten, and killed, caught in a hell ruled by dogs and the whims of all-powerful sadist-guards (not all of them German). Jews were destined for extermination in these work camps, even as the Reich suffered from a labor shortage that led it to exploit more than seven million foreign slave laborers. Goldhagen emphasizes the economic irrationality of this strategy, citing it as proof once again of the primacy of the German drive to exterminate Jews. True, but there were many other instances of both economic irrationality and cruelty to *non*-Jews that were just as injurious to German interests.

The book's most gripping chapter concerns the death marches that began in the winter of 1944 and spring of 1945, when Jews, separated from non-Jewish fellow prisoners, were hounded from camp to camp as the Allied armies closed in on Germany. Goldhagen concentrates on one hellish march in particular, the 22-day trek from the Helmbrechts camp in Franconia to a place some 120 miles away, across the Czech border. The march "began and ended in slaughter." From the first, Jews were beaten, killed, or left to freeze, starve, and die under conditions far worse than the abominations that non-Jews suffered. All this in spite of the fact that Himmler had given orders—for his own opportunistic reasons—to cease killing Jews. The guards on this march disregarded the orally transmitted order and indulged in crazed sadism, women guards showing special cruelty. (A few Germans tried to throw the prisoners scraps of bread, but the guards brutally prevented such succor.) Goldhagen's passion finds its best expression in this and other accounts of harrowing horror. He recounts these scenes of utter inhumanity with admirable fortitude. But the ever-repeated judgment is of course less compelling: "These Germans . . . were voluntaristic actors . . . Their trueness to meting out suffering and death was not an imposed behavior; it came from within, an expression of their innermost selves."

Reviewers have commented on the originality of his treatment of the death marches. Actually, Martin Gilbert's *Holocaust*—a book Goldhagen does not mention—gives an overview of the marches from accounts of the few survivors, focusing on the victims and not on the few known perpetrators.

All these acts of barbarism, these human enactments of the worst of Hieronymous Bosch's nightmares, were committed by Germans (and, Goldhagen notwithstanding, by non-Germans) who, according to Goldhagen, felt neither shame nor compunction. The Jew was the enemy, at once all-powerful and subhuman; the demonization had struck roots. Goldhagen wants to correct a perspective that focuses on "the desk murderers." The Holocaust was more than a bureaucratic operation; it was not the work of so many banal cogs in the wheels of evil. But while he rightly points to the thousands of individual tormentors and murderers, Goldhagen tends to underplay the powerful role of the state apparatus that gave those murderers license, one that involved the collaborative efforts of the rulers of the Reich and their servants, officials in multiple ministries, party desk

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officers, the government, the army, the judiciary, and the medical establishment.

Goldhagen singles out those murderers who were "ordinary Germans" and who, he insists, were motivated solely by their "cognitive model" of the Jew. He then moves from specific and harrowing examples to a grotesque extrapolation: having examined the acts of some hundreds or perhaps even thousands of people, he insists that almost all Germans were moved by the same hatred, approved the killing, would have acted in like fashion if chance had so decreed. As he writes, " . . . the institutions treated here . . . should permit the motivations of the perpetrators in those particular institutions to be uncovered, and also allow for generalizing both to the perpetrators as a group and to the second target group of this study, the German people." The leap from individual cases to the German people at large is unpersuasive, but necessary for his indictment of his "second target group."

Some 50 years ago, at the end of the war, this view of the uniqueness of German criminality was commonly held. It was once a comforting certainty that Germans and only Germans were capable of such organized atrocities—for which Goldhagen is the first to assign a single motive. But in time the interpretation of the Holocaust became more differentiated, less self-exculpatory; we also know more about atrocities today, whether in Cambodia, Biafra, or Bosnia.

Can one even try to explain the Holocaust (the horror of which for many, myself included, somehow eludes understanding) without regard to its historical context? Should one? The Inferno occurred at a given historical moment, at a time of mounting barbarism and moral indifference, which had returned to Europe in unimaginable force during the Great War, barely diminished in the interwar years, and reached an apogee during this second world war. National Socialism, we know, was at once Germany's most criminal and most popular regime, Hitler the century's most charismatic leader. The terror that he launched in Germany spread to conquered Europe: German troops of various formations extended the terror to Poland, Russia, Greece, everywhere. Thus villages were burned, hostages shot, and men, women, and children hounded, starved, separated, and killed—all that and everywhere. There were thousands of massacres in Poland, and 2.5 million Russian prisoners of war were deliberately starved to death. The links that connect this pervasive brutality to the systematic extermination of European Jewry cannot be found in specific documents or individual decisions, but can those links be doubted? Furthermore, scholars have now established that both Germans and non-Germans knew far more far earlier about the Holocaust and the atrocities in the east than was once assumed. But most of these people worried about their own predicaments and tried to preserve their complacent self-regard, their moral self-esteem, by choosing not to know or believe—a denial that has marked much of the world in our century. In brief: the Holocaust took place in the long night of organized bestiality. That is its context.

THE CONTROVERSY

Hitler's Willing Executioners and its reception in this country aroused instant concern in Germany. As early as April, the German media organized extensive discussions on the book; some of the talk was favorable, as were the first reviews in America, but

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much of it was critical, sometimes in an ad hominem way.[3] In early August, just before the German translation was published, *Die Zeit*, Germany's celebrated weekly, which had already given uncommon, perhaps unwarranted, attention to the book, allotted Goldhagen exceptional space to respond to what he called "The Failure of the Critics." In his response, Goldhagen attacked all his critics and rejected all their arguments—with dazzling arrogance. He accused them not only of failing to answer central questions, but even of failing to ask them: "If then they are confronted with a book that delivers precisely these answers, then they react in a rage that makes one think of people who want to silence someone because he touches on a long-preserved taboo." But these scholarly critics include precisely those liberal German historians who for decades have done the most to analyze and document the nature and atrocities of the Third Reich, who by meticulous research have established the complicity of so many German individuals and institutions, including the churches and the Wehrmacht. Goldhagen nowhere acknowledges the immense, courageous labors of these German historians and writers, who have presented their people with as stark and honest a portrait of their past as is possible—and have done so to the irritation of many "ordinary Germans" who would prefer not to be reminded of the uniqueness of that past.

Der Spiegel, which also has extensively covered the sensation that is Goldhagen, reports that the German translation (which I have not seen), with a new introduction by the author, modifies or mutes some of his more sweeping allegations. In his many interviews he has taken pains to highlight the exculpation that appears in a mere note at the end of the American edition, where he writes that he did not mean "to imply that a timeless German character exists. The character structure and the common cognitive models of Germans have developed and evolved historically and, especially since the loss of the Second World War, have changed dramatically." In his appearances in September before German audiences, Goldhagen denied ever having had the notion of collective guilt and seemed eager to attenuate such sentences in the book as "Germany during the Nazi period was inhabited by a people animated by beliefs about Jews that made them willing to become consenting mass murderers." His subject of course touched the deepest German questions of guilt and individual responsibility, and did so, apparently, in a fashion different from the book. It would seem that he tried to please his German audiences.[4]

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[3]The first book about the book has just appeared, a collection of critiques published in Germany, also with a provocative title: Julius H. Schoeps, ed., *Ein Volk von Mördern? Die Dokumentation zur Goldhagen-Kontroverse um die Rolle der Deutschen im Holocaust* (A people of murderers? Documentation concerning the Goldhagen controversy about the role of the Germans in the Holocaust), Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1996.

[4]According to German press reports, he did so triumphantly. In my brief visit to Germany in early October, I was told that his charm, telegenic presence, and conciliatory manner enthralled his public and bested his critics. German commentators remained puzzled, as I am, by the discrepancy between the public acclaim and the scholarly criticism, coming especially from the liberal side, and by the discrepancy between the writer's arrogance and the speaker's appealing modesty.

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Hitler's Willing Executioners was a best-seller in this country, and it sold 80,000 copies in the first four weeks after its publication in Germany. Some Germans have remarked to me that whatever the book's flaws, it should be welcomed because it will reinvigorate the debate and stimulate new scholarship. *Der Spiegel* has made this same point, as has the distinguished American historian Gordon Craig. But the book also reinforces and reignites earlier prejudices: latent anti-German sentiment among Americans, especially Jews, and a sense among Germans that Jews have a special stake in commemorating the Holocaust, thereby keeping Germany a prisoner of its past. The book is now a major datum in German-American relations. Perhaps it could be viewed as an academic equivalent of the simplistic television series "Holocaust," which also had an enormous impact.

The astounding reception of so polemical and pretentious a book can hardly be attributed solely to its topic or thesis. Shrill and simplistic explanations of monstrous crimes obviously command attention. But there is more at work here: the author's ceaseless boast of radical originality was endorsed on the book's jacket by two well-known scholars, both distinguished in fields other than German history—and between them praising Goldhagen's work as "phenomenal scholarship and absolute integrity . . . impeccable scholarship, a profound understanding of modern German history . . . obligatory reading." The American and German publishers touted the book with all the great promotional power at their command. Perhaps Goldhagen's manipulated, public-relations-orchestrated success tells us more about the culture of the present than the book's substance tells us about the horrors of the past.

C-SPAN

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The Impossible Necessity of Nigeria

A Struggle for Nationhood

Crawford Young

The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis. BY WOLE SOYINKA. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 170 pp. $19.95.

"We have lost the twentieth century," lamented Chinua Achebe, one of Nigeria's brilliant literary sons, in 1983, "are we bent on seeing our children also lose the twenty-first?" The three towering figures of Nigeria's early years of independence—Obafemi Awolowo, Nnamdi Azikiwe, and Sir Ahmadu Bello—had all at some point in their careers expressed doubts about preserving Nigeria as one country. In 1947 Awolowo even commented that Nigeria was not a nation but "a mere geographic expression."

Now Nobel laureate Wole Soyinka rekindles the long-running debate about the possibility of Nigerian survival in his combative new political essay, *The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis.* For three decades a tireless foe of a succession of predatory regimes, Soyinka's contempt for the most recent military custodians of Nigerian nationhood echoes the sentiments of many of his fellow Nigerians. Is Nigeria a nation, and should it be?

Soyinka's powerful prose brilliantly sketches the dilemmas plaguing Africa's demographic giant and reveals the stark choices facing Nigeria, a nation brought to the edge of ruin by the misappropriation of its oil wealth. His own ambivalence about "the national question" bears witness to the broader uncertainties among many Nigerians. Except for those who benefit directly from the status quo, most view the exercise of authority and political practice in Nigeria as morally bankrupt. Does a state shamelessly plundered by a succession of rulers have any legitimate claim on the loyalty of its citizenry? Can the nation be reborn, redeemed, and resurrected from below? In Soyinka's view, the results of the June 1993 elections held the promise of just

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

such a redemption, but their annulment plunged the country into the direst straits it has yet encountered. He still prefers a single Nigeria to any other immediately available outcome, but concedes that he "frankly could not advance any invulnerable reason for my preference for a solution that did not involve disintegration."

Soyinka's intellectual odyssey reflects the trajectory of Nigerian nationalism. Like many of his generation, he began with a devout commitment to a strongly united Nigeria of socialist orientation and pan-African bent. The disappointments of the First Republic (1963-66) compelled Soyinka to reconsider his political moorings. He became an early adversary of military rule and took an active part in some progressive intellectuals' efforts to avert civil war. He later opposed both the Biafra secession and its violent suppression. Soyinka's criticism of the use of military force to end the secession cost him a two-year sojourn in squalid dungeons, cementing his implacable opposition to military dictatorship; his eloquent 1972 memoir, *The Man Died,* provides a gripping account of his incarceration. Maintained at the price of prolonged periods of enforced exile, his personal courage and integrity command broad respect.

Soyinka's authority also springs from his literary stature. A playwright, poet, novelist, and author of a vivid autobiography of a Yoruba childhood, he received a Nobel Prize for Literature in 1986. Soyinka's political writings have always combined polemical force with expository grace, and his stinging characterization of Nigeria as a failed state is no exception.

Nor could it be more timely. The brutal execution in November 1995 of Ogoni leader Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight of his associates highlighted once again the uncertain bonds between a would-be Nigerian "nation" and its subject ethnic communities. Ogoni discontent germinated in

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the deepening conviction that Ogoniland's ecosystem had been ravaged in pursuit of oil production, the revenues from which accrued entirely to the Nigerian state, with little benefit returned to the Ogoni community.

But the struggle between the Ogoni and General Sani Abacha's military dictatorship is not relevant for Nigeria alone. The stakes of Nigeria's survival are high for all of Africa. A further downward spiral of institutional decay could spark an implosion that would flood neighboring states with an unmanageable wave of refugees. Beneath the relative calm of Nigeria's surface lies a far-reaching crisis of legitimacy.

A CONSTRUCTED NATION

Nigeria is an artifact of the colonial partition. Even its name and original national anthem, as Soyinka reminds us, were the creations of British women. But if Nigeria began as an imagined community, it became real enough through shared subjugation and resistance to coerced consolidation, a process eloquently described in James Coleman's 1958 classic, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism*. Conventional wisdom holds that stable governance requires the legitimating embrace of nationhood, spawning the often forced state discourse of "nation-building." Both the Nigerian rulers who succeeded to power in 1960 and their erstwhile British tutors saw the need for just such nation-building.

As they conceived it, Nigerian nationhood rested on three pillars: the state, as competent manager of the public realm; a "federal character," with equilibrated roles for the three large ethnic communities and the many smaller ethnic minorities; and the democratic process. The growing fear in Nigeria today that a Nigerian nation may be what Soyinka has called a mere "farcical illusion" is the result of manifest dereliction on all three fronts.

Although corruption in Nigerian politics had colonial antecedents and became apparent soon after independence, in the early years the sums involved were modest and the practitioners less brazen. Both the triumphant aura that victory in the 1967-70 civil war conferred on the federal government and the magnanimous treatment of the vanquished helped legitimize the state and allowed it to maintain its authority throughout the 1970s. A phenomenal surge in oil revenues and highly visible public investment in roads and schools further sanctified the state's position, and the smooth transition to democratic rule in 1979 suggested that stability would prevail well into the 1980s. But in 1983 the sordid comportment of Shehu Shagari's civilian regime, which Soyinka excoriates as a "poli-thug state," again opened the door to military intervention.

Civilian rule was not the only casualty of the early 1980s. The end of the oil boom in 1982, the emergence of a serious debt problem by 1986, the ensuing decline in the well-being of the Nigerian salaried middle class, and the increasingly unrestrained use of political power for personal profit exposed the infirmities of the state.

Just as the credibility of the state's management of the public realm was collapsing, so too was its federal character. The failure of the First Republic pointed out the flaws of a federal structure constructed around the three largest ethnic blocs. The 3 colonial-era regions were progressively divided into 4, then 12, 19, 21, and finally 30 states—perhaps with more to come. Unsustainable as it may seem, this strategy has liberated the smaller ethnic minorities

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from an oppressive hegemony of the three largest ethnic groups by dispersing those three groups among several states. Carefully ensuring a proportionate distribution of power without creating an explicitly ethnic federation, the Second Republic's constitution and its successors have in many ways been ingenious formulas for national survival.

Political reality, however, especially during the military years, failed to follow the script of balanced diversity. The two civilian prime ministers (1960-66, 1979-83) were both Hausa-Fulani, the politically and demographically dominant ethnic category in the north. During most of Nigeria's 27 years of military rule, the senior autocrat has also been from the north. Even though Generals Yakubu Gowon (1966-1975), Ibrahim Babangida (1985-1993), and Sani Abacha (1993-) are not themselves Hausa-Fulani, Nigerians view them as integral parts of what Soyinka terms "a self-perpetuating clique from the yet feudally oriented part of the country."

In the public mind, the changing patterns of Nigeria's revenue flow further diluted the reality of the nation's federal character. By the 1980s, 80 to 90 percent of state revenue and foreign exchange came from the petroleum sector, and accrued first and foremost to the federal government. The individual states were left entirely dependent on federal handouts.

THE DEMOCRATIC MIRAGE

Through the decades of corruption and political turmoil, a public commitment to the democratic process as an indispensable source of legitimacy has remained a remarkable constant in Nigerian political life. Since World War II, the country's undemocratic regimes, whether colonial or military, have always justified their rule by claiming that they are interim superintendents preparing the way for democratic government.

Although Babangida's promises of a transition to democracy were far less credible than those issued by his predecessors, until 1993 the hope—even expectation—of military withdrawal persisted. Thus transition management retained some plausibility as a surrogate for democratic legitimation. The annulment of the 1993 elections, by common consent fairly conducted, shattered that illusion. For Soyinka, the annulment constituted "the most treasonable act of larceny of all time: It violently robbed the Nigerian people of their nationhood!"

Although Abacha engineered the creation of yet another constitution, and although the first steps have been taken toward a promised hand-over of authority to an elected government in 1998, public skepticism has only deepened. For perhaps the first time since independence, Nigerians suspect that the military intends a permanent transition in which new artifices will forever delay democratic rule.

UNITED WE STAND. . .

Perhaps Soyinka overstates his case, but the three pillars of Nigerian nationhood have been badly shaken. Is there a choice, as Soyinka asks, other than "that mangy, flea-infested flag that the sanctimonious nationalist drapes around his torso to cover a repulsive nudity"? Four options have been suggested at various times: a pan-African construction, broader regional groupings, an entirely redrawn map based on cultural geography rather than the accidents of colonial partition, and allowing free rein to ethnic self-determination.

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Closely inspected, none of these options provides much solace. Soyinka himself, though in his youth a fervent supporter of the first alternative, sees the elevation of ethnic communities as sanctuaries for retreat as the emergent choice of Nigerians in despair. It may not be his own preference, but it is one that may gain strength as the cynical disengagement from Nigeria as both a state and a nation continues apace.

Nigerians are by no means alone in their collective self-doubt. With a debilitating economic decline completing its second decade in many African lands, the remorseless pressures of globalization and world capital markets, and the frustrations that endless "structural adjustments" have engendered, even the indisputable headway in African political liberalization cannot dissipate the apprehensions.

Ethiopia represents the most audacious venture in territorial reconfiguration along ethnic lines, with a comprehensive redrawing of internal boundaries and a constitutional guarantee of ethnic self-determination, even including the right to secede (although the current power configuration will not permit anyone to exercise that right). Some have suggested that the only solution for the intractable ethnic polarization in Rwanda and Burundi is the creation of two new states, "Uhutu" and "Tutsiland." But the magnitude of the ethnic cleansing required for implementation of such formulas, the ambiguous boundaries of ethnic identity, and the huge costs involved make reconciliation a far more appealing option. However, if populations became territorially segregated on the ground, as in Bosnia and Cyprus, circumstances might eventually dictate a rearrangement of the regional state system. In short, the long-term survival of the 53 sovereign units issuing from Africa's colonial partition is far from certain.

Democratization, with its many limits and flaws, remains the only path extending beyond impasse, in Nigeria and elsewhere. Only through democracy can Nigeria begin to reclaim legitimacy. The 1993 balloting revealed a remarkably broad distribution of electoral support for the victor, Moshood Abiola; although he won overwhelming backing in his native Yoruba region, he also garnered impressive support in the east and the north. Annulling the elections was a tragic act of folly; history will surely vindicate the harsh verdict Soyinka passes on those who made the decision to do so.

Nigeria has little cultural logic; its peoples would never have chosen to live together. Over time, though, coexistence became a historical necessity, and citizens came to accept their common nationhood. In the euphoric days of newly won independence and the triumphant aftermath of the civil war, Nigerian unity resonated powerfully. Until recently, public faith in the ideal of nationhood required only that Nigeria's military rulers maintain a credible promise of democracy. But with the growing suspicion that the current regime may indefinitely prolong its transition to democratic rule, the ideal's power is shrinking. Its demise risks making Nigeria a political impossibility.

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Recent Books on International Relations

Political and Legal

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA

Debating the Democratic Peace. EDITED BY MICHAEL E. BROWN ET AL. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996, 379 pp. $17.00 (paper).

The essays in this extremely useful volume, many of them previously published in *International Security*, bring together much of the work done on the "democratic peace" hypothesis in recent years. The assertion that democracies tend not to fight one another is, in Bruce Russett's words, "one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can be made about international relations," and the academic debate on the issue has been both interesting and of high quality. The volume begins with such proponents of the hypothesis as Russett and Michael Doyle, then moves to counterpoints by Christopher Layne, David Spiro, and Jack Snyder. The controversies they address concern how to define democracy, empirical evidence of wars or near wars, and the causal connections between democracy and peace.

It is hard not to conclude that an important relationship binds democracy and peace, though it has certain qualifications: it is not an iron rule, but a correlation that is dependent on the degree to which not just democratic but liberal institutions and norms are consolidated. Hence it is not surprising that many of the counterexamples cited by critics concern borderline liberal-democratic states such as the American South, Wilhelmine Germany, or the Soviet successor states. The policy question then is not whether democracy is conducive to peace, but under what circumstances it is reasonable to expect democracy to develop, and what instruments outside states have for promoting it. This question, falling as it does more within the province of comparative government and political economy than international relations, is the one missing piece of an otherwise excellent volume.

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Against Capitalism. BY DAVID SCHWEICKART. Boulder: Westview, 1996, 387 pp. $24.95 (paper).

Unlike many critics of capitalism, Schweickart has done his homework, taking seriously the arguments of contemporary neoclassical economics and its philosophical defenders and carefully critiquing them. He argues that the marginalism underlying Alfred Marshall's theory of value tends to overstate the social contribution made by owners of capital, whose sacrifice in terms of deferred consumption is not comparable to the sacrifice of those who contribute their labor. His proposed "economic democracy" alternative is a variant of Yugoslav worker management, with state ownership of productive assets and allocation of new investment resources by various quasi-public bodies. Despite his efforts to anticipate neoclassical arguments in advance, he does not ultimately have adequate answers to two central questions: first, how worker management–cum–public-sector finance will avoid serious allocational inefficiencies, and second, how adequate investment and entrepreneurship will emerge in the absence of clearly defined property rights. While he can point to relatively successful economies that depart from neoclassical norms, it is not clear that his will be one of them.

Hatreds: Racialized and Sexualized Conflicts in the 21st Century. BY ZILLAH EISENSTEIN. New York: Routledge, 1996, 223 pp. $62.95 (paper, $17.95).

This book begins with a diatribe against contemporary hatreds, from Bosnia and Rwanda to Oklahoma City and Los Angeles. The target, however, proves elusive, as every national, ethnic, or religious hatred sooner or later elides into some form of sexual oppression. Just as Lenin was surprised that nation trumped class in 1914, so Eisenstein is dismayed that ethnicity trumps gender today. While the author would like to see this priority reversed through global feminist solidarity, I'm not sure she will be any more successful than socialists of the Second International. There is a deep contradiction at the heart of her agenda: favoring multiculturalist identity politics over what she regards as the fraudulent universalistic and egalitarian aspirations of American democracy, she ultimately ends up encouraging precisely the kind of self-regarding communalism that is the source of contemporary group hatred.

The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action. BY LARRY MINEAR, COLIN SCOTT, AND THOMAS G. WEISS. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996, 123 pp. $25.00 (paper, 10.95).

This book breaks little new ground in surveying the interlocking roles of the media, governments, and nongovernmental organizations in responding to humanitarian crises. In some cases the media leads the other institutions; in others, it distorts priorities and messages. From case studies briefly covering Iberia, northern Iraq, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, and Rwanda, the authors conclude that the three need to work together more closely. Much more useful, at this point in the discussion, would have been a study of cases like Sudan, Angola, and Afghanistan that received

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relatively little media attention despite the gravity of their humanitarian problems because they were inaccessible, dangerous, or passé.

The Prosecution of International Crimes: A Critical Study of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. EDITED BY ROGER S. CLARK AND MADELEINE SANN. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1996, 502 pp. $49.95.

This book, consisting of articles previously published in the *Criminal Law Forum*, exhaustively documents the work of the ad hoc international tribunal set up to prosecute war crimes in the former Yugoslavia. It makes a meticulous legal case for the jurisdiction of such an international tribunal and will doubtless be of great use to those prosecuting similar cases in the future. It also demonstrates the irrelevance of a great deal of international law to the situation on the ground: the NATO Implementation Force could arrest indicted war criminals like Radovan Karadzić and Ratko Mladić tomorrow if U.S. commanders weren't worried about retaliation from local Serbs, something one would not know from the chapter on "Securing the Presence of Defendants," which deals instead with the legal niceties of extradition and ensuring the rights of defendants.

Beyond Confrontation: Transforming the New World Order. BY CHARLES HAUSS. Westport: Praeger, 1996, 249 pp. $55.00 (paper, $17.95).

This book begins with the premise that we face a global crisis of racial, ethnic, and religious strife, environmental decay, poverty, and war, and that the solution lies in "new thinking" that stresses interdependence and cooperation over confrontation. The author's basic solution—that people around the world improve their moral behavior—ignores the complex social roots of immoral behavior and the equally complex institutional structures on which moral behavior often rests. Peace, in other words, frequently rests on the prevalence of liberal institutions, which in turn is encouraged by economic development; laying these foundations is not simply a matter of being more accommodating in conflict situations.

Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts. BY TIMOTHY D. SISK. Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1996, 143 pp. $6.95 (paper).

This useful and workmanlike book offers formulas for stabilizing political systems in situations where full democracy is not possible—an important and often underestimated aspect of international diplomacy. It explains that power-sharing arrangements lie on a spectrum between consociational approaches that take existing communities and their leaders as givens, and integrative ones that seek to create new institutions and alliances cutting across communal lines. The book makes the important point that the international community has placed too much stress on early elections based on simple majority rule in the absence of prior power-sharing agreements, something that frequently makes ethnic conflicts worse and undermines the objective of democratic reform.

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Economic, Social, and Environmental

RICHARD N. COOPER

Postwar Politics in the G-7: Orders and Eras in Comparative Perspective. EDITED BY BYRON E. SHAFER. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996, 360 pp. $50.00 (paper, $19.95).

This book is not, as it might first appear, about the Group of Seven as an institution, but rather a series of essays on postwar politics in each of the G-7 states. Choosing this subset of nations makes sense, but while many of the individual chapters are interesting, the book suffers from the lack of a rigorous comparative framework. Given the topic, it is also curious that so little reference is made to the work of Seymour Martin Lipset and the extensive literature on American exceptionalism; one would not even know that the United States is the outlier along many of the political dimensions discussed.

Genocide, War, and Human Survival. EDITED BY CHARLES B. STROZIER AND MICHAEL FLYNN. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996, 343 pp. $58.50 (paper, $22.95).

This festschrift for the psychologist Robert Jay Lifton is the sort that gives such volumes a bad name. As the title indicates, the themes linking these 26 essays are very broad; the editors make no effort to synthesize the material or even provide a common definition for terms like "genocide." Some pieces, like the essay by historian George Mosse on the virtue of "manliness" and the Great War, are interesting; others, like the one by Charles Green suggesting that residents of American inner cities suffering from social ills like drug use and crime are victims of genocide, devalue the moral meaning of the term.

The Key to the Asian Miracle: Making Shared Growth Credible. BY JOSÉ EDGARDO CAMPOS AND HILTON L. ROOT. Washington: Brookings, 1996, 198 pp. $26.95.

While some economists focus on exceptionally high investment, others on education and absorption of foreign technology, to explain the remarkable rise of seven Asian economies from poverty to the ranks of "middle class" nations over the last seven years, this short book emphasizes political conditions. To achieve business cooperation, even authoritarian regimes (which governed these countries much of the time) must persuade the public to accept the rationale for their economic strategies and must elicit a reaction from business. Political stability is more likely to prevail if the benefits of growth are widely shared, and are perceived to be widely shared, through land reform, public education, and the provision of credit to small enterprises and even households (for housing). Competent officials must be put in charge of implementation and protected from continual political interference from legislatures and heads of government. The authors note that concern that the 1949 communist revolution in China would spread may have spurred these countries to adopt growth policies. Occasionally drawing comparisons with developing countries elsewhere, they

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add to scholarly knowledge about the successful countries but do not definitively identify the keys to success.

The Emptiness of Japanese Affluence. BY GAVAN MCCORMACK. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996, 311 pp. $35.00.

The picture McCormack paints of contemporary Japan is not a pretty one. The leading industry—construction—is rife with corruption, which has suffused Japanese politics. Centrally driven national development plans have suppressed local initiative and preferences. Traditional sensitivity to nature has been sacrificed for economic growth. Rice farming is defended on environmental and social grounds but acknowledged to be doomed because young Japanese do not want to become farmers. Despite recent apologies since the death of Hirohito, official Japan is still largely in denial about World War II, and because of the atom bomb many Japanese consider themselves the primary victims. Japan therefore remains suspect among its Asian neighbors. An Australian historian, McCormack offers a refreshing perspective different from that typically found in American popular books, drawing extensively on the writings of Japanese authors outside the establishment, and he performs a signal service in making their reflections, anxieties, and criticisms available in English. But he occasionally reports "facts" that are incorrect, such as that the U.S. market for agricultural goods has been more protected than the Japanese market, though even these reflect current perceptions in Japan.

The International Labor Organization: The International Standards System and Basic Human Rights. BY HÉCTOR G. BARTOLOMEI DE LA CRUZ, GERALDO VON POTOBSKY, AND LEE SWEPSTON. Boulder: Westview, 1996, 296 pp. $69.95.

Human Rights, Labor Rights, and International Trade. EDITED BY LANCE A. COMPA AND STEPHEN F. DIAMOND. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996, 311 pp. $39.95.

With the globalization of the economies of the rich countries, the question of international labor standards is likely to be pressed with greater urgency. The Swepston book, an extension and update of a Spanish book by his two co-authors, is basically a useful treatise on the International Labor Organization—how it works, what actions it has taken, and the status of international labor standards and formal conventions on workers' rights. Unfortunately, it suffers from a limited (and sometimes misleading) index, so that readers have to dig around for what they want.

The second book is the product of a 1992 conference at Yale Law School, updated through 1994. Most of the 15 authors are sympathetic to pressing forward internationally on workers' and union rights, which they view largely from an American (legal) point of view. But there are useful contributions by Denis MacShane on the European social charter and by Philip Alston on fair labor standards in U.S. trade legislation. Alston finds these provisions at best hypocritical, since the United States itself has not ratified the relevant ILO conventions, and at worst bald protectionism clothed in the language of workers'

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rights. Several essays describe how transnational issues of workers' rights have entered American courts. There is much stimulating material here, although there is little recognition, beyond the essay by R. Michael Gadbaw and Michael T. Medwig, that many foreign workers, if they had to choose, might prefer wage-increasing economic development, as in many East Asian countries, to American conceptions of workers' rights. Hence there is too little discussion of the extent to which such a tradeoff might actually be in force.

A Vision for the Economy: Openness, Diversity, and Cohesion. BY ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, ALBERT BRESSAND, AND TAKATOSHI ITO. Washington: Brookings, 1996, 124 pp. $28.95 (paper, $10.95).

This book is the capstone volume of an ambitious research program sponsored by the Brookings Institution on the integration of national economies into the world economy. It draws on detailed work by others published separately in 21 short volumes on various dimensions of world economic integration. Underlying many of the studies is the analytic distinction between national self-sufficiency, shallow integration, and deep integration among national economies. For the past 50 years most countries have been engaged in a process that the authors call shallow integration, reflected institutionally in organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization, whereby countries trade goods, services, and capital with one another but otherwise attempt, circumstances permitting, to maintain national freedom of action with respect to most aspects of economic policy. According to the authors, as global markets become more integrated, these national differences will increasingly be seen as a source of unfair advantage or disadvantage, and domestic political pressures will mount to remove the disadvantages. This process will result in some convergence of national economic policies. But convergence, they argue, may not always be desirable, and in any case the focal point of the convergence may not be the most socially beneficial one.

This suggests that efforts should be made to achieve deep integration, by which the authors mean international cooperation designed to preserve diversity when it is desirable and to move convergence in a socially desirable direction. Of course, many international agreements that can be used toward these ends already exist. The authors call for additional cooperation, especially in competition policy, product standards, public support for basic science and technology, and international environmental issues. More ambitiously, they identify taxation and macroeconomic coordination as candidates for cooperation, but are less sanguine about success in those areas. Readers will be pleased or distressed, depending on temperament and experience, that the authors favor the creation of new international institutions—open-membership functional clubs to address each area, and a club of clubs to coordinate them.

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Military, Scientific, and Technological

ELIOT A. COHEN

War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage. BY LAWRENCE H. KEELEY. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 245 pp. $25.00.

Most well-read students of warfare have a vague sense that the notion of peacefully primitive humanity has taken some hits in recent years. This book, however, documents the pervasiveness of cruel, chronic, and systematic warfare among most hunting-gathering societies, and, insofar as archaeological evidence may speak to us, prehistoric tribes as well. Keeley, an anthropologist long frustrated by the unwillingness of many of his colleagues to face up to this unsavory fact, makes it quite clear that the notion of primitive war being stylized and relatively bloodless is false. At once scholarly and lucid, he paints a dark picture of human nature, although he does not believe humankind is doomed to a perpetual striving for mutual extinction. A sobering, grim, and important book.

Flight of the Lavi: Inside a U.S.-Israeli Crisis. BY DOV S. ZAKHEIM. Washington: Brassey's, 1996, 268 pp. $25.95.

Zakheim was a Defense Department official in the Reagan administration, and the Lavi was a partially American-funded Israeli fighter airplane that he helped kill, thereby saving both countries a great deal of money and, no less important, an equally great deal of purposeless irritation. What makes the story particularly piquant, however, is the author's religion: an Orthodox Jew, Zakheim spoke Hebrew and knew Israel well. This book, a well-woven, ironic, and occasionally cutting memoir, succeeds at several levels. It tells the tale of bureaucratic wrangling over American cost estimates that proved the Lavi virtually unaffordable, much to the outrage of Israeli advocates. In the bickering and maneuvering that took place, Zakheim had some unlikely allies, including Israeli admirals who feared the Lavi would devour their own sorely needed reequipment programs. The description of personal struggle, including the author's savaging by some Israelis and Americans and warm support from others, combined with sharply worded aperçus about the ways of Pentagon politics, make the story of the Lavi's downfall a gripping, even moving, read.

Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1968-1973. BY WILLIAM M. HAMMOND. Washington: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1996, 659 pp. $43.00.

The heroes of this book are neither the press in Vietnam nor those they covered, but the American people, who displayed independence of judgment and a substantial measure of contempt for all those who sought to manipulate them. The author, who in a previous volume discussed the media in the early phases of the conflict, does a magnificent job of describing the painful relationship between the military and the press in Vietnam. His work will thereby discourage those who would see the Vietnam-era press either as a pack of scurrilous antimilitary subversives or, conversely, as paladins of truth at odds with a corrupt and compul-

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sively dishonest military establishment. This is a tale of complexity, a solidly wrought, painstakingly honest, and disinterested history of the kind that represents the work of the Army Center of Military History at its outstanding best and amply justifies the existence of such an institution. Officers and civilian government officials alike would do well to read it with the utmost care, for the problems described herein cut to the heart of a modern democracy at war.

The History of the Unified Command Plan, 1946-1993. BY RONALD H. COLE ET AL. Washington: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995, 157 pp.

Few subjects have as little glitter as the history of organizational wiring diagrams. Yet this slender monograph, produced by the professional historians of the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tells an important tale. Much as close scrutiny of a skeleton tells a shrewd scientist about the physique and evolution of a gigantic beast, the history of formal military organization can tell much about a great power's armed forces, conception of national security, and, in the case of the United States, growth to global dominance. The unified command plan describes the relationship of the operational commands of the United States, the organizations that wield military power. Embedded in the dry details of bureaucratic wrangling are many vital stories, among them the rise of joint organizations, the expansion of American military interests over the entire globe, and the centralization of authority in the person of the chairman of the joint chiefs. Hardly a dazzling read, but a worthwhile one.

Engineering the F-4 Phantom II: Parts into Systems. BY GLENN E. BUGOS. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1996, 258 pp. $29.95.

Like the C-47 Dakota or the Spitfire of World War II fame, the F-4 is a classic airplane. Designed in the mid-1950s, it played a vital role in Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli wars and even served in the Persian Gulf War as a suppressor of enemy air defenses. In its upgraded variants it will continue to fly well into the first decades of the next century. Bugos, a skilled historian of technology, tells the tale not only of its design but of its bureaucratic history—how the air force came to adopt a navy aircraft, how other nations decided to purchase it, and what role it had in deciding the outcome of various conflicts. This is, in short, a model of technological history, fluently written and accessible to a much broader audience than simply aviation buffs.

The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Fleets of the World: Their Ships, Aircraft, and Armament. COMPILED BY A. D. BAKER III. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995. $160.00 ($495.00, CD-ROM).

The bulky reference works that crowd the shelves of defense analysts should, and soon will, give way to products like the CD-ROM version of this annual guide. On a current-generation computer it afforded quick searching by country, ship type, aircraft, photo, line drawing, and other criteria. The information could then be

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printed. Although there are some drawbacks (line drawings were blurred), by and large this is an easier reference work to handle than the heavy tomes it replaces. Before too long, one hopes, even more sophisticated products (which show movement, for example, or allow a reader-viewer to examine an object from different angles) will appear. This compact disk merely duplicates the content of the book, albeit with the advantage of a computer's ability to search swiftly through large amounts of data. The next generation of products should exploit those areas in which computers can outperform their print competitors. At $495.00, however, this item will remain out of the price range of most potential purchasers other than research institutions.

The United States

DAVID C. HENDRICKSON

The Day Before Yesterday: Reconsidering America's Past, Rediscovering the Present. BY MICHAEL ELLIOTT. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996, 320 pp. $24.00.

An imaginative survey of the transformations that have overtaken America since the Golden Age after World War II. Elliott, the editor of *Newsweek International* and former Washington editor of *The Economist,* argues that the nation's discontents seem oppressive only by comparison with the years of false reference after 1945. Extend the comparison backward before 1914—to a country with sharp class divisions, immigrants tearing at the national identity, and an economy with high levels of foreign ownership—and it is the Golden Age that appears exceptional. The author writes like a therapist trying to get his patient—the nation—to adjust to the anxiety brought on by bereavement and loss, and he is firm in his conviction that Americans need to stop wishing for what they cannot have. But if the Golden Age is over and cannot be recovered, there is, he insists, plenty of room for optimism about America's prospects. The book is weakest in the sometimes strained comparisons between today and the more distant past; its strengths lie in the exuberance of Elliott's prose, the sharp eye he casts on the social and economic transformations of the past 50 years, and his almost giddy appreciation of the vitality and diversity of American life.

Nixon Off the Record: His Candid Commentary on People and Politics. BY MONICA CROWLEY. New York: Random House, 1996, 231 pp. $23.00.

An enjoyable little book, by Nixon's foreign policy assistant from 1990 until his death in 1994, that paints a revealing portrait of the aging statesman's views in his last years. Touching is the picture of them conspiring together—the fresh-faced coed (born in '68), all apparent sweetness and light, faithfully recording every night (unbeknownst to Nixon) the pearls of wisdom and buckets of black bile dispensed by the grizzled veteran of the political wars. If the author's observations are sometimes saccharine, her characterization of his views and phrasing seems absolutely true to form. Apart from detailing Nixon's preoccupation with engineering a massive aid package to Russia in 1992 and 1993, there is not much on foreign policy in this book; that will be treated more fully in a second volume.

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Instead, Crowley recounts his views on leadership, his running commentary on the 1992 elections, and his developing relationship with President Clinton, with whom he formed a troubled partnership in 1993 after having privately denounced him as an utterly worthless character the entire preceding year. Many of his observations—of Hillary Clinton, James Baker, Warren Christopher, and Gerald Ford, among others—are pretty withering, and not to be repeated in a family magazine. But his native shrewdness is also continually on display, along with the sometimes unintentional hilarity of the curmudgeon.

Smoke and Mirrors: The War on Drugs and the Politics of Failure. BY DAN BAUM. New York: Little, Brown, 1996, 396 pp. $24.95.

A journalistic account of the origins and development of a policy "as expensive, ineffective, delusional, and destructive as government gets." Baum, formerly a reporter with *The Wall Street Journal* and *The Atlanta Constitution,* covers the years from the early 1970s to the present, providing a warehouse of anecdotes to underscore his damning indictment of the drug war. The work lacks the analytical power of other anti-prohibitionist tracts (the best of which is the encyclopedic study by Steven Duke and Albert Gross, *America's Longest War);* nor does Baum address the dilemmas and conundrums associated with legalization. A sarcastic tone, together with an acute sense of the absurd, may be admittedly difficult to avoid when treating of this subject, but the author's indulgence in them goes beyond the recreational. Still, this is a powerful and alarming book, which ought to, but doubtless will not, prompt a rethinking of an unsuccessful policy that has yielded unintended and pernicious consequences.



The Twenty-first Century Will Be American. BY ALFREDO G. A. VALLADÃO. New York: Verso, 1996, 221 pp. $25.00.

Prophecies of the "Americanization of the World"—the title of a 1902 book by W. T. Stead—have been around, in one form or another, for much of the nation's history. This book, by a professor at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques and a former correspondent for *Libération,* is the latest entry in the genre. Valladão traces the growth of a "World-America" centered on a powerful chief executive, binding the nations together in a network of security, economic, and cultural ties. The United States, because of its multifaceted power and multicultural heritage, is uniquely situated to be the moving force behind this "worldwide democratic empire." The passage from republic to empire is an old theme in American speculation over the nation's purpose and destiny, frequently rendered at home in the tones of a jeremiad, and one might expect a Brazilian living in Paris to treat "the great mutation" with a certain reserved skepticism. Not so. Valladão is optimistic about the ability of the empire, if properly

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managed, to win the consent of the peoples making up the "federation of free nations." Though sometimes quirky in its choice of illustrative materials and excessively imbued with the spirit of one-worldism, this imaginative and thought-provoking study is well worth attention.

The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy. EDITED BY DAVID GRAY ADLER AND LARRY N. GEORGE. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996, 396 pp. $45.00 (paper, $19.95).

An excellent scholarly compendium of 14 essays focusing on the wide gulf that has developed in the last 60 years between constitutional principle and governmental practice in the conduct of foreign affairs. Like most constitutional scholars, the authors take a restrictive view of presidential authority, relying on the founders' intentions and early foreign policy to make their case that unilateral presidential control of foreign relations "poses a grave threat to our democratic society and is without constitutional warrant." Their approach minimizes the checks that do exist on executive unilateralism and underestimates the costs that would ensue from greater congressional activism and judicial oversight, but the argument from constitutional design presented here is, on its own terms, quite compelling. It is odd indeed, as one contributor notes, that the Reagan administration should have combined an expansive view of executive power with homilies regarding the strict construction of the Constitution—but perhaps no stranger than that liberal critics should insist on confining the executive in eighteenth-century fetters while embracing a view of the powers of the national government far beyond the dreams of eighteenth-century ambition.

A New North America: Cooperation and Enhanced Interdependence. EDITED BY CHARLES F. DORAN AND ALVIN PAUL DRISCHLER. Westport: Praeger, 1996, 166 pp. $49.95 (paper, $15.95).

A useful collection of seven essays on the prospects for increased cooperation between the United States, Canada, and Mexico. Charles Doran and Sidney Weintraub stress the need to "deepen" the North American relationship before "widening" it to include other countries of the Western Hemisphere, on the plausible grounds that premature widening would derail the prospects for further cooperation within the framework of NAFTA. Several of the essays are much too narrow in focus. Drischler, for instance, confines his discussion to the effect of NAFTA on foreign direct investment in the United States, an approach that stands uncomfortably alongside the more comprehensive assessments of Mexican and Canadian perspectives by Delal Baer and Edward Safarian. Baer's essay is the best of the lot, though her assessment that U.S.-Mexican relations have entered a more treacherous phase is at odds with the sunnier perspectives of most of the other contributors.

Outposts of Empire: Korea, Vietnam, and the Origins of the Cold War in Asia, 1949-1954. BY STEVEN HUGH LEE. Buffalo: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995, 295 pp. $39.95.

A careful, scholarly analysis of the development of Western policy in East Asia during the formative years of the Cold

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War. The author, a historian at the University of British Columbia, unfortunately says nothing about the wisdom of U.S. policy, an approach that is dispassionate to a fault. He is concerned instead with explaining what that policy was and the influences on its evolution. He argues that the concept of "empire by invitation" makes more sense in Western Europe than in East Asia, where political structures were less developed and where Americans played a critical role in fostering the emergence of indigenous anticommunist elites. His most important contribution is assessing the influence of Britain and Canada on the development of American policy. Both countries were torn between the fear of renewed American isolationism and the desire to place limits on an aggressive U.S. policy that might land them in a world war. This balancing act, in which American leadership was simultaneously encouraged and restrained, has not lost its relevance in the post–Cold War world. The care with which Lee treats this subject makes his work valuable not only to historians of the period but to those interested in the broader problem of cooperation among the Western democracies.

Western Europe

STANLEY HOFFMANN

The Logic of Evil: The Social Origins of the Nazi Party, 1925-1933. BY WILLIAM BRUSTEIN. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, 235 pp. $27.50.

Brustein, a sociologist at the University of Minnesota, examines who became Nazis (that is, party members between 1925 and 1933) and why. His analysis is based "on a unique and exceptionally rich sample of more than 42,000 individuals." The most useful part of this book is the group of chapters in which the author analyzes the material interests of different classes and the responses of the various Weimar parties. Far more debatable is Brustein's use of rational choice theory. He "postulates that the Nazi party's emphases on protectionism, autarkic development, tax relief, resettlement, and mandatory application of impartible inheritance should have positioned the party to recruit successfully among the old middle class of artisans, merchants, and small independent farmers," and found that this was indeed the case. When other postulates are not confirmed by the data, he explains the discrepancy by examining material incentives or disincentives to joining. The presence of 40 percent of working-class Germans among the Nazi joiners is explained, again, by the party's working-class programs.

The problems are, first, that—strange as it may seem—rational choice explanations share with psychoanalysis the ability to explain absolutely everything on the basis of fundamental assumptions about human behavior that are anything but scientifically provable, and, second, that they tend to exclude, ipso facto, explanations based on the irrational factors of humanity: passions, hatred, prejudices. Brustein is convinced, by his method, that these factors, and especially antisemitism, played only a minor role in decisions to join the Nazi party. But his method does not allow him to exclude

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them, and a pure rational choice account tends to leave out such factors as the comparative lack of appeal of parties that had class-oriented programs comparable to the Nazis, the prominence of "irrational" appeals—to an exacerbated nationalism as well as to antisemitism—in the Nazis' propaganda, the drama of depression, and the drift at the end of Weimar. Brustein concludes that "evil may have ordinary and rational origins," but he does not tell us how these "ordinary and rational" calculations led to the kind of monstrous evil that was Nazism. For this, one has to read Daniel Goldhagen.



The Dawn of Peace in Europe. BY MICHAEL MANDELBAUM. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1996, 209 pp. $19.95.

The theme of this clearly and convincingly argued book is that, however disorderly the rest of the world may be, "there was, and is, a new security order in Europe," which represents "the dawn of peace" there—even if it cannot do much about internal violence. With the end of the Soviet empire, the return of democracy—albeit fragile—in Eastern Europe, and the military balance that prevails on the continent thanks to the "treaty-imposed restraints" that all European states have accepted, an almost unprecedented common security order is now in place. NATO plays a major role in this order but would jeopardize the "best of all possible worlds" by "either the contraction or the expansion of its membership." The strength of the argument lies not only in Mandelbaum's skillful demonstration of it, but also in his careful analysis of the agreements negotiated in the 1980s and 1990s and the way they have contributed to NATO's "defense dominance." Mandelbaum's critique of NATO expansion remains as trenchant and sensible as it was when he presented it last year. As for Russia, he argues, rightly, that its future will largely be determined by internal developments, but adds that a continuing American military engagement in NATO will play an important role in preventing Russia from becoming a source of European instability once again.

The French Melting Pot: Immigration, Citizenship, and National Identity. BY GÉRARD NOIRIEL. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, 325 pp. $57.95 (paper, $22.95).

Noiriel is the leading French social scientist dealing with immigration in France. His criticism is particularly acute on the "canonical" French writings (such as those of Fernand Braudel), that leave little room for immigrants in their discussions of French identity. He examines the communities of immigrants that have formed and merged with the previously established French, and shows that practically every new wave of migrants—from Italy at the end of the 19th century, Poland between the wars, North Africa since the 1960s—has met with the same prejudices and pessimistic evaluations of its "assimilability."

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His remarks on immigrants' economic contributions are equally provocative, and he often contrasts the richness of American writings on the melting pot with the poverty of French literature on the subject of immigration, despite the importance of immigration in the formation of the French nation. There have been many other studies of these issues since 1988, when the book was published in France, but Noiriel's was one of the first and remains the work with which anyone interested in the subject should begin. The eight-year delay between the French and American editions is incomprehensible.

Politics and Symbols: The Italian Communist Party and the Fall of Communism. BY DAVID I. KERTZER. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996, 211 pp. $25.00.

A social scientist who teaches anthropology and history, Kertzer is interested in a large part of what Brustein leaves out: the role of symbols and ritual in politics. He applies his expertise to the internal struggles that accompanied the transformation of the Italian Communist Party into the Democratic Party of the Left in the early 1990s. He focuses on the party's interpretation of its past, the construction of a collective memory in which the October Revolution and the Italian resistance were the central points, and the "ritual struggle" in party congresses, where different groups offered, and fought over, "alternative histories." It is an interesting story, but it is a bit precious. With many quotes from French scholar Pierre Bourdieu, Kertzer tries to convince us that the battle over the party's name "revealed its magical ability to change the political world," and that "the ability to name is at the center of political power, at the heart of political innovation." But what about the international and domestic context, which pretty much forced the Italian PC to abandon its past in order to survive, and also provided it with opportunities to get rid of baggage that had become an obstacle to expansion? The problem with focusing on symbols and rituals is that it relegates to the background the ideas that people fight over, or die for, as well as the calculations and passions involved in struggles for power.

New European Orders, 1919 and 1991. EDITED BY SAMUEL F. WELLS, JR., AND PAULA BAILEY SMITH. Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1996, 121 pp. $32.50 (paper, $14.95).

This fine collection of essays by American scholars and the English historian David Dilks originated in two conferences organized by the East and West European Studies Program of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, in Washington and Prague. We are used to comparisons between the post–World War I and post–World War II European orders. This slim volume forces us to think about "after 1919" and "after 1991." The authors examine postwar structures, public opinion, minority rights, economic vulnerability, collective security, and lessons of the Yugoslav crisis (but only up to 1993). While no sweeping generalizations emerge, and the brevity of most of the essays leaves one a little hungry

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for more, they are thought-provoking, elegant, and well worth reading. One question hangs over the volume: Will a new European order develop, one less flimsy than the "order" that collapsed so soon after 1919? The answer is pretty cautious, as can be expected from a group of historians and historically minded political scientists.

European Integration: Progress, Prospects, and U.S. Interests. BY MICHAEL CALINGAERT. Boulder: Westview, 1996, 225 pp. $56.00 (paper, $18.95).

Michael Calingaert, who has a solid background in diplomacy and the private sector, in 1988 published a very useful book called *The 1992 Challenge from Europe.* This new volume is a sober, succinct, and thoughtful survey of the latest developments in European integration, of the post-Maastricht accomplishments, failures, and problems of the European Union, and of the EU's relations with the United States. The author is reasonably optimistic about the prospects for monetary union, lucid about the many cleavages between the EU's members, and convinced that "the pretense of a homogeneous union in which all member states, over time, follow the same policies and participate in the same programs" will have to be given up and that increasing institutional differentiation will occur. Skeptical about the American idea of a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement, he prefers an "incremental process" in economic and political cooperation between the EU and the United States. For a rigorously objective and comprehensive analysis of the current state of the EU, readers should begin with this volume.

Western Hemisphere

KENNETH MAXWELL

Venezuela and the United States: From Monroe's Hemisphere to Petroleum's Empire. BY JUDITH EWELL. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996, 267 pp. $50.00. (paper, $20.00).

Ewell, Newton Professor of History at the College of William and Mary, has produced a useful overview of U.S.-Venezuelan relations from the time of Bolívar and Monroe to the present. Despite Venezuela's importance as a petroleum producer and a long tradition of activist foreign policy initiatives, Venezuela is currently one of Wall Street's least favorite Latin American nations. It only half-heartedly embraces the new consensus on economic reforms, at a time when oil revenues will no longer allow Venezuelan politicians to buy their way out of problems or co-opt political opposition. Geography, history, and petroleum, Ewell argues, have facilitated a greater degree of "Americanization" in Venezuela than in any other Latin American country. Venezuela's political and economic future will not be without significance for the region or the United States.

The Andean Cocaine Industry. BY PATRICK L. CLAWSON AND RENSSELAER W. LEE, III. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, 288 pp. $35.00.

A clear-eyed analysis of the Latin American cocaine business. Two longtime observers, Clawson, senior research professor at the National Defense University, and Lee, president of Global Advisory Services, look at how much income cocaine

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generates, its importance to the Andean economies, and the history and structure of the cartels. They also examine the effects of the cocaine business on Andean societies and politics and ask what can be done. They convincingly dismiss such extreme measures as massive aerial spraying programs—though technically feasible because of the concentration of the producing areas—and legalization. They believe that counternarcotics programs need to be refocused or ended and recommend three goals: breaking up trafficking cartels, taking a stand against high-level corruption, and developing the legal economy to reduce traffickers' political clout. They do not underestimate the political obstacles and note that, despite its rhetoric, the U.S. government has never committed much financial support to international drug control efforts. According to the White House's own figures, the $300 million the Clinton administration allocated in 1993 was only six-tenths of one percent of the estimated value of all illegal drugs sold in the United States.

Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas. EDITED BY TOM FARER. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, 416 pp. $38.50 (paper, $19.95).

A valuable collection of essays edited by a well-respected law professor and human rights activist who directs the Law and International Relations program at American University, this volume focuses on the tension between collective action for the defense of democracy and traditional notions of sovereignty in the Western Hemisphere. Taking as their starting point Resolution 1080, approved by the General Assembly of the Organization of American States in Santiago, Chile, in 1991, which urges the OAS to respond to hemispheric violations of democracy, a group of well-known scholars explore this issue through case studies (Chile, El Salvador, Haiti, Peru) and comparative analyses. The authors review the legal justifications for international action to defend democracy and examine alternative approaches. They agree that outsiders can contribute significantly to the defense of democracy but believe that domestic events and social actors, including strong national institutions, are more important. Electoral observation and economic embargoes can be effective, but multilateral action is more successful than unilateral coercive measures. Among the more provocative contributions are an analysis of Cuba by Jorge Dominguez—where the question of sovereignty is, as Dominguez argues, "an end in itself"—and an essay on Mexico by Denise Dresser.

It is a pity that Farer did not provide a comprehensive conclusion to this book, or engage more fully the contradictions implicit in some chapters or the ideological shift that underlies the enthusiasm for intervention among some of the authors who in the past have vociferously opposed intervention, especially when it was the United States that was intervening. Dominguez, for example, might have noted that Castro's Cuba was not too concerned with the "sovereignty" of other nations when its agents, arms, and propaganda sought to "make the world safe for Revolution"; nor did Cuba seem worried when it mortgaged

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the Cuban economy for Soviet subsidies, with disastrous consequences.

The Discovery and Conquest of Mexico, 1517–1521. BY BERNAL DIÁZ DEL CASTILLO. New York: Da Capo Press, 1996, 512 pp. $16.95 (paper).

A welcome republication of one of the enduring works of the sixteenth century. This edition was originally drawn by Genaro Garcia from the only exact copy of the original manuscript and published in Mexico in 1928. The book is a stirring eyewitness narrative by a foot soldier in the Cortez expedition who participated in all the battles, victories, and near-disasters that befell the Spaniards as they met, fought, and sought to comprehend the extraordinary world their very presence was soon to shatter. Diáz saw both the splendor and the collapse of the Mesoamerican civilizations. In old age, from his vantage point in Guatemala's old capital, he wrote the story down as he remembered it, in simple, declarative prose. Diáz's magnificent history is fresher and more readable than ever. It also gives full credit, albeit in a backhanded way, to the warriors who opposed the Spaniards, a respect earned after many fierce encounters and not a few wounds. The conquest in Diáz's account is never the inevitable collapse of indigenous resistance before superior European arms that is still too often recounted by modern historians who have forgotten to look at the original sources. One historian who has not forgotten, Hugh Thomas, introduces this edition with an erudite and enthusiastic preface. A. P. Maudsley's translation preserves all the simplicity and directness of the original. Anyone interested in the story of the Americas should begin here.

Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Republics

ROBERT LEGVOLD

The Coming Russian Boom: A Guide to New Markets and Politics. BY RICHARD LAYARD AND JOHN PARKER. New York: Free Press, 1996, 368 pp. $27.50.

The title certainly captures one's attention. The authors, one a well-regarded economist at the London School of Economics, the other an experienced correspondent for the *Economist,* begin by asking whether Russia is in a historical and cultural world of its own that prejudices its chances of establishing democracy and a modern market economy. They emphatically say no, and then turn to 11 other questions, such as, why did communism fail? Can Russia beat the mafia? Will Russia break up? The answers come in clear, economical form, but on the broadest questions simplicity becomes superficiality. Why, given all their contemporary misery, have the Russian people not revolted? Because most have dachas to divert them in the summer and the cold to deter them in the winter.

When they turn to economic matters, however, the authors are more incisive. Because Layard participated in the reform, it comes as no surprise that they believe Gaidar's program was basically correct. Mistakes were made, but not those usually claimed, and some of the blame belongs to the West, particularly the United States for not having done enough early on. Still, Russia starts with enormous advantages—a highly educated

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population, vast natural wealth, and a potentially rich agriculture—that are about to kick in. The case at this point is rather an act of faith, but, as these authors show, scarcely so reckless as some might think.

Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers. BY WARREN ZIMMERMANN. New York: Times Books, 1996, 255 pp. $25.00.

There is nothing mealy-mouthed about Warren Zimmermann, the U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1989 to 1992. From the get-go he sinks his teeth into the villains, worst among them Slobodan Milošević, a consensus culprit in most Western accounts. Zimmermann, however, pursues him like an avenging angel; every reference, every estimate of the man conveys his loathing for him as the central cause of the violence and even the breakup itself. On the latter, Zimmermann is not fully convincing. He makes plain that the Slovene political opposition meant to (and did) tear their republic from Yugoslavia, and his contempt for the Croat leader Franjo Tudjman is only a tad less than for his Serbian counterpart, not least because he too practiced "nationalism as racism." Zimmermann's heroes are the people of Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia who deserved better than they got from the men who would stop at nothing to hang on to power, and the writers, community leaders, and politicians who tried to stand in their way. In particular, he admires Ante Marković, Yugoslavia's last prime minister, a Croat, who wanted to keep Yugoslavia together by reforming it politically and economically—the policy Zimmermann was sent to pursue. Alas, the fight between the heroes and the destroyers was not a fair one. The agony, frustration, and anger this sad denouement caused the author pours poignantly from these pages.

The Gorbachev Factor. BY ARCHIE BROWN. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, 406 pp. $30.00.

Brown means to settle—or at least to say more than anyone until now about—Gorbachev's precise role in history, from his arrival in power in 1985 to his dramatic exit in 1991. Not only is the author one of Britain's most prominent scholars in Soviet and post-Soviet studies, he has been from the start the keenest and most diligent follower of Gorbachev's years in power. Although he has a biographer's sympathy for his subject, biography is not Brown's purpose. He is focused instead on the hard historical issues surrounding Gorbachev: What did he believe? What did he hope to accomplish? Did he understand the forces he unleashed?

Brown's richly textured answers rest on three well-argued but not universally accepted assumptions: it is nonsense to fault Gorbachev for trying to reform the unreformable rather than striving to create an alternative system when the old guard would have destroyed him in a week had he tried. Second, Gorbachev, for all the surface ambiguity, was by the end a social democrat who no longer embraced Lenin's core ideas. Third, of the four massive transformations he guided (until three of them slipped from his control), of the economic system, the political order, the union, and foreign policy, he deserves to be judged a success with

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respect to at least two. He did revolutionize Soviet foreign policy, and he pushed the Soviet Union further down the road to democracy than anyone could have dreamed in 1985. That he failed in the other two realms, Brown argues, owed both to the magnitude of the challenges and to his personal weaknesses, including, at key points, his flawed decisions.

Brown makes no attempt to conceal Gorbachev's mistakes, some of them large and tragic, but the weight of the book reminds the reader how thick and perilous were the obstacles to swift and efficient reform and how human it was for even a talented man to misjudge history and misplay his hand—yet, still, how much unhappier the outcome would almost certainly have been without him.

The Price of the Past: Russia's Struggle with the Legacy of a Militarized Economy. BY CLIFFORD G. GADDY. Washington: Brookings, 1996, 225 pp. $26.95.

"For Russia, the first priority is not to preserve and protect the illusory value of assets embodied in its oversize defense-industrial sector," argues Gaddy, "but to develop the market economy that gives those assets value." Alas, he continues, policymakers normally start from the other end, searching for arms makers with valuable human and other assets and then trying to move those assets into some other line of production. They should let scientists and skilled technicians become, by dint of natural talent, what the market needs—bankers, marketing specialists, insurance agents, tax and corporate lawyers—leading Russia away from its "hypermilitarized" condition. The market gives Russia what it never had, a sense of what defense costs and proof that it has far more than it can afford. Gaddy offers a remarkably insightful analysis of the extent to which the Soviet economy was militarized, how best to measure it, precisely what happened when Russian reformers and foreign governments tried to rein in and transform the Russian defense industry, and where the matter rests today. A very solid, informative book.

Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania. BY THOMAS CAROTHERS. Washington: The Carnegie Endowment, 1996, 144 pp. $12.95 (paper).

Carothers, a lawyer who has worked for USAID and other private organizations assisting democratic development where communist tyrannies once stood, now gives a timely reflection on the broader balance sheet as a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment. Characteristic of those in the field, Carothers does not root his efforts in theories of democracy, but offers a brisk, pointed assessment of political parties, elections, the rule of law, parliament, civil society, trade unions, and the media. Some points are useful and should have been obvious: the outsider's contribution can only be marginal. Some are pedestrian: when the do-gooders pursue their own agenda, failure can be relied upon, as in the International Republican Institute's efforts to bolster opposition parties. There are, however, some eye-opening points. Promoting civil society has been an article of faith in U.S. policy, and civic advocacy groups have been stressed in Romania because of their prominent role in American civil society, but churches and other social movements have virtually been ignored. What American democracy builders take to be universal

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features often reflect Americans' own special, sometimes parochial, qualities. All in all, the advice is incisive, level-headed, and appropriately modest.

Middle East

WILLIAM B. QUANDT

The Hidden Hand: Middle East Fears of Conspiracy. BY DANIEL PIPES. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, 401 pp. $45.00.

Anyone who has spent much time in the Middle East will have a favorite example of a conspiracy theory, often involving quite complex and fantastic explanations for the woes of the region. Indeed, one need not travel as far as the Middle East to find conspiracy theories alive and well. But Pipes is convinced that the propensity to see a hidden hand behind much of political reality is a distinctive feature of the Middle East. But is it? And, if so, why? To his credit, Pipes notes that it was not until their relative decline in power vis-à-vis the West that Middle Easterners began to imagine conspiracies. In addition, he notes that, especially in this century, the Middle East has been the stage for many covert actions by outside powers, which have left their mark on a whole generation of writers and political activists. To be convincing, however, Pipes' argument that Middle Easterners are clearly different from other weak, vulnerable, and manipulated peoples would require a systematic comparison with South Asians, Africans, or Latin Americans, which is beyond his scope. That leaves a book-length essay of many anecdotes and explanations on this neglected topic, but not much in the way of in-depth or comparative analysis explaining the causes or importance of Middle East conspiracy theories.

Pipes uses such terms as "laggard people" to describe Middle Easterners in a condescending tone that weakens his argument. He also often writes as if repetition is all it takes to prove his point. But in some cases the authors cited at length sound as though they were paid hacks churning out propaganda that neither they nor their bosses believed. In other cases Pipes' threshold for a conspiracy theory seems remarkably low. Is it really a sign of a conspiratorial mentality to take seriously the allegation that Israel planted a spy disguised as a beggar on the streets of Beirut before the 1982 invasion? And is it really so hard to believe that the CIA tried to recruit a notorious Palestinian terrorist? Aren't those tactics typical of what intelligence agencies do?

Israel on the Road to Peace: Accepting the Unacceptable. BY ZIVA FLAMHAFT. Boulder: Westview, 1996, 252 pp. $17.00 (paper).

The purpose of this book is to underscore the important role of Israeli domestic politics in the ups and downs of the peace process in recent years. This is a valid, if not particularly novel, point, and unfortunately the book adds little to the story or to the broader understanding of the diplomacy of Arab-Israeli peace. The author, who is pro-Labor, notes the many times that American initiatives were rejected because they entailed more concessions than Israel was prepared to

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make. That is no doubt true, but certainly American statesmen had other objectives in mind than obtaining the agreement of the Israeli government of the day. The Reagan initiative of 1982, which opposed Israeli annexation of the West Bank and called for a halt in settlement activity, was launched primarily to appease Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. And eventually George Bush and James Baker helped to unseat the Shamir government when, in new regional circumstances, many Israelis perceived rejection of U.S. proposals to be too costly. Was that a failure of U.S. diplomacy, or an astute form of pressure? The book is also marred by numerous errors. Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan, for example, did not spend "some years" in "pre-negotiations" with Anwar Sadat's adviser before the Camp David Accords were negotiated. He met him twice in late 1977, with only modest consequences.

Perilous Prospects: The Peace Process and the Arab-Israeli Military Balance. BY ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN. Boulder: Westview, 1996, 304 pp. $65.00 (paper, $25.00).

Between War and Peace: Dilemmas of Israeli Security. EDITED BY EFRAIM KARSH. London: Frank Cass, 1996, 298 pp. $32.50.

Cordesman is the bulldog of military analysts of the Middle East. He wrestles each scenario to the ground, chews on it, declares victory, then moves on indefatigably to the next. This tenacious performance is accompanied by a blizzard of tables, lists of names and facts, a welter of footnotes, and a good measure of sensible analysis. For example, in his judgment, the Arab-Israeli conventional military balance is fairly stable, but Israel can still be threatened by terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Venturing a bit afield from his military analysis, he concludes that a demilitarized Palestinian state could be the key to a lasting peace settlement.

Karsh's edited volume bears little resemblance to Cordesman's. It opens with a blast at Israeli revisionist historians who have allegedly not taken Israeli security concerns to heart. Next on the list of those who endanger peace in the Middle East are those who call on Israel to give up its nuclear weapons. Thereafter a variety of authors tackle aspects of Israel's security problems that would persist even after a peace settlement is reached. Much of this has merit, but the editor sets an unnecessarily polemical tone at the outset. One might almost imagine that some American president had decided to focus on nonproliferation as an issue and to put the spotlight on Israel.

Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability. EDITED BY JAMAL S. AL-SUWAIDI. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 1996, 425 pp. $60.00 (paper, $40.00).

Contemporary Iran is not an easy country to understand, as this first-rate collection of essays makes clear. For some, Iran is still a potential threat to gulf stability, a state to be contained by America allied with other status quo powers. Most of the authors here, however, see Iran as evolving into a status quo power in its own right, albeit one with hegemonic ambitions. There is no consensus among the authors, but the editor joins the optimists in foreseeing a time in which Iran will cooperate with its neighbors to bring

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stability to the gulf. The most intellectually rewarding of the essays is by Roy Mottahedeh, who provides a fine account of the dilemmas created by Khomeini's notion of the guardianship of the jurist.

The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party. BY NIKOLAOS VAN DAM. New York: I. B. Tauris, 1996, 228 pp. $24.50.

First published in 1979, this excellent study of the sectarian bases of Syrian politics has been thoroughly updated. The author remains pessimistic about a peaceful evolution away from today's Alawi-dominated dictatorship toward a more representative and democratic regime, but he does believe that some measure of liberalization is nonetheless possible. He also argues that the regime's foreign policy has nothing to do with its sectarian base. He expects the post-Asad period to remain one of Alawi preeminence, but without the commanding figure of Hafiz al-Asad to dominate the scene, many uncertainties will arise.

Algeria: The Next Fundamentalist State? BY GRAHAM E. FULLER. Santa Monica: RAND, 1996, 124 pp. $15.00 (paper).

If politics were fair, Algeria's Islamists would be exercising a degree of state power after being on the verge of winning the 1991 parliamentary elections—deeply flawed as they doubtless were. From this observation, Fuller extrapolates that the Islamic Salvation Front will again have its moment, and that the West should prepare for an inevitably more Islamist Algeria. He then tries to imagine what that will be like. "Not so bad" is the gist of his reassuring answer. One can object to several parts of the analysis. The FIS seems unlikely to be resurrected anytime soon, and a more moderate Islamist party, Hamas, is taking its place. The military is not about to step aside and allow another Islamist victory, and the balance of forces in the field is, at least for now, tipped in its favor. Although they may be the single largest and best organized political movement, the Islamists cannot plausibly claim support from the majority of the population. Finally, no doubt, the FIS did contain some moderate voices, but the key individual responsible for the enormous popularity of the FIS among Algerian youth was a radical firebrand named Ali Benhadj, who most likely would have won the power struggle had the FIS come to power.

Muslim Politics. BY DALE F. EICKELMAN AND JAMES PISCATORI. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, 235 pp. $39.50 (paper, $13.95).

This pairing of an anthropologist and a political scientist has produced a novel perspective reflecting the special concerns of the former for symbols and language as opposed to power and force. The bottom-up view of political reality—what political symbols mean to ordinary folks, the prevalence of Islamic symbolism in the bargaining that goes on in everyday life—is a useful corrective to the more common focus on self-proclaimed Muslim leaders. But it also has the effect of complexifying everything to the point where no judgments or conclusions are possible. This approach suggests that Muslim political life is no more violent or authoritarian than that of any other

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society. Well, maybe, but I wouldn't want to try to make that case to anyone who had tried to stand up to Khomeini, or to a southern Sudanese, or an Iraqi Kurd, just to take a few examples of victims of the peculiarly harsh form of bargaining that often goes on in the Middle East. True, Islam per se is not to blame. And it is certainly valuable to be reminded that most Muslims are peaceful, law-abiding people most of the time. But one still has to acknowledge the political realities that dominate the lives of many Muslims—a reality of repression, fear, and actual or potential violence.

Sovereign Creations: Pan-Arabism and Political Order in Syria and Iraq. BY MALIK MUFTI. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996, 286 pp. $35.00.
This well-conceived book brings a fresh interpretation to the rather tired story of Iraqi and Syrian political maneuvering in the heyday of Arab nationalism. Making careful use of sources rarely consulted by Western scholars, Mufti sensibly distinguishes the major projects of Arab union, showing that Hashemite dynastic unionism had little in common with what he calls the "defensive unionism" of the 1950s and 1960s. During this latter period a number of efforts to bring about unity between two or more Arab states were made, and the United Arab Republic was intially seen as a success but ended as a disastrous failure. Malik is clear in his judgment that the motives for rushing toward union had little to do with Arab nationalism, but that the driving force was "domestic power struggles between contending elites." As the state systems became more robust in the 1960s and 1970s, the search for unity declined, leaving the region with two regimes wedded to an ideology of Arab unity that barely masked the personalistic side of their dictatorships. But the author suggests hopefully that as the current "Bonapartist" moment draws to a close, the next phase will involve the middle classes in the still-shaky state institutions, put in place earlier in this century, that gave birth to them.

The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World. EDITED BY LAURA GUAZZONE. Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1996, 390 pp. $85.00.
This is a very good collection of essays that examines various strategies toward political Islam in the Arab world, ranging from exclusion to partial accommodation. The editor is inclined to believe that some form of accommodation of moderate Islamists is possible and inevitable, a theme repeated by some, but not all, of the other authors. The individual country studies are generally very good. Indeed, the only thing wrong with this book, which will keep it from reaching the many students who would benefit from it, is its outlandish price.

Comrades and Enemies: Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine, 1906–1948. BY ZACHARY LOCKMAN. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, 440 pp. $60.00 (paper, $25.00).
Conventional nationalist histories of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the target of this study of Arab and Jewish workers in Palestine in the first half of the century. Lockman does not quarrel with the notion that the two communities were on a collision course from the outset, but he argues that each influenced the other in

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important ways—they were "mutually formative"—and that moments of cooperation occurred. His specific case involves railroad workers who showed flashes of class solidarity, as good socialists would hope. But on balance, even left-leaning Zionists had a hard time accepting the legitimacy of Arab nationalism, and the concept of "Hebrew labor" made it difficult to forge working-class alliances. Much more information is available on Jewish than on Arab attitudes and policies, but the author uses all available data. Today it is perhaps less surprising that socialist ideology failed to overcome the particularism of national claims, but there was a time earlier in the century in which many Labor Zionists thought a clash between the two communities could be avoided. By looking at the segment of society where class solidarity should have been strongest, Lockman shows in microcosm the tragedy that befell Palestine.

Asia and the Pacific

DONALD ZAGORIA

The Deng Xiaoping Era: An Inquiry into the Fate of Chinese Socialism, 1978-1994. BY MAURICE MEISNER. New York: Hill and Wang, 1996, 537 pp. $27.50.

A provocative account of the post-Mao era in China by one of America's leading Sinologists. Meisner focuses not only on China's enormous quasi-capitalist success story—now the conventional wisdom—but also its traumatic underside. This includes a considerable increase in economic inequality, a wide gap between city and countryside, a rise in unemployment and crime, and an absence of job security and social benefits. Utilizing a Marxist lens, Meisner concludes that the "incongruous coincidence of economic progress and social deterioration . . . has been the price of capitalist development everywhere." Although Meisner's framework is powerful, its use of slippery concepts such as "exploitation" is tautological. He concedes that working people in both city and countryside now generally enjoy greater incomes and improved material conditions of life, but he insists that to say they are better off "does not diminish the degree of exploitation." But since capitalism by the author's definition is exploitative, even substantial improvements in the living standards of Chinese workers would have to be described as "exploitation." At the root of the analysis is the longing of many Western and Chinese intellectuals for a path of modernization that, in his words, "avoids the painful vicissitudes of capitalism." So far in the twentieth century, however, efforts to avoid those vicissitudes, both in China and in many other countries, have often led to totalitarian dictatorships rather than social democracy. Still, this book will stand out as one of the most sensitive and illuminating analyses of recent Chinese society, economics, and politics.

Remembering and Forgetting: The Legacy of War and Peace in East Asia. EDITED BY GERRIT W. GONG. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1996, 123 pp. $15.95 (paper).

An uneven and not very well integrated group of essays on an important topic:

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How do Confucian societies develop a modern sense of national identity? Lucian Pye, one of academia's most insightful analysts of "political culture," notes that East Asian countries are in a "paradoxical fix," with grand traditions but tumultuous recent histories that have left them with many mental blockages. The Sinic civilization stands out as one of the great achievements of the human race, but the Chinese have more than 100 years of recent history that they seek to "suppress, deny, distort, or blatantly falsify." "The Japanese people," says Pye, act as though "they had no recollection of having started a major war," and Japan easily slips into the role of the underappreciated country. The South Koreans, although open to the world, lack a coherent modern national identity and close associations with other countries, see themselves as victims, and in a sense still inhabit a "hermit kingdom." These blocked memories result from some of the more profound characteristics of their shared Confucian tradition. In another insightful essay, Chas. W. Freeman, Jr., says the Chinese and Taiwanese people's image of each other stems from the divergent historical paths the two have taken during the past century, and he insists that the United States must make clear to Taiwan that it will not shed blood to prevent a change of Taiwan's name and flag.

Mending Fences: Confidence and Security-Building in South Asia. EDITED BY SUMIT GANGULY AND TED GREENWOOD. Boulder: Westview, 1996, 243 pp. $61.50.

This is a very thoughtful collection of essays, with an excellent introduction, that discusses whether confidence-building measures that have been used successfully in Cold War Europe and some other regions can be applied in South Asia to improve relations between India and Pakistan and between India and China. The two editors introduce the volume with a summary of broad propositions. Then there are thorough studies of the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistani disputes, two illuminating chapters on the experience with medium-range nuclear-armed missiles in Europe and the Middle East, and an extremely insightful essay by Jasjit Singh, director of the Institute of Defense Studies in New Delhi, on mutual threat perceptions. He discusses the need for serious dialogue on the subject, with the greatest payoff coming from addressing peacetime deployments of military power. If close to "expected operational areas," he says, "these deployments can create an "almost permanent strategic surprise capability."

Asia-Pacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities. EDITED BY GARY KLINTWORTH. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, 308 pp. $49.95.

In this useful volume, a group of scholars, most of them Australians at the Australian National University, offer a comprehensive and well-balanced picture of strategic trends developing in the Asia-Pacific region. There is a particularly penetrating analysis of American policy in the Pacific by Coral Bell and a cautiously optimistic conclusion by Klintworth. The volume serves as a useful antidote to the recent broad-ranging, illuminating, and pessimistic analysis of Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal in *Survival,* the journal of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Bell concludes that the United States will continue to play the dominant role in Pacific affairs and "remains a

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necessary balancer." Klintworth and his colleagues conclude that the case for pessimism on the security outlook for the Asia-Pacific region is wanting. Grounds for cautious optimism include the continued engagement of the United States in the region, the likelihood of continued strong economic growth, and the development of regional economic, diplomatic, and other forms of cooperation.

Africa

GAIL M. GERHART

Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey. BY FERGAL KEANE. New York: Viking, 1996, 198 pp. $22.95.

"Exterminate All the Brutes": One Man's Odyssey into the Heart of Darkness and the Origins of European Genocide. BY SVEN LINDQVIST. New York: Free Press, 1996, 179 pp. $20.00.

These two superbly written African travelogues share a theme: genocide and the human depravity at its roots. Keane, a skilled journalist who covered the 1994 Rwandan massacres for the BBC, has written "a diary of an encounter with evil beyond any scope of reference I might have had when the journey began." While lacking the depth of analysis or detail found in the accounts by Gérard Prunier and African Rights, Keane's reporting powerfully engages the reader—heart, mind, and senses—in the terror and horror of the genocide and its catastrophic aftereffects.

Lindqvist, a Swedish writer with a discerning eye and a broad intellectual repertoire, has written "the story of a man traveling by bus through the Sahara desert and, at the same time, traveling by computer through the history of the concept of extermination." Lindqvist presumes that generations born after World War II have largely been raised on liberal assumptions about human equality, tolerance, and the desirability of preserving biological and cultural diversity. Thus they insufficiently appreciate the hold of social Darwinism over preceding generations, among whom there were reputable intellectual defenders of genocide—the extermination of "less fit" peoples whose lands and resources were coveted by more powerful rivals. He vividly reminds us of Belgian brutalities in the Congo, the murderous heroics of Henry Morton Stanley, the near-extinction of Native Americans, Tasmanians, and Hereros, and the atrocities of French colonial conquest in West Africa. The list is just a sample from the bloodstained annals of European imperialism. Among his conclusions: when Hitler was a child, "the air he breathed" was noxious with rationalizations for genocide derived from European colonial history. And even today, when children are dying from the "whip of debt that whistles over poor countries," the educated public is not ignorant of the outrages "committed in the name of Progress, Civilization . . . and the Market," but, as in the past, too often chooses to ignore or excuse them.

Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa. BY PIERRE ENGLEBERT. Boulder: Westview, 1996, 201 pp. $69.00.

Although plagued by political instability throughout its postcolonial history—

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parties and factions appear, merge, and vanish in a welter of acronyms and pseudo-ideological tendencies—Burkina Faso stands out among African countries. It has experienced relatively little civil strife, and has had good public sector management and slow but steady economic growth, despite mass poverty and high illiteracy. Englebert, a Belgian political economist, makes a valiant if overly academic attempt to account for these characteristics by examining the country's development through the prism of state-society relations. He highlights the cultural and historical attributes of the numerically dominant Mossi: their low propensity for ethnic nationalism and material acquisitiveness and the marginalized position of their traditional authorities in relation to the country's political and military elites. The regime of the quixotic Thomas Sankara (1983-1987) is briefly examined, but more attention goes to his less colorful successor, Blaise Compaoré. Have the foundations for enduring statehood been laid in Burkina Faso? On the basis of Englebert's analysis, the most that can be concluded is maybe yes, maybe no.

Oil and Socioeconomic Crisis in Nigeria: A Regional Perspective to the Nigerian Disease and the Rural Sector. BY EMMANUEL U. NNADOZIE. Lewiston: Mellon University Press, 1995, 192 pp. $49.95.

In the 1980s the Nigerian economy fell victim to a strain of what economists call Dutch Disease, a precipitous decline following a windfall boom from exploiting a natural resource, brought on not by tulips but by oil. This valuable study reviews the effects of the 1970s oil boom on the national economy, then presents an extended case study of Egbema, an oil-producing district in Igboland. Rural small landholders, who were the great majority of Egbema's population, did not derive any direct economic benefits from oil, the author shows, and their overall welfare deteriorated. The reasons were environmental pollution, rampant inflation, a shift away from labor-intensive crops due to the scarcity and rising cost of labor, and the government's failure to increase spending on schools and social infrastructure at a pace equal to that of population growth. When oil boom became oil doom in the 1980s, farmers found themselves worse off than before, and the country, once agriculturally self-sufficient, had become a net importer of food. Underlying Nigeria's failure to make oil resources an engine of national development, the study concludes, were short-sighted and venal leaders who failed to follow policies that would have benefited citizens.

African Conflict Resolution: The U.S. Role in Peacemaking. EDITED BY DAVID R. SMOCK AND CHESTER A. CROCKER. Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995, 163 pp. $14.95 (paper).

An overview of America's actions and options in promoting peace in Africa. The contributors propose building the capacity of Africans—in governments, military establishments, universities, nongovernmental organizations, regional bodies, and especially the Organization of African Unity—to prevent and resolve conflicts, with practical suggestions for diplomatic action, training, logistical backup, and institutional support. Unfortunately, the book is marred by shamelessly distorted presentations of Reagan administration policies of "constructive engagement" and

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"linkage" in southern Africa. Crocker, who was assistant secretary of state for African affairs from 1981 to 1989, claims these policies were successful "leadership in African peacemaking," but most Africa experts blame them for prolonging the wars in Angola and Namibia and encouraging South Africa's aggression and intransigence. Robert Oakley, U.S. special envoy to Somalia in 1992-93, turns the "success" story into an even more imaginative fable in which South Africa "actively discussed and negotiated rather than . . . relying on the use of military force."

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

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Letters to the Editor

Elliot L. Richardson, Jeffrey Laurenti, Ian Williams, and others respond to Senator Jesse Helms

JUST THE FACTS

To the Editor:

Senator Jesse Helms is behind the curve on his history, factually wrong in many of his assertions, and evidently intent on shutting down the organization he talks of saving ("Saving the U.N.," September/October 1996).

Senator Helms first claims that the United Nations' bureaucracy and budget are both expanding. That is not true. At the time of the 1988 reform package, the U.N. Secretariat consisted of about 12,000 people. Today it is budgeted at just over 10,000 employees, with a mandatory 6.4 percent vacancy rate that reduces the total to just over 9,000.

The senator's call for a further 50 percent staff reduction cannot be serious. Among all the studies by intergovernmental bodies and efficiency experts, none has come up with a way of enabling the United Nations to do what governments have required of it with half its current staff. Serious suggestions for feasible economies would be welcome, and there is certainly a need for better integration of functions. But a bald demand for halving the staff without a corresponding reduction of assigned tasks is frivolous.

The growth of the core U.N. budget also began to slow in 1988, and it has now stopped. President Ronald Reagan acknowledged this achievement in his last year in office, when he called for payment of U.S. arrears and the resumption of regular annual contributions. President George Bush tried to make good on that pledge, but Congress balked on the deal—and continues to hold out.

The exception to the downsizing trend was, of course, peacekeeping. The end of the Cold War brought the Security Council both new freedom and new challenges. As the instrument of choice, peacekeeping ballooned in size, scope, and cost. From the complex but successful peacekeeping operation in Namibia in 1989 to the troubled one in Bosnia that ended in December 1995, the Security Council authorized an average of three new missions a year. Each required a separate vote in the council, and each won the approval of the United States. The peacekeeping trend peaked in 1994. Since then the cost of peacekeeping has dropped from $3.3 billion to an estimated $1.3 billion for 1996.

Helms cites an estimate by Charles Lichenstein, a former U.S. representative to the United Nations, that puts current annual U.S. contributions to the United Nations at $3.5 billion. That figure includes nearly $2 billion in "goods and services"—expenses incurred voluntarily by the United States in pursuit of its

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own national interests. Rolling that amount into U.N. dues is like counting the cost of a golfer's lessons and Izod shirts toward his club dues.

The senator also mixes apples and oranges when he fails to distinguish obligatory from voluntary contributions. The United States was billed $321 million for the year's regular budget (25 percent of the total) and will be billed an estimated $400 million for peacekeeping (31.7 percent of the total). In addition, the United States is billed about $336 million for U.N. agencies and donates another $500 million in voluntary contributions. After failing to make its mandatory payments under treaty obligations, the United States now owes $528 million for past regular budget assessments, $1 billion for peacekeeping, and millions more in dues to specialized agencies.

Helms has a similarly skewed view of Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace.* He sees it as evidence of a secretary-general's hunger for power rather than as an honest attempt to deal with the globalization of security. The *Agenda for Peace* does not call for a standing army, as Helms asserts. It instead requests that member states place units within their national forces "on call," an idea first proposed in 1945 in Article 43 of the U.N. Charter. The deployment of such units would still have to be authorized by the Security Council, and could thus be vetoed by the United States.

At the core of the senator's argument is the thesis that if big government is bad, the United Nations must be worse. The United States should not have to give up slices of sovereignty, he argues, to erect a structure that regulates international life. When and to what extent an international crisis demands a multilateral response will always be debatable. No one, however, is asking the United States to surrender its sovereignty, or even to vote—or pay—for any activity of which it does not approve.

Helms' call to "empower member states vis-à-vis the bureaucracy in budget determinations" is based on an equally flawed assumption. U.N. budgets are approved by consensus of the member states, not by the bureacracy. Here too the United States has, in effect, veto power.

In arguing that the United Nations brings to the table irrelevant actors who only complicate matters, Helms asks what Ireland is prepare to contribute to bring about Mideast peace. Is he not aware that since 1960 more than 200 Irish nationals have been killed or injured in U.N. peacekeeping missions in the Middle East? Does that not earn Ireland a seat at the table?

On Bosnia, Helms says the United Nations "accepted a mission it was incapable of fulfilling." True, but only because its members—the United States among them—were not prepared to make the sacrifices, including the loss of life, that its proper execution would have required. In fact, the secretary-general recommended against U.N. involvement in Bosnia, but the members on the Security Council chose to approve a feeble form of intervention. And when its member states approve a course of action, the United Nations has no choice but to pursue that course with such resources as the member states see fit to give.

Helms smiles favorably on Representative Joe Scarborough's (R-Fla.) proposal to replace the United Nations with a "league of democracies." Such a

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league might well be useful for the like-minded states, but there is only one universal organization, and that is the United Nations. The United States cannot seriously purport to exercise effective world leadership without playing a leading role in the world body. As Americans, moreover, let us never forget that the spirit and life of the U.N. Charter, which was drafted and signed in San Francisco, reflect the same values that inspired our own charter documents.

ELLIOT L. RICHARDSON
Under Secretary of State and Attorney General in the Nixon administration

SOVEREIGNTY SMOKE SCREEN

To the Editor:

The surreal epigram of the Vietnam war declaring that "it was necessary to destroy the village in order to save it" comes alive again in Helms' prescription for either "fixing" or folding the United Nations. Helms unabashedly vows to "lead the charge for U.S. withdrawal" if member states spurn his ultimatum for drastic cutting—an 80 percent reduction in the regular U.N. budget, to a minuscule $250 million. This would be, by his own acknowledgment, unacceptable to the rest of the world community. However, the senator should also note that his views are unacceptable to the American public. A Gallup survey in October 1995 found that 84 percent believe the United States should not "give up its membership in the United Nations," while a Wirthlin survey found that 82 percent believe U.S. membership in the organization is important (with 54 percent calling it "very important").

Suspicion that Helms' demands for "reform" are merely a pretext to accomplish withdrawal is grounded in historical precedent. The campaign in the early 1980s to take the United States out of UNESCO—the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization—was also orchestrated around demands for reform. After the U.S. withdrawal, UNESCO's member states dumped the agency's offending leadership and adopted all the Reagan administration's reform demands. Nevertheless, thanks largely to Senator Helms' vigilant opposition, the United States to date has reneged on its pledge to return.

Facts are not central to Helms' thesis. The U.N. work force is not proliferating, but shrinking. Its budget is not spiraling upward, but contracting. It is not principally Americans who pay U.N. costs, but foreigners. Europeans pay a larger share of U.N. expenses (33 percent) than Americans (25 percent), even though the European Union's share of world income (28 percent) is virtually identical to America's. Far from bearing disproportionate burdens and risks in U.N. peace operations, Americans make up barely 2.6 percent of the 22,603 troops in current U.N. missions. This total force level, incidentally, has plummeted by two-thirds in just three years, which disposes of Helms' assertion that peacekeeping is the United Nations' "fastest-growing industry."

Not even the much-vilified Boutros Boutros-Ghali has ever, as Helms charges, called on governments to "give the secretary-general" a standing army and the power to collect taxes. The U.N. chief's most ambitious proposals have all assumed that authority for decision-making and implementation will rest in the hands of member states. These feverish charges do, however, illuminate Helms'

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underlying ideological objection to the U.N. idea: his is an uncompromising avowal of the absolute primacy of state sovereignty. In fact, the section of his article that considers the question of sovereignty is the most serious and deserving of respectful attention.

Helms is concerned that the United Nations has acquired a life and legitimacy of its own, constraining the leaders of states, who, he argues, should maintain "absolute and exclusive sovereignty." The problem is not that the United Nations can force governments to act without their consent (certain Security Council measures aside). In fact, the U.N. Charter is just the tip of the iceberg. A thickening web of international law obligates subscribing states to fulfill common requirements—and, in some circumstances, to abide by judgments of international panels—in areas as disparate as drug trafficking, trade, airline safety, the environment, and human rights.

Ironically, Helms' concerns resonate most powerfully with governments often faulted for human rights offenses. China, Cuba, Iran, and Sudan are among the world's fiercest opponents of U.N. interference with state sovereignty when the human rights of individuals are under assault by the state apparatus. Assertions of absolute sovereignty, foreign or domestic, can serve more often as a smoke screen for the oppressor than as a safeguard for the citizen.

The catastrophe of World War II led nation-states to agree in 1945 on a system for common defense against threats to "international peace and security." They gave the members of the U.N. Security Council the power to set security policy that would be binding on all states, to coerce intransigent belligerents, and "to ensure," in the U.N. Charter's words, "that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest."

This was a derogation of the sovereign's traditional freedom to initiate war at will (just as various Geneva conventions have infringed on the sovereign's choice of means for waging war). Even a veto-wielding Security Council member renounces the sovereign's freedom to change his mind after agreeing to a common policy. Thus have Russia and France been kept in compliance with the embargo on Iraq, and thus was the United States kept in compliance with the arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. When nations pool their sovereignty through collective action, they can efficiently and cheaply achieve results unattainable when individual states unilaterally make sovereign decisions on security.

The contrast with U.S. efforts to impose unilateral sanctions is striking. The failure of these sanctions to achieve any of Washington's goals regarding Cuba, Iran, and Libya has led to secondary boycott legislation, like the Helms-Burton Act, aimed at bludgeoning other sovereign governments into conforming to American policy wishes. With respect to military missions, Americans have found it expedient to rely on the United Nations to gather troops from other countries to allow the early withdrawal of American forces from such places as Haiti and Somalia.

These security advantages—to say nothing of the value of the U.N. activities against disease and illiteracy and for the environment and refugees—explain the broad agreement in the American policy community that engagement in

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the United Nations is relevant to the achievement of many vital American purposes abroad.

JEFFREY LAURENTI
Executive Director, Policy Studies, United Nations Association of the United States of America

To the Editor:

Helms' concern for national sovereignty is somewhat inconsistent. He is happy to try to force unilateral decisions concerning trade with Cuba, Libya, and Iran on the rest of the world, but balks at the thought of the United States being held to collective international decisions in which it has participated—such as the legal obligation to pay U.N. dues that was incurred when the Senate ratified the U.N. Charter.

The senator's position is as unsound pragmatically as it is ethically. In fact, far from the United Nations threatening U.S. interests, more rational observers see the United Nations as an essential tool of U.S. foreign policy. Without it, for example, the United States would have had considerable difficulty building the Gulf War coalition. And while Helms may have been unhappy with the operation in Haiti, there is little doubt that this was a U.S. foreign policy objective carried out under the thin blue veil of the United Nations, one that is now being paid for by countries with minimal interest in Haitian refugees landing in Florida during a U.S. election year.

In the United Nations itself, the under secretary-general for administration and management and the heads of the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Children's Emergency Fund, among other positions, are in practical terms U.S. presidential appointments. At the risk of emulating the senator's simplification, the United States runs the United Nations, not the other way around.

The senator's ad hominem attacks on Boutros-Ghali, even if now echoed by the White House, reveal either ignorance or a willful misrepresentation of how the United Nations works. The secretary-general has indeed pursued a fairly modest program of U.N. "empowerment," for which he has had the support of many members, if not the United States.

Specifically, Helms takes issue with the idea of a levy on international transactions as well as the proposal to designate units within national forces as "on call" for U.N. operations. The secretary-general proposed the international levies in response to Congress' persistent failure to honor its financial obligations. Furthermore, the proposed standby units are meant to repair the present arduous ad hoc process of assembling forces anew for each operation. The effectiveness of the preemptive positioning of U.S. troops under the U.N. flag in Macedonia suggests that much of the bloodshed in Bosnia and Rwanda could have been averted if such a force had been available for rapid deployment.

Whatever Helms alleges Boutros-Ghali presided over in the way of expansion, not a single U.N. peacekeeping operation has been implemented that did not have the approval of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations. The senator must know this, since he refers to the U.S. veto—which, characteristically, he recommends be used against missions "deem[ed] wholly inappropriate," while allowing the United States to opt out of funding missions it simply disagrees with.

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When he refers to the "United Nations," all too often the senator is referring to those countries who disagree with U.S. policy. In the few instances when Helms claims the "United Nations" has objected to U.S. policy—issues related to the Middle East and Cuba, for example—it was in fact the overwhelming majority of member states, including close U.S. allies like Britain, who stood in opposition.

IAN WILLIAMS
U.S. editor, WarReport, *and President, U.N. Correspondents Association*

THE LONELY POLICEMAN

To the Editor:

Denigrating Jesse Helms, ignoring him, or canceling my subscription is not the right response to his article. Since Helms' attack on the United Nations springs from a mental attitude toward a world in the process of dynamic change, it is that attitude that must be addressed. Helms' view that the United States is number one and responsible to no one is not confined to the senator.

Essentially, Helms' critique of the United Nations comes down to the idea that the United States can build a fortress around itself, shutting out the implications of the 40,000 nuclear weapons still in existence, a widening gap between rich and poor in the world, worsening environmental deterioration, and unprecedented migrations of suffering peoples. The struggle to build the conditions for peace by advancing a post–Cold War global security agenda is what the United Nations is all about.

Charges that the United Nations is costly and bureaucratic are subterfuges for the real attack against the United Nations as the manifestation of the end of colonialism in all its forms, whether political, military, economic, social, or cultural. Critics of the United Nations have caught a glimpse of the future, and they don't like it. I have often stood in the well of the General Assembly looking up at the faces of the delegates and recognized that they are a reflection of the modern world. Most of the modern world is nonwhite, non-Western, and non-Christian. More than 90 percent of the nearly 100 million annual births occur in regions where the vast majority of people can be so categorized. The United States represents only 6 percent of the world's population. It is not doing the United Nations a favor by staying a member. It very much benefits U.S. interests in commerce and security stability if the United States plays a constructive multilateral role through the U.N. system.

DOUGLAS ROCHE, O.C.
Former Canadian Ambassador for Disarmament, and Visiting Professor, University of Alberta

To the Editor:

"Saving the U.N." serves the important purpose of stimulating debate about the United Nations and its value to the United States. But the debate should proceed on an objective, factual foundation. The United Nations that Helms attacks is not the United Nations of today. The United Nations is reforming, perhaps not as fast as we would like nor as extensively as we demand, but the direction is unmistakable.

The United Nations' no-growth budget for 1996-97 means more than 1,000 fewer bureaucrats. And the no-growth budget for 1998-99 cuts 500 additional staff positions. Furthermore, U.S. con-

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tributions to U.N. peacekeeping dropped from $519 million in 1995 to $359 million in 1996. And finally, since October 1, 1995, by act of Congress, the assessment rate for peacekeeping that the United States accepts is 25 percent, not 31.7 percent.

The United Nations is engaged, with strong U.S. support, in reinventing its governing process. Its new Efficiency Board, under the leadership of Under Secretary-General Joe Connor, has launched 400 projects designed to make the United Nations work better and cost less. According to the board's first report, 23 percent of these projects have been completed, and the rest are under way with set goals for completion.

Management reform is not enough. The United Nations needs direction from its 185 member states on what it should and should not be doing. That is why the Clinton administration in February submitted a plan for reforming the U.N. system to the General Assembly's high-level working group on U.N. reform. Recommended reforms include: streamlining the bureaucracy, reducing the number of senior posts, consolidating the sprawling economic and social agencies, creating a cabinet-style secretariat with no more than five departments, a new deputy secretary-general for management, a sunset provision for U.N. programs, and the extension of the inspector general function throughout the U.N. system.

I am confident that any fair-minded discussion of these important issues will result in the rededication of the United States to the building of a reformed and more effective United Nations. Americans do not want to stop the world and get off. But neither do they wish to bear any burden and pay any price—let alone play the role of world policeman.

DAVID E. BIRENBAUM
Former U.S. Representative for U.N. Management and Reform

BAD MEDICINE

To the Editor:

Jesse Helms is right to call for the radical overhaul of the United Nations, but utterly mistaken in his prescriptions. The real danger is not "U.N. encroachment on the sovereignty of nation-states," but U.S. national interests overriding the rule of law in international affairs. George Soros makes these underlying issues clear ("Can Europe Work?" September/October 1996).

The United Nations and the European Union were formed to prevent a recurrence of war. World War II was largely a consequence of the failure of the League of Nations and the absence of the United States. As global economic competition continues to intensify, the world's population rises toward 8 billion people, the arms trade grows unchecked, and global warming threatens food production, the seeds of war are increasingly abundant. Europe's and the United States' abdication of responsibility contributed to the crises in Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda for which the United Nations was scapegoated. Such human disasters justify strengthening the United Nations, not weakening it.

TITUS ALEXANDER
London, United Kingdom

PHONE HOME

To the Editor:

"Saving the U.N." states that the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of

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Outer Space "counts among its crowning achievements the passage of a resolution calling upon sovereign nations to report all contacts with extraterrestrial beings directly to the secretary-general." Senator Helms appears to be referring to the Declaration of Principles Concerning Activities Following the Detection of Extraterrestrial Intelligence, a non-U.N., nongovernmental document prepared by the International Academy of Astronautics and endorsed by several other international nongovernmental organizations.

The declaration is not an international agreement and is not binding on governments. Its purpose was to encourage astronomers who use radio telescopes to search for signals that may come from extraterrestrial civilizations to follow certain practices when handling an apparent detection. Those practices include verifying that the signal is real, notifying several international organizations and the general public if the signal is confirmed, and not sending a message to the detected civilization without international consultation. The declaration is open to signature by any organization or persons engaged in the scientific search for extraterrestrial intelligence.

MICHAEL A.G. MICHAUD

The author coordinated the drafting of the Declaration of Principles Concerning Activities Following the Detection of Extraterrestrial Intelligence

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

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